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ABSTRACT

A REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL REPORTING RESEARCH POST-GASB
34 AND INVESTIGATIONS OF GASB 54 FUND BALANCES
By Brent Roberts, PhD
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in Business (Accounting Concentration) at Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2019.
Director: Carolyn S. Norman, Professor of Accounting and Department Chair, School of
Business, Virginia Commonwealth University

My dissertation consists of three studies. My first study builds a literature review of state
and local general-purpose government financial reporting research after Governmental
Accounting Standards Board (GASB) Statement No. 34’s issuance in 1999. This review also
includes governmental bond and financial condition research that is related to financial reporting.
About 130 papers are cited and future research suggestions are given within my review. The
research referenced shows that governmental reporting information post-GASB 34 has shaped
studies’ investigations of financial reporting outcomes and associations, and will continue to
influence governmental reporting studies into the future.
My second study examines both the rearrangement of governmental fund balance
amounts after GASB Statement No. 54 and the factors associated with GASB 54 governmental
fund balance categories. Using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, I determine
several relevant findings. Even though the pre-standard governmental “reserved” fund balances
had a relatively predictable allocation to the updated GASB 54 fund balance types, pre-standard
“unreserved” fund balances had greater variance in allocation to the GASB fund balance
vii

categories. In my determinants analysis, general service charges and income per capita are
positively, while prior deficits, population, and unemployment are negatively related to GASB
54 governmental fund balance categories that have higher spending flexibility. The findings
suggest reporting consistency improvements with GASB 54 fund balance requirements, and that
there are specific factors that promote or hinder the accumulation of flexible fund balance types.
My third study examines the relationship between GASB 54 flexible fund balance types
and either future bond-specific outcomes or future revenue/expenditure compositions. My
analyses utilize pooled OLS regressions. The results demonstrate that future bond interest costs
decrease and bond ratings increase as the amount of either “unrestricted” or “unassigned”
governmental fund balances increase. Changes in flexible fund balances are also found to be
positively related to future operating expenditure changes, while negatively related to future
changes in property tax, service charge, and distinct types of intergovernmental revenues. These
results indicate that flexible fund balance information signals financial health which influences
both external entity decisions and future municipality financial planning.
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CHAPTER 1

A Review of State and Local Government Financial Reporting Research Post-GASB 34

1

ABSTRACT: Governmental Accounting Standard Board Statement No. 34, published in 1999,
updated the financial reporting model of state and local governments. As such, much of the
subsequent governmental accounting research has been shaped by this statement. This paper
conducts a literature review of state and local general-purpose government research investigating
financial reporting/disclosure choices and associations after GASB 34’s implementation. Within
this review, I also list papers related to two important and intersecting topics: Bonds and
financial condition. The research cited demonstrates the significant influence of GASB 34
reporting information on research, and that future research will continue to use GASB 34-related
measures to examine financial reporting outcomes and relationships.
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INTRODUCTION

The implementation of Governmental Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 34
(GASB 34) marked a monumental step in guiding financial reporting at the state and local
government levels (GASB 1999). This standard has had a substantial influence on much of the
state and local government research that focuses on financial information post-GASB 34. Since
governmental financial reporting researchers use and build measures based on financial
statement information, the updated financial reporting model has modified some existing, or
created new, figures and disclosures that shifts the focus of reporting analysis from prior
methodologies. Thereby, it is relevant to gather and list governmental accounting research papers
that concentrate on financial reporting and its direct associations after GASB 34’s publication
date. Accordingly, I provide a literature review of state and local general-purpose government
financial reporting research post-GASB 34.
GASB 34 was published in June 1999 as a culmination of desires to update the
governmental financial reporting model to better avoid inconsistencies or misleading disclosures
experienced in the past and to provide added usefulness to external financial statement users
(e.g., Patton and Hutchison 2013a; 2013b; Kinnersley 2016). The increased ability to hold
governments accountable by providing reporting information that better allows interested parties
to assess the current or changing financial condition was a major motivator for GASB 34 (e.g.,
Kravchuk and Voorhees 2001; Mead 2002). Thus, many features of GASB 34 were developed
for the purpose of heightened transparency and understanding for governmental stakeholders.
GASB 34 states that it “establishes new financial reporting requirements for state and
local governments throughout the United States” (GASB 1999). The major components of
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GASB 34 are a management’s discussion and analysis (MD&A) section, basic financial
statements, and required supplementary information (RSI). The MD&A “should introduce the
basic financial statements and provide an analytical overview of the government’s financial
activities” (GASB 1999). Thereby, knowledgeable government finance officers should give a
readable analysis for users to examine how the government’s financial condition either improved
or worsened over the fiscal year. There are several pieces of literature that examine MD&A
disclosures (e.g., Guo, Fink, and Frank 2009; Rich, Roberts, and Zhang 2016).
The basic financial statements should include the new government-wide financial
statements (i.e., statement of net assets and statement of activities) which use an accrual basis
and economic resources measurement focus to report all assets, liabilities, revenues, expenses,
gains, and losses of the entire government and separate governmental and business-type
activities (GASB 1999). Fund financial statements are also included in the basic financial
statements to display financial information about governments’ major funds, partitioned by
governmental funds (i.e., general fund, special revenue, capital projects, debt service, and
permanent funds) or proprietary funds (i.e., enterprise or internal service funds) (GASB 1999).
Research often uses financial ratios or account balances from the basic financial statements to
discover important associations (e.g., Wang, Dennis, and Tu 2007; Gore 2009). Notes to the
financial statements designed to give information “essential to a user’s understanding” should
additionally be part of the basic financial statements.
Finally, RSI should be provided, which includes budgetary comparison
schedules/information and requirements for governments using the modified approach for
infrastructure assets (GASB 1999). Vermeer, Patton, and Styles (2011) and Jordan, Yan, and
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Hooshmand (2017) are examples of infrastructure reporting and budgetary literature,
respectively.
There have been several governmental accounting literature reviews developed over the
past two decades. The literature review from Kim, Plumlee, and Stubben (2018) provides an
overview of U.S. government structure and background. Their paper also provides a review of
prominent governmental accounting literature from a broad variety of topics, along with data
sources to support future research.
Other governmental literature reviews have focused on selected overarching topics or
research methods. Kidwell and Lowensohn (2011) provide a literature review on behavioral
accounting research in the governmental setting. Budgeting and auditing were found to be the
most prominent topics for the examined period of 1991-2007. Reck, Wilson, Gotlob, and
Lawrence (2004) review governmental accounting research that focuses on capital market
consequences. Many of these studies look at how bond interest costs, ratings, or pricing are
influenced by auditing characteristics, financial information, and reporting regulation. Mullins
and Pagano (2005) highlight research on local government budgeting and finance over the last 25
years, especially those articles found in Public Budgeting & Finance. They focus on five areas
relevant to the past quarter-century and toward the future: (1) intergovernmental finance, (2)
general financial management, (3) general budgeting and budget reform, (4) alternative service
delivery, and (5) capital budgeting.
This literature review covers research on financial reporting at the state and local generalpurpose government levels after GASB 34’s implementation in 1999. 1 As such, I do not include

1

Specifically, I review research that includes at least some sample years including or after 2001. I select this date
because GASB 34’s mandatory effective date for governments with total annual revenues (excluding extraordinary
items) of $100 million or more is June 15, 2001 (GASB 1999).
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papers that focus on nonprofit organizations, special-purpose governments (e.g., school districts),
nor those examining the federal government. Since governmental auditing, pension or other
postemployment benefits (OPEB), and management-based performance research represents
broad topics on their own, I also omit governmental research that concentrates on these
overarching concepts. Finally, I do not cover research designated for practitioner journals for the
purpose of consistency. The cited papers are from either peer-reviewed journals or are in
working paper form.
This paper contributes to prior literature in four ways. First, this paper offers a literature
review on recent reporting research at the state and local government levels. As described earlier,
other governmental literature reviews were either broadly focused (e.g., Kim et al. 2018),
emphasized different methodologies (e.g., behavioral studies in Kidwell and Lowensohn 2011),
or research areas (e.g., capital markets in Reck et al. 2004). In comparison, my review delves
deep into government financial reporting-focused papers that mostly utilize archival methods
with some surveys, interviews, and case studies. My hope is to provide fellow researchers a
quick guide to finding relevant papers to aid in supporting their current governmental reporting
research efforts and possibly spark new ideas for future papers.
Second, my review includes research from a variety of academic journal sources. Many
pieces of governmental financial reporting research come from governmental accounting
journals (e.g., Baber, Gore, Rich, and Zhang 2013; Reck and Wilson 2014). However, public
administration and political science journals also offer valuable insights and papers dedicated to
state and local government reporting (e.g., Kloha, Weissert, and Kleine 2005a; Marlowe 2011).
Including various perspectives in my literature review shows the complementary environment
with those whom conduct governmental reporting research.
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Third, I provide insight into some key changes of GASB 34 that had an effect on research
conducted subsequent to its implementation. Many papers sought to discover how GASB 34
information changed reporting behavior and what factors were impacted by its measures (e.g.,
Johnson, Kioko, and Hildreth. 2012; Bloch 2016; Arapis and Reitano 2018; Beck 2018).
Finally, I also include research dedicated to two significant topics that are interrelated
with governmental financial reporting: Bond research and financial condition research. Each
topic has determinants and outcomes that are shaped by reporting information and characteristics
(e.g., Trussel and Patrick 2009; Palumbo and Zaporowski 2012; Pridgen and Wilder 2013).
The rest of this paper goes as follows. First shown is research dedicated to broad
evaluations of GASB 34 content and implications for future governmental accounting
researchers, including those in different financial reporting perspectives. Next, I display research
investigating governmental financial reporting and disclosure topics comprised of reporting
decisions, written disclosures, reporting associations, and disclosure perceptions. I then list
research dedicated to bond topics categorized into information environment, reporting decisions,
and additional factors subtopics. Afterward, research on financial condition topics is given
separated by either indicators or fiscal health associations. Finally, the conclusion section
provides a brief summary of my literature review and suggests some implications that follows
governmental financial reporting research.

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

OVERARCHING GASB 34 EVALUATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
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This section shows literature designed to inform researchers on key features and
implications of GASB 34. These research papers were typically written within a couple years
after GASB 34 was created as state and local governments were on the verge of implementation
(or even chose adoption early). Several governmental reporting experts cited afterward have
taken the lead to ready others for the various costs and benefits associated to GASB 34. These
commentary pieces help guide researchers to find new and interesting ideas within GASB 34’s
new financial reporting model.

[TABLE 1.1 ABOUT HERE]

The next three papers cited describe the historical developments that contributed to
GASB’s desire to create an encompassing standard to direct governmental financial reporting.
Past weaknesses of previous financial reporting models and information became rallying calls for
state and local governments to offer financial statements that were more transparent, more
accurate, and better disclosed financial condition changes and measures. Also importantly, the
new standards should hold governments’ financial managers more accountable.
Patton and Hutchison (2013a) describe how the financial reporting model for state and
local government has evolved over the past century or so. Past periods shifted the financial
reporting model in response to calls for accountability, measurement focus, aggregation, and
budgetary disclosure. The implementation of GASB 34 represents the culmination of reporting
needs over the past time period. The MD&A, basic financial statements (including governmentwide statements), and other required disclosures under GASB 34’s guidance is suggested to
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provide fiscal accountability through improved measurement, transparency, and governmentwide information.
Patton and Hutchison (2013b) study how developments (especially over the 15 years
prior to implementation) have shaped GASB 34. GASB utilized significant resources and
garnered perspectives from different financial users in order to create this overarching standard
for state and local government financial reporting. The diverse set of needs is suggested to be
addressed with government-wide and proprietary fund statements using an economic resources
measurement focus and full accrual accounting. The governmental fund statements should also
use a current financial resources measurement focus with modified accrual accounting. The
report should include a budgetary comparison schedule for actual-to-budgeted measurement as
well.
Kinnersley (2016) offers a historical literature review on the evolution of totals columns
reported on the balance sheets for state and local governments. Prior to GASB 34, a combined
totals column was either optional or prohibited due to concern of misleading users by combining
funds with different bases of accounting or including restricted assets. GASB 34 finally required
state and local governments to display a single consolidated total for all primary governmental
funds on the newly created Statement of Net Assets.
The next set of articles offers in-depth analysis of GASB 34’s content. They showcase
the major components and changes mandated by GASB 34. Several give pros and cons that state
and local governments will likely face when preparing and presenting their financial information.
The standard’s implications are also provided to emphasize how different perspectives (e.g.,
governments, citizens, and bond analysts) will view this new disclosure format. Some of these
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papers offer suggestions for future research based on GASB 34’s updated reporting
requirements.
Mead (2002) highlights key features of GASB 34 and assesses how GASB 34 addresses
accountability between state and local governments and its citizens. GASB 34’s new model
“comprises of (1) MD&A, (2) basic financial statements, and (3) other required supplementary
information.” New government-wide reporting and MD&A requirements should better explain
current levels of and changes in financial condition and give governmental financial managers
more flexibility in describing the reasons for such conditions and changes to improve
understanding. The implementation of GASB 34 is suggested to have benefits that outweigh its
costs.
Kravchuk and Voorhees (2001) outline and provide commentary on the new financial
reporting model prescribed by GASB 34. They suggest GASB 34 is an “effort to enhance overall
accountability” for state and local governments through requirements designed to apply private
sector standards in a governmental entity setting. Two groups believed to benefit the most from
the new model are financial intermediaries and citizens. Even though the new accrual-based
government-wide statements, comparative budgeting, and MD&A are claimed to improve
financial information understanding and clarity, significant additional costs may burden
governments in presenting this updated information according to GASB 34.
Patton and Bean (2001) assess why and how GASB 34 changed reporting requirements
for capital assets. An underlying goal of GASB 34 was to increase statement users’ awareness
and understanding of a state or local government’s measures reflecting operational accountability
through the implementation of new government-wide financial statements. An economic
resource flow measurement method would be utilized with such disclosures as all capital assets
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reported on the government-wide statement of net assets and all expenses (including
depreciation) for capital assets reported on the government-wide statement of activities.
Wilson and Kattelus (2001) comment on potential implications of how GASB 34’s
reporting models could influence decisions of both municipal managers and municipal bond
analysts. They suggest that by requiring new statements that provide added operational
accountability (such as the government-wide statements), managers’ disclosures of their
government’s short- and long-term financial condition can improve understanding. Bond
analysts should make improved decisions by acquiring knowledge of how efficient and effective
a government’s finances are being managed through GASB 34’s disclosures. However, some
managers may face a steep cost in reporting the information required by GASB 34.
Wallace (2000) provides a brief overview of GASB 34 and presents many potential
GASB 34-related research opportunities as the standard is newly adopted. The suggested future
research encompasses many research methodologies including archival, experimental, survey,
and field study. The article offers potential research questions in a variety of overarching topics,
such as valuation, new disclosure presentation (and perceptions about), budgeting, auditing, and
outside influences. The lack of accessibility is suggested to hinder the usefulness for citizens.

REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE TOPICS

As GASB 34 requires an updated format of reported financial information, governmental
finance officers will accordingly make financial disclosures based on this guidance. These
disclosure decisions include accounting methods (e.g., modified or depreciation methods for
infrastructure assets), classifications (e.g., governmental fund balances), and written disclosures
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(such as those found in the MD&A section). Researchers have subsequently used GASB 34based financial measures and disclosures (sometimes found in new financial statements such as
government-wide Statement of Activities) to find a wide variety of relationships. Additionally, a
range of financial statement users and stakeholders will judge the usefulness of the mandated
financial information presented in their accountability or sustainability assessments of their
governments.
I break this section into four categories of research falling under reporting and disclosure
topics. In order of presentation, the four categories are: (1) Reporting decisions, (2) written
disclosures, (3) reporting associations, and (4) disclosure perceptions.

Reporting Decisions
This section displays papers that examine governmental reporting or disclosure choices.
Some of these choices can occur based on accounting regulation or guidance (e.g., GASB 34).
These can range from GAAP adoption to infrastructure reporting methods. Governments also
have accessibility options to connect stakeholders with financial information. Additionally,
government finance officers may also make discretionary reporting choices to garner favorable
outcomes.
Three studies investigate implementation decisions involving either GASB 34 or the use
of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). The researchers find different
government characteristics associated with accounting adoption choices.

[TABLE 1.2 ABOUT HERE]
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Patrick (2010) studies how the decision to adopt GASB 34 is shaped by government size
with samples of local governments in Pennsylvania. Survey responses from local governments
indicate that either smaller or rural governments were less likely to adopt GASB 34 after the
suggested state deadline for government type. Local governments with greater occupational
specialization (as proxied by in-charge person job title) and those using independent CPAs to
perform their annual audits were more likely to adopt GASB 34.
Carroll and Marlowe (2009) test the associations between municipal accounting policies
and types of stakeholders on 375 municipalities in Illinois from the fiscal year 2002. Multivariate
tests show that the municipal bond market (as proxied by the issuance of debt by the
municipality) and the federal government (as proxied by the total amount of federal
intergovernmental revenue) are stakeholders significantly related to the use of GAAP.
Khumawala, Marlowe, and Neely (2014) survey local governments to study if GAAP
adoption is related to accounting credentials, degrees, and financial reporting awards. An
empirical analysis of the usable 357 responses from non-GAAP-required states reveals that
having degreed accountants or receiving the GFOA’s certificate of achievement for excellence in
financial reporting is associated with the adoption of GAAP. They suggest that political and
economic responses might not explain GAAP adoption decisions as well as accounting
professionalism.
Another financial reporting choice found in recent research involves the accessibility of
the actual financial reports themselves. The following two studies focuses on how reporting users
can obtain financial statements and which statements are available.
Styles and Tennyson (2007) investigate the accessibility for external report users to
retrieve CAFRs though the government’s website with a sample of randomly selected 300
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municipalities partitioned into three by population size. The analysis shows that large
municipalities are more likely to place their financial reports online than medium or small
municipalities. Additionally, municipalities having higher incomes per capita and those receiving
GFOA’s Certificates of Achievement for Excellence in Reporting have a higher probability of
online financial reports. Municipality size, income per capita, debt per capita, and financial
position were also positively related to ease of accessibility to retrieve the online reports.
Yusuf, Jordan, Neill, and Hackbart (2013) surveyed the largest cities and counties (also
every state capital city) in 2010 to identify reporting practices for PAFRs. The 52 usable
responses indicated that 75 percent of local governments have issued popular financial reports
(such as PAFRs and budget summaries). The decision to issue popular reports appears to be
driven by the desire to provide citizens with important information and increase transparency and
accountability.
The next three papers examine governmental financial managers’ discretion for financial
reporting. Specifically, these papers look at whether finance managers can and do strategically
report financial information to achieve desirable outcomes. This aspect is synonymous with
earnings management in the corporate environment. Such findings would suggest that
government finance managers have incentives to report information strategically.
Beck (2018) investigates the use of discretionary accruals within both full accrual and
modified accrual financial statements by a sample of 232 Californian municipalities with
populations over 30,000 for years 2008-2013. The results indicate that municipalities use
discretionary accruals prior to bond offerings and to avoid deficits. Although, less discretion is
used during increased creditor scrutiny or when discretion of modified accrual statements would
be more detectable.
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Felix (2015) uses 103 municipalities with population over 25,000 from 2001-2003 to
examine whether inter-fund transfers are utilized to manage changes to the general fund balance
toward zero. The findings indicate that inter-fund transfers are managed toward a zero general
change regardless of whether the pre-managed balance change is positive or negative. Moreover,
the use of inter-fund transfers occurs more frequently with municipalities having greater
stakeholder oversight and the strong-mayor form of government.
Gore (2015) studies if unionized municipalities can hide amounts within less transparent
fund balances with a sample of 3,427 observations from 728 municipalities. Analyses
demonstrate that unionized municipalities, compared to nonunionized municipalities, have lower
proportions of unreserved general fund balances and higher proportions of fund balance outside
of the general fund, suggesting motivation to avoid displaying significant discretionary funding
resources.
As shown in the research afterward, yet another accounting choice involves the usage of
slack resources. These resources may be either designated by stabilization funds (to protect
against economic shortfalls) or simply holding sufficient amounts of unreserved fund balances
(as an optional safety net). Choosing to build or utilize slack comprises thoughtful consideration
of the goals (and perceptions) of the state or local government.
Gianakis and Snow (2007) investigate the use of stabilization funds and GAAP-basis
unreserved general fund balance (as proxied by free cash) in local Massachusetts governments.
Results indicate a weak relationship between the two major sources of slack resources.
Municipalities were found to prefer decreasing free cash rather than using stabilization funding
in the presence of reduced state aid.
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Snow and Gianakis (2009) surveyed 74 municipalities in Massachusetts in 2006 to
discover their strategies involving stabilization funding. Respondents indicated that stabilization
fund balances were deemed important to maintain for bond ratings and fiscal responsibility, and
thus finance officers were hesitant to utilize the stabilization funds for revenue shortfalls or
unexpected expenses. Some municipalities used stabilization funding to finance capital projects
or in the presence of revenue emergencies.
Stewart, Hamman, and Chapman (2018) use fiscal year 2015 to analyze fund balance
policies in all 102 Illinois county governments. The analysis shows only 18 percent of Illinois
counties have formal reserve policies regarding unreserved/unassigned fund balances (e.g.,
minimum balances, replenishment, or spending guidelines). Larger and wealthier counties are
found to be more likely to adopt fund balance policies—though only one county met all of the
GFOA’s unreserved fund balance recommendations.
The last two studies in this section investigate choices in specific reporting contexts.
Infrastructure asset reporting in GASB 34 allows governments to choose between the modified
approach and depreciation method. Internal service funds, on the other hand, give governments
an accounting option for cost allocation.
Modlin (2011) studies if the use of internal service funds (ISFs) has declined in a sample
of 97 surveyed county governments in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee.
Respondents’ results show that only 27 percent of counties used ISFs for cost allocations.
Counties with larger budgets or cost allocation plans were more likely to use ISFs. The lack of
use was attributed to interdepartmental functions or reconciliations that account for the costs.
Vermeer et al. (2011) examine how state governments disclose general infrastructure
assets post-GASB 34 using CAFRs between 2001 and 2008. They find that many states lacked
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detailed disclosures on retroactive capitalization, such as which infrastructure assets were
retroactively capitalized, the retroactive period used, and cost measurement basis used. For the
sample period, 56 percent of states used depreciation accounting while the remainder used the
modified approach for reporting their infrastructure assets. In a follow-up contact with state
controllers/comptrollers, depreciation accounting tended to be used when the state lacked an
adequate asset management system for the modified approach.

Written Disclosures
Related to reporting choices is the discretion to present verbal or written information
designed to provide users explanations or clarifying content. The intent of written information is
for knowledgeable governmental finance managers to provide useful disclosures for reporting
users to make appropriate assessments of the government’s current or changing financial
condition (GASB 1999). These written disclosures can be found either in required notes to the
financial statements or in more descriptive sections (like the MD&A or transmittal letter). As
well, the popular annual financial reports (PAFRs) are designed to be “less detailed and are often
intended for users whose financial reporting needs are better satisfied through condensed
information” (GASB 1987). The following study analyzes the quality of these written
disclosures.

[TABLE 1.3 ABOUT HERE]

Guo et al. (2009) use a content analysis to explore the degree and characteristics of
disclosure quality differences with 43 Floridian cities over 50,000 in population. Examining the
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MD&A for fiscal years 2006-2008, they find that these larger cities vary significantly in
disclosure quality. Also, higher disclosure quality cities provided deeper MD&A descriptions
regarding financial and socioeconomic conditions and benchmarks, including comparisons at the
regional, state, and federal level. Lower disclosure quality cities tended to omit significant details
of financial condition and trends, suggesting more boilerplate information was provided.
The following set of five studies predominantly focuses on readability of financial reports
or MD&A sections. These research pieces suggest that a sufficiently low reading grade level will
increase the usefulness of information by increasing citizens’ understanding.
Marsh, Montondon, and Daniels (2004) analyze the readability of 78 fiscal year 2001
PAFRs that won an award from the GFOA. They find that the average page length was
approximately 13 pages and contained slightly over one image per page. The mean readability
measures show that between a 9th and 11th grade reading level is needed for these PAFRs. These
findings suggest that local governments should reduce the reading level and communicate in a
more simplified writing style to better disseminate information to citizens.
Marsh, Montondon, and Kemp (2005) use 84 MD&As from municipalities in 2003 to
determine the readability of MD&As post-GASB 34. The results indicate that the mean
readability grade level for MD&As ranges from 8.7 to 12.9. Notably, smaller cities tended to
have MD&As with a higher readability level than larger cities.
Marsh and Montondon (2005) compare the readability of the same 84 MD&As from
Marsh et al. (2005) to the readability of 78 local government award-winning PAFRs. As PAFRs
are designed for citizen users, a surprising finding is that most of the readability measures used
did not find significant differences between PAFRs and MD&As. However, MD&As were found
to be more likely to use passive voice, longer sentences, and longer words.
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Lutz, Marsh, and Montondon (2011) analyze 2001 MD&As from five of each small (total
revenues less than $10 million), medium (total revenues between $10 million and $100 million),
and large (total revenues greater than $100 million) cities to discover if readability differences
exist between groups. They do not find evidence of MD&A readability differences between the
three size groups of cities, but an average 12th grade reading level is required for comprehension.
There is evidence of differences between groups for sentence complexity.
Yusuf and Jordan (2017) assess MD&As’ citizen accessibility with a sample of state
CAFRs from 2009 to 2012. They use a composite measure of accessibility blended from
document length, readability, and timeliness components. The analysis shows that state MD&As
average 13.2 pages (5,916 words), were issued an average of 203 days after fiscal year-end, and
all had readability levels above 12th grade. These results suggest MD&As of this period are too
long, unreadable, and untimely for most citizens, which creates a lack of transparency and
accountability.
The final three section papers deal with the linguistic tone and textual similarity of
written disclosures. These studies investigate various associations related to positive or negative
language choices (specifically within the MD&A section) or factors that are related to MD&A
textual year-over-year changes.
Rich et al. (2016) measure the linguistic tone of MD&As within 362 municipalities for
the fiscal year 2011 to predict future financial reporting quality. They find that greater positive
tone in the 2011 MD&A is associated with less future financial reporting delay after controlling
for current reporting timing and municipality governance, demographic, and financial factors. As
well, municipalities receiving GFOA’s Certificate of Excellence in Financial Reporting tend to
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have timelier future financial reporting, while municipalities with higher unemployment have
less timely future reporting.
Rich, Roberts, and Zhang (2019a) examine determinants of MD&A tone and the
relationship between MD&A tone and future internal control quality with the 362 municipality
sample described in Rich et al. (2016). The determinants analysis shows that MD&A tone is
positively associated with the council-manager government form, citizen educational
achievement, and intergovernmental revenue, whereas tone is negatively associated with general
fund deficits and reporting delay. Additionally, evidence is found that positive (negative) MD&A
tone is related to fewer (greater) future internal control issues.
Rich, Roberts, Wall, and Zhang (2019b) explore the factors associated with MD&A yearover-year content changes using a sample of 1,141 municipality MD&As from 2011 to 2015.
The findings note that larger changes in unemployment rate and the occurrence of auditor
turnover are related to more MD&A textual changes. Municipalities in states with GAAP
requirements and those with debt changes tend to have greater textual MD&A similarity.
However, greater textual change in the MD&A is also found to be associated with disagreement
between bond rating agencies.

Reporting Associations
As I move from different reporting decisions (including written choices), I find research
that investigates various associations between financial information and other attributes.
Specifically, these associations could be with government characteristics (e.g., population or
government type), financial conditions (e.g., fund balances, financial slack, revenue sources,
fiscal distress), or external reactions (e.g., credit ratings). Furthermore, the strength and direction
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of these associations may differ in times of recessionary forces. Since the following studies are
post-GASB 34, some of the financial information investigated will be unique to the new
governmental reporting model.

[TABLE 1.4 ABOUT HERE]

This section’s first five papers explore and demonstrate relationships between financial
reporting quality and budgeting. These studies show that reporting quality can be either
measured in terms of negative events (such as reporting lag or restatements). The other research
cited examines budgeting and future revenue/expenditure outcomes or reporting characteristics.
Sohl, Waymire, and Webb (2018) model the factors associated with total and bifurcated
reporting lag in 1,693 Illinois local governments in fiscal year 2014. Respective lagged delays
are found to predict fiscal year-end to audit report delay, audit report to state comptroller
submission delay, and total delay in both general and special purpose local governments. General
purpose governments tended to have greater total delay while select audit factors were
significant in bifurcated delays. The authors suggest tools such as eXtensible Business Reporting
Language (XBRL) to improve reporting and reduce audit report to state comptroller submission
delay.
Rich and Zhang (2016) study if accounting restatements are related to an increased
likelihood of financial manager turnover with 138 municipalities from 2001 to 2004. Compared
to a matched control sample without restatements, the analysis indicates that municipalities are
more likely to experience finance director turnover subsequent to a restatement. The results
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suggest that material accounting reporting failures are undesirable and can lead to managerial
changes.
Costello, Petacchi, and Weber (2017) examine state balanced budget restrictions on fiscal
decision-making over a period between 2001 and 2010. The findings show that states with
stricter balanced budget provisions tend to participate in asset sales, inter-fund transfers,
spending cuts, and tax increases when financial stress occurs. Furthermore, spending cuts and tax
increases are prioritized for smaller deficits, whereas a combination of all four fiscal actions
occur for larger deficits.
Marlowe (2009) analyzes how overspending budgets increase future budgeted
expenditures (i.e., a ratcheting effect exists) within the 1993-2007 period for about 350
Minnesota cities. The results show an increase in budgeted expenditures following an
overspending in the prior period. Cities with higher levels of financial slack in total general fund
balance reduces the ratcheting effect, whereas higher slack found in unreserved general fund or
enterprise fund balances sometimes increase the ratcheting effect.
Jordan et al. (2017) explore how revenue compositions affect 47 states’ revenue
variances from 2007 to 2011. The findings indicate that more diversified revenue structures
reduces both the occurrence likelihood and the magnitude of a negative revenue variance. Even
though revenue elasticity also reduces the magnitude of the negative revenue variance, the
probability of occurrence is increased.
The next two papers look into tax and expenditure limitation impacts on local
government. Both studies suggest negative effects from increases in tax and expenditure
limitation strictness.
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Jimenez (2018) investigates how states’ tax and expenditure limitation rules on local
governments impact city budgetary solvency. Using a sample of 560 cities with population
greater than 50,000 during fiscal years 2006-2012, the analysis shows lower unrestricted net
position and change in total net position when a state has greater tax and expenditure limitation
stringency. The relationship with change in net position is strengthened during recessionary
periods between 2009 and 2011.
Maher, Stallmann, Deller, and Park (2017) examine how state reserve balances are
associated with tax and expenditure limitations between years 1992 and 2010. They find
marginal evidence that combined revenue and expenditure limits or separate expenditure limits
have a negative relationship with total reserves. Democratic or mixed government control is
found to have smaller total reserves and budget stabilization funds. Revenue volatility positively
(while intergovernmental revenue percentage negatively) relates to state reserve balance types.
The subsequent two studies explore GASB 34 infrastructure asset reporting. Adoption of
these reporting requirements are shown to shape future capital assets. The accounting method
chosen (depreciation method or modified approach) can also be a significant influence.
Kim and Ebdon (2017) assess whether 47 states’ highway capital spending and
maintenance expenditures were influenced by GASB 34 infrastructure reporting and/or the
reporting method used in sample years 1995 to 2009. Their findings show that GASB 34
requirements increased capital spending and total expenditures, but not capital maintenance
expenditures. States using the modified approach were not statistically different on capital or
maintenance spending from states using the depreciation method.
Kim, Chen, and Ebdon (2018) extend Kim and Ebdon (2017) by investigating whether
infrastructure quality is increased by GASB 34 infrastructure reporting implementation or chosen
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infrastructure method with 45 states from 1995 to 2009. They find that state highway quality was
higher after using GASB 34’s infrastructure reporting. The modified approach is associated with
higher infrastructure quality than the depreciation method is.
The next set of research focuses on governmental financial slack. The first five papers
find financial, government, and socioeconomic factors associated with levels of cash holdings
and fund balances. Afterward, two articles that assess outcomes of financial slack are cited.
Gore (2009) examines determinants of expected cash holdings from 9,413 municipalityyear observations from 1997-2003. The results show that municipalities hold more cash when
their revenues variation, growth, and scarcity of revenue sources is higher. On the opposite side,
municipalities hold less cash when they are larger in population and receive more state revenue.
Potential agency issues are also tested and the analyses indicate that municipalities with
additional cash spend more on administrative expenses and management’s salaries and bonuses,
but not in cutting taxes.
Arapis and Reitano (2018) use 103 Florida cities between 2005 and 2012 to examine the
factors associated with financial savings behavior. Most sample cities are shown to have
maintained their unassigned general fund balance levels (i.e., not falling below the GFOA’s
recommendation). Results indicate that higher property taxes, population, and debt service
expenditures increased the likelihood of falling below the GFOA’s recommendation; while net
enterprise transfers, general government expenditures, and wealth decreased the probability of
falling below the recommendation.
Stewart, Phillips, and Modlin (2013) explore how revenue streams and volatility affect
savings levels in Illinois, Mississippi, and North Carolina counties between 2005 and 2010.
Unreserved fund balances are found to be directly associated with property tax,
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intergovernmental, and other revenues. Additionally, conservative ideology is shown to be
positively related with unreserved balances, while unemployment, greater non-white population,
and greater white-collar employment are negatively related with unreserved balances.
Guo and Wang (2017) examines determinants and spatial relationships with unreserved
fund balances in 2007-2011 Florida counties. The 66 counties are shown to maintain higher
unreserved balances when revenue volatility and property tax rate are higher (or when
unincorporated population is lower). Unreserved fund balance relationships are also somewhat
dependent on neighboring counties own levels of property tax rates, unincorporated population,
and intergovernmental revenues.
Stewart (2011) extends Stewart (2009) by investigating whether government type (“unit
systems” with separated political and administrative responsibilities similar to a council-manager
form or “beat systems” with fused political and administrative responsibilities) determines the
level of savings within unreserved fund balances within Mississippi counties. The author
suggests that counties in Mississippi with unit systems tend to have larger populations and
affluence than those with beat systems. During times of resource abundance, unit systems
increased savings when intergovernmental increased and decreased savings with higher per
capita income, while beat systems had the opposite effect. Both systems increased savings when
property taxes increased and decreased savings when debt per capita or population increased.
Hendrick (2006) investigates slack resources found in unreserved fund balances and the
subsequent effect on fiscal condition and decision-making on a sample of 264 municipal
governments within the Chicago metropolitan area between years 1997 and 2003. Unreserved
fund balances are found to be related to revenues less expenditures, the magnitude of
expenditures, and long-term fiscal conditions. Results also indicate that the effect of slack
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resources reflect current fiscal conditions by accumulating slack when conditions worsen in
order to reduce risk factors.
Su and Hildreth (2018) test whether the level of financial slack impacts the likelihood of
issuing short-term note debt in 478 California cities from 2003 to 2011. Holding higher levels of
unreserved fund balance is shown to reduce both the probability of note issuance and the
issuance amount. Further analysis demonstrates that salary expenses and long-term debt
positively increase their reliance on short-term borrowing.
From a different perspective, the next two research pieces offer insight into how creditors
use financial information. They find significant governmental financial measures and
characteristics that are considered within credit ratings.
Johnson et al. (2012) examine how credit rating agencies utilize ratios and information
from financial statements post-GASB 34 implementation. Based on states’ financial information
from 2002 to 2005, they find evidence that credit ratings incorporate government-wide
information. Credit rating agencies are also found to prefer conducting primary financial
analyses based on the general fund instead of the entire government.
Davies, Johnson, and Lowensohn (2017) study whether restricted and unrestricted net
assets contain nonfinancial factors of interest to credit raters with a sample of 256 local
governments with populations more than 100,000 for fiscal years 2007-2011. These liquid net
assets are found to relate positively with property values, net asset changes in business-type
activities, and the mayor-council form of government, but negatively with violent crime,
unemployment, and non-pension postemployment benefit liabilities.
The subsequent two papers explore the outcomes of new fund balance requirements.
Created in 2009, GASB Statement No. 54 (GASB 54) “establishes fund balance classifications
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that comprise a hierarchy based primarily on the extent to which a government is bound to
observe constraints imposed upon the use of the resources reported in governmental funds”
(GASB 2009). Thus, the following research mostly focuses on how older fund balances shifted
into the GASB 54 categories.
Chase and Roybark (2013) provide an overview of GASB 54 and elaborate on the
standard’s effect on fund balance reporting. They suggest that GASB 54 should promote a more
consistent application of governmental fund reporting and disclosure, and thereby offer more
understandability and information content regarding resources. An analysis of local Virginia
governments shows only a minimal increase from the 2010 unreserved fund balances to the new
2011 unrestricted fund balances (or 2010 unreserved-undesignated to the 2011 unassigned).
Kelly (2013) analyzes how budget stabilization could be impacted by GASB 54’s
guidance on fund balance disclosure. Additionally, the CAFRs of 187 cities with populations
between 100,000 and 250,000 in fiscal year 2011 were collected to investigate the distribution of
the two past fund balance categories into the five recent fund balance categories. Results indicate
that formerly reserved fund balances (and 32% of formerly unreserved balances) are allocated to
the newer nonspendable, restricted, committed, and assigned fund balances. With only fiscal year
2010 reserved fund balances, these are allocated 21% to nonspendable, 6% to restricted, 43% to
committed, and 62% to assigned fund balances for fiscal year 2011. However, these findings also
raise questions on how allocated fund balances will be used and for which purposes.
The following papers examine financial reporting research under recessionary periods.
Three articles examine the historical or simulated effects of a recession. The remaining papers
shown study possible governmental characteristics or reporting balances in a recessionary
context or investigate differing reporting reactions to economic downturns.
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Plummer and Patton (2015) examine how government-wide financial measures are able
to assess fiscal sustainability for states in fiscal year 2008. Adjusted total net assets (assets less
capital assets, liabilities, and obligations) is suggested to estimate the extent revenues have
covered costs over the past and current periods. Most states are found to have a negative adjusted
total net assets balance, suggesting payments for costs are being shifted to future periods and
harming fiscal sustainability. The adjusted total net asset deficit averages $1,000 per household
in 35 states, and $10,000 per household in 15 states.
Snow, Gianakis, and Fortess (2008) use revenue data from 2000 to 2005 to simulate
recessionary effects on all 351 Massachusetts municipalities to test how well these municipalities
can cope with economic downturns given their revenue growth and slack resources. The
simulation reveals that 55 municipalities (about 16 percent) could not endure a high severity
recession. These vulnerable municipalities may have too much state-aid reliance, significant
nondiscretionary expenditures, little property tax revenue growth, and/or lack of stabilization
funding in order to handle substantial recessions.
Ross, Yan, and Johnson (2015) analyze CAFRs from 2005 to 2011 from the 35 largest
cities to establish how well cities weathered the Great Recession. A primary finding is that the
total governmental or general fund revenue amounts for these cities remained relatively stable.
Many cities had less revenues from other sources and intergovernmental transfers due to the
recessionary period, but results point to cities utilizing a combination of raising property taxes
and reducing their net assets to minimize deficits.
Stewart (2009) examines determinants of unreserved fund balances for Mississippi
counties both in times of relative resource abundance (1995-1999) and relative resource scarcity
(2000-2004). Unreserved fund balances were found to have significant variation and tended to be
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higher in times of abundance and lower in times of scarcity. Property tax revenues and per capita
income were positive determinants of unreserved funds, while population change was a negative
determinant during abundance periods. Under scarcity times, population change was a positive
determinant, and governments with separated political and administrative responsibilities had
less unreserved funds. Debt per capita was a significant negative determinant to unreserved funds
in both times.
Wang and Hou (2012) examine both the what factors influence counties’ general fund
balance levels and how those levels affect expenditures during recessionary periods. Using all
100 North Carolina counties from 1990 to 2007, they find that property taxes, local option sales
taxes, and county wealth positively impact general fund balances, whereas capital outlays and
unemployment negatively impact general fund balances. The results also demonstrate that
general fund balance does not significantly influence expenditure gap (i.e., difference between
actual and projected expenditures) during periods of economic downturn.
Sacco and Busheé (2013) investigate the revenue and expense directional change
responses to the 2001 and 2007 recessions for 30 cities with populations between 100,000 and
250,000. Starting in 2003 (after the 2001 recession), net assets generally increased steadily until
2007. The 2007 recession caused net assets to drop as revenues declined more quickly than
expenses decreased. Analysis of five sample cities’ MD&As reveals disclosures (including
graphs) suggesting public safety expenses and general government spending increases even
during recession, meanwhile infrastructure assets are significantly lowered.
Stewart, Hamman, and Pink-Harper (2017) utilize 101 Illinois counties from 2000 to
2010 to investigate whether prior financial slack stabilizes future county expenditures. The
results show prior unrestricted governmental activity fund balance limits the subsequent
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expenditure gap in periods of economic downturns. The relationship is insufficient during
economic upturns.
Rivenbark, Afonso, and Roenigk (2018) utilize a sample of 471 North Carolina
municipalities between fiscal year 2006 and 2013 to assess how the Great Recession affected
both depreciable capital assets and the capital asset condition ratio. Recessionary years only had
a slight negative effect on the amount of depreciable capital assets. However, univariate analysis
indicates that accumulated depreciation outpaced depreciable capital assets in the capital assets
condition ratio over the sample period.

Disclosure Perceptions
I wrap up the recent research on financial reporting topics with a section on the
perceptions of state and local government financial reporting. Research on reporting reactions is
important as it shapes subsequent reporting choices, and potential future accounting standards
(e.g., the voices that brought forth GASB 34). These perceptions may be from the governmental
management’s (i.e., finance officer) or external users’ perspectives (e.g., citizens or municipal
analysts). The following papers gather their perceptional data via either survey or interview
research methods.

[TABLE 1.5 ABOUT HERE]

The first set of four research papers collects perceptions directly about GASB 34. Since
GASB 34 changed the way state and local governments report their financial information, it is
important to assess if reporting managers and external users deem the standard to have improved
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the reporting environment. As well, these perceptions can weigh in on the cost-benefit argument
of new GASB 34 requirements.
Frank and Gianakis (2010) sent a survey in 2007 to chief financial officers of cities with
populations of at least 50,000 to gather the perceptions of the new reporting model required by
GASB 34. They found that finance officers often disagreed that the new model was more helpful
for bond raters and in raising concern for budgeting or financial condition. However, the MD&A
is considered to be successful in reporting factors affecting financial condition. Some
respondents deemed the cost of the new reporting model to exceed the benefits. Though the
authors suggest some of the negative perceptions may be due to lack of experience with the new
accrual basis of accounting.
Lu (2007) analyzes the pre- and post-GASB 34 CAFRs of Georgia state government and
interviews managers within Georgia’s Department of Audits and Accounts to determine how
GASB 34 impacts financial reporting. Helpful new features such as the MD&A, two different
government-wide statements, and reconciliation between governmental fund and activities are
deemed to have potential in improving accountability. Interview respondents also perceived
financial statement structure under the new reporting model easier to follow.
Frank, Gianakis, and McCue (2005) research finance officers’ perceptions of GASB 34
implementation in improving forecasting by surveying a random sample of 1,600 cities and
counties with populations over 35,000 in 2001. The association between GASB 34
implementation and enhanced forecasting is found when local governments utilize forecasting
software and have finance directors with advanced degrees.
Bloch (2016) sent a survey to members of the National Federation of Municipal Analysts
(NFMA) in 2013 to get their perceptions on whether the new information required by GASB 34
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improved governmental financial reporting quality and better reflected governments’ financial
position. A total of 107 of usable respondents indicated that, while financial reporting
information and transparency has improved, the need to communicate with government officials
to reduce uncertainty remains. Also, fund financial statements are deemed more useful than
government-wide financial statements for municipal analysts. The survey additionally finds that
the MD&A is considered the most valued new component of GASB 34, except when it contains
boilerplate information.
Outside of the perspectives on GASB 34, the following research delves into perceptions
of other financial reporting aspects. Financial users can range from professionals (as in the first
four papers) to citizens (in the last two papers). These papers gather responses on such items as
reporting rationale, usefulness, accountability, and timeliness.
Fischer and Holmes (2018) survey 159 accounting and finance professionals to gather
their perceptions on tax abatement reporting and information preferences. The majority of
respondents considered tax abatements as a good way for cities to encourage new business and
create new jobs. Even though respondents indicated that some of GASB 77’s tax abatement
required information was important, they also thought several disclosures not required by the
statement were important as well.
Hunt, Freeman, and Marsh (2014) sent a questionnaire to members of the 2005 list of
NFMA to gather perceptions of fair value reporting within fund financial statements. 142
respondents viewed cost information about investments in the fund financial statements to be as
valuable as the respective fair value information. Fair values for other assets and liabilities was
perceived negatively. These findings suggest the current preference for fair value information
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and elimination of cost information for investments may not be favorable for municipal analysts,
and thereby disclosure should retain both cost and fair values.
Kloby (2009) interviews chief financial officers from ten cities who were sustained
recipients of GFOA’s PAFR awards program from 2002 to 2005. Interviewees felt that popular
reports are beneficial in providing a “quick reference” to communicate important financial
management information and build citizen’s confidence in such information. These financial
officers are perceived as having significant flexibility in determining the report’s style and
content. Citizen-based financial reporting is deemed to increase accountability but not
necessarily to promote further citizen participative budgeting.
Mead and Marlowe (2011) investigate both the length of time that governments take to
issue their CAFRs and if issuance time affects the usefulness of information using random
samples of state and local governments from 2006 to 2008. They find that state and local
governments average between 174 and 199 days from fiscal year-end to issuance date. Survey
results from 194 members of the NFMA, Governmental Research Association (GRA), and
National Association of Legislative Fiscal Officers (NALFO) in 2010 highlight that information
usefulness decreases very rapidly with lengthier information delay. About 88 percent, 43 percent,
and 9 percent of respondents felt that information received within 45 days, within 90 days, and
within 180 days, respectively, was “very useful.”
Yusuf, Jordan, Franklin, and Ebdon (2017) conducted a 2010 survey to residents of seven
cities within the Hampton Roads region of southeastern Virginia to measure citizens’ views
regarding local government financial disclosure and responsibility. They found that residents
rated informational transparency and accessibility very high, but their cities tend to use passive
methods for disseminating popular financial reports. Fiscal accountability was rated near the
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national average. Despite being given opportunities for citizen participation in budgeting, cities
were found to not extensively seek out participants nor were required to formally incorporate
participants in the process.
Jordan, Yusuf, Mayer, and Mahar (2016) conducted focus group interviews and followup questionnaires in 2012 of Virginia citizens to explore citizen users’ perceptions of
governmental financial reporting. Participants indicated that they preferred to know about
revenues over expenditures, and taxes over fees. Citizens expressed some concern over a lack of
timeliness of useful information, suggesting that interim reporting of important financial
conditions and outcomes, when relevant, may be more beneficial for understanding and
awareness than reporting solely in the released financial statements.

Directions for Future Research
As governments issue their financial reporting, there is a question on how governments
promote their financial reports. Some governments provide their financial reports online, but
each may differ on where the reports are placed on their websites (or even placed in state auditor
websites) (e.g., Styles and Tennyson 2007; Yusuf et al. 2013). The number of years of financial
statements also differ between governments. Could struggling governments be more likely to
hide their CAFRs in difficult to locate webpages on their site (or provide fewer years of reports)?
A survey could gather perceptions of report availability, while an archival study could examine
debt consequences of report availability.
Gore (2015) finds that unionized municipalities are more likely to hide amounts in
obscure funds. The findings of Felix (2015) suggest governments aim to reduce general fund
balances to zero through inter-fund transfers. These studies point to certain types of governments
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preferring to utilize fund management strategies. Specific government characteristics (e.g.,
council-manager form or finance officer professionalism) could be associated with fund
management. As well, fund management could be more likely or more material prior to certain
decisions (e.g., prior to significant debt issuance(s) or election cycle).
Even though the general fund is a significant information source, (e.g., Johnson et al.
2012) do other fund types provide information content to outside parties? There may be
significant determinants of fund types like proprietary or special revenue funds. Such balances
could also highlight interesting relationships to important consequences (e.g., impacts to
municipal debt or intergovernmental revenues). Additionally, economic conditions could
influence fund allocations (e.g., Stewart 2009). Thus, are certain fund categories neglected (or
preferred) during economic downturns or upturns?
Several studies have looked at readability measures on governmental reporting (e.g., Lutz
et al. 2011), but stakeholder perceptions could indicate different reactions to readability or
textual features. A survey could answer if there are citizen perception differences between
governments with more readable statements (e.g., CAFRs or PAFRs) and those with less
readable statements (e.g., Yusuf et al. 2017). Moreover, do average local education levels match
the readability of financial reports? Municipal analysts could also react (e.g., with bond interest
costs or ratings) to different textual characteristics in the MD&A or other explanatory
disclosures.
Lu (2007) demonstrates that several states provide oversight on local governments and
deem GASB 34 to have aided their cause. However, a survey could help indicate what state
oversight authorities look at when assessing local government reporting. Specifically, are there
preferred areas or measures within the CAFRs that help judge local financial conditions? A
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survey or interview method could gather insight into what responses occur if states are (or are
not) satisfied with the local government reporting and financial assessment.

BOND TOPICS

Warranting its own overarching topic within this literature review is research
investigating relationships with governmental debt. Much of this literature follows how financial
information influences debt issuances (sometimes referred to credit quality). Common bond
indicators include bond ratings and true interest costs (TIC). Research has suggested that bond
measures reflect governments’ financial condition information (e.g, Marlowe 2010; Pridgen and
Wilder 2013). Thus, state and local governments with healthy finances should receive better
bond ratings and lower interest costs, while those with unhealthy finances should receive worse
bond ratings and higher interest costs. Besides research examining bond measures reactions from
governmental financial information is research exploring the endogenous opposite side where
government reporting managers choose accounting methods and presentation choices based on
perceived debt market effects. Additionally, credit ratings may also be affected by other
governmental characteristics, conditions, and external factors.
This bond topics section is partitioned by three categories: (1) Information environment,
(2) reporting decisions, and (3) additional factors.

Information Environment
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This section cites research that examines how bond indicators are related to various
financial disclosures and other relevant information. This information environment includes
GASB 34 specific disclosures and financial reporting health or signaling.

[TABLE 1.6 ABOUT HERE]

The first six papers cited use the implementation of GASB 34 to find associations with
updated financial information and bond consequences. Overall, it appears GASB 34-related
ratios and disclosures provide incremental information to primary and secondary bond markets.
Marlowe (2010) explores if GASB 34 information provides differences to pricing within
both the primary and secondary bond markets using municipality fixed-rate general obligation
bonds from 2003 to 2007. The results show that government-wide financial information is not
significantly more helpful than fund-based measures in primary market pricing. Conversely,
government-wide financial information is found to be substantially helpful in secondary market
pricing.
Kioko, Moldogaziev, and Johnson (2013) investigate if GASB 34-related measures
impact the pricing of debt securities in secondary markets with a sample of 34,002 bond-week
observations for fixed rate general obligation bonds between 2005 and 2010. The analysis
reveals that net position and revenues minus expenses predicts the average secondary market
bond pricing. However, the effect fails to hold over the long run. Informed investor pricing
appears to utilize information from business-type activities and governmental activities, while
uninformed investor pricing relies on revenues less expenses.
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Pridgen and Wilder (2013) expand upon Plummer, Hutchison, and Patton (2007) by
investigating if GASB 34 government-wide financial measures are associated with default risk
using 2005 data from 409 municipalities participating in the GFOA’s award program. 2 Financial
position, financial performance, leverage, and liquidity measures are found to predict underlying
debt ratings. Three additional net asset components (unrestricted net assets, restricted net assets,
and investments in capital assets net of related debt) are also related to debt ratings.
Benson and Marks (2014) used a sample of 274 insured general obligation bond
issuances from 114 Texan cities to investigate whether new GASB 34-related measures impact
bond ratings and bond insurance premiums. They found that unrestricted net assets and invested
in capital assets less related debt (both scaled by population) positively affect bond ratings and
bond insurance premiums. The results also show that revenues minus expenses per capita is not
significantly related to the aforementioned debt variables.
Reck and Wilson (2014) investigate the incremental effect of GASB 34 government-wide
accrual and modified accrual information in explaining bond default risk. Results demonstrate
that the government-wide accrual financial information model explains more towards net interest
costs than the pre-GASB 34 general fund model. However, including aggregated modified
accrual information does not appear to improve the government-wide accrual model.
Callahan and Waymire (2015) examine how GASB 34’s budget-to-actual variance
disclosures relate to bond ratings with a sample of 190 city-year observations from fiscal year
2003 to 2006. CAFR data suggests that municipalities strive towards small favorable variances
for revenues, expenditures, and the difference between revenues and expenditures. A positive
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Plummer et al. (2007) investigate if GASB 34’s government-wide information is associated with default risk (as
proxied by underlying debt rating) for a sample of 530 Texas school districts for fiscal year 2002.
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association is found between bond ratings and favorable expenditure variances, while a negative
association exists between bond ratings and either favorable or unfavorable revenue variances.
The remaining papers in the section investigate financial reporting signaling on bond
outcomes. Results of these studies suggest that the bond market responds to signals of
governmental strength or weakness (or uncertainty).
Amrahova, Bluestone, Hildreth, and Larson (2017) examine whether fiscally healthy
municipalities have higher bond issuance yields in the secondary market. They use a sample of
50 cities over 200,000 in population and find that municipality fiscal health has a small impact
on secondary bond market yield (a 0.283 percent increase in average yield per 1 percent increase
in the measure of fiscal health). The timing of the CAFR release is found to not influence the
yield.
Baber and Gore (2008) explore municipal debt issuances with a sample of municipalities
from 25 states that explicitly declared annual financial reporting requirements (GAAP or no
requirement) in years 1995-2002. The results show no significant differences in debt usage
between municipalities in GAAP states and those in states without mandated reporting. Also,
municipalities in GAAP states have lower TIC and utilize more public debt over private debt
than municipalities in states without reporting requirements.
Gore, Henderson, and Ji (2016) examine if internal control weaknesses affect municipal
bond markups (the difference between underwriter agreed reoffering price and dealer price). The
analysis uses a sample of 551,083 tax exempt and fixed coupon rate municipal bonds dated
between 2005 and 2013 to find a relationship between larger markups and internal control
material weaknesses, especially when there is greater information asymmetry between issuer and
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investors. Furthermore, bonds issued by municipalities with material weaknesses take longer to
sell.
Charles and Shon (2018) utilize 1,920 state bond issuances from 1984 to 2007 to test how
debt levels affect bond borrowing costs. The level of state debt is found to be insignificantly
associated with future true bond interest costs. General obligation bonds, callable bonds, bond
buyer index, taxable bonds, and maturity years increase borrowing costs, whereas competitively
sold bonds decrease borrowing costs.
Baber et al. (2013) examine the relationship between accounting restatement and
municipal governance or debt characteristics with 207 municipalities for fiscal years 2001 to
2004. They find that TIC increases following the disclosure of a financial restatement. The
relationship is strengthened when municipal governance is poor, when audit oversight is low, or
when municipal manager entrenchment is high. Following a restatement, municipalities tend to
use less debt and prefer issuing secured debt as compared to unsecured debt.
Beck, Johnson, and Parsons (2018) develop a measure of information ambiguity (the
extent to which bond ratings are verifiable) to see if bond yields are affected by ambiguity. They
use 1,372 general obligation bonds from 78 randomly chosen municipalities. The findings
demonstrate that both magnitude and direction of ambiguity effects bond ratings and yields.
Specifically, negative ambiguity results in steeper penalties for bond yields than the gradual
rewards during positive ambiguity.

Reporting Decisions
This next section displays research investigating how bond consequences relate to
financial reporting decisions. These reporting decisions include accounting method/policy
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choices and financial statement timeliness. The findings of the selected papers reveal that
governmental finance managers may improve/weaken their bond indicators through different
reporting choices.

[TABLE 1.7 ABOUT HERE]

The two studies below investigate if the choice of infrastructure asset reporting method
has an effect on bond indicators. Each study finds that the bond market has a slight preference
for the modified approach over the depreciation method.
Benson and Marks (2017) examine whether the method of reporting infrastructure assets
is associated with state bond ratings over fiscal years 2011 through 2013. Between the
depreciation method and the modified approach, results indicate that bond ratings are shaped by
the interaction between infrastructure asset reporting approach and government-wide accounting
measures. Specifically, unrestricted net assets per capita (for Moody’s) and invested in capital
assets less related debt capita (for Standard and Poor’s, also known as “S&P”) interact with the
modified approach indicator to determine the effect on state bond ratings.
Bloch, Marlowe, and Mead (2016) assess if the infrastructure asset reporting method used
influences the secondary bond market. With a sample of secondary market auctions of municipal
bonds from 2013 to 2014, they find that states using the modified approach have 24 percent
lower bid spreads on bond auctions than states using depreciation approaches.
The next three studies measure governmental debt indicators association with slack
resources or equilibrium spending. Even though additional slack shows a degree of fiscal health,
the results point to little or no significance on impacting bond ratings.

41

Marlowe (2011) examines the effect of slack level on credit ratings for a sample of 514
general obligation bond issues from 2007 to 2010 for local governments. Results suggest that
slack has only a small influence on credit quality. Smaller, resource-lacking governments can
lower the likelihood of a lower rating by 7 percent by holding some slack compared to none.
Larger, resource-abundant governments can increase the probability of a top rating by 9 percent
by holding a high level of slack compared to a low level of slack.
Grizzle (2010) studies whether budget stabilization funds influence the credit ratings of
general obligation bonds. Using state-level data from 1997 and 2006, the results show that weak
deposit rules (withdrawal rules) are associated with lower (higher) bond ratings. However,
budget stabilization fund type and size does not appear to affect bond ratings.
B. Apostolou, G. Apostolou, and Dorminey (2014) use a sample of 3,285 county-level
general obligation bonds between 1995 and 2007 to investigate the relationship between
borrowing cost and equilibrium spending. They find that TIC is lowest when general fund
revenues match general fund expenditures. As spending diverges from the equilibrium point, the
relative increases in interest costs rise faster when expenditures exceed revenues than for when
revenues exceed expenditures.
Three studies shown afterward explore if timeliness or availability in financial reporting
is a significant factor in improving credit quality. Under the assumption that less timely
information is less useful, the studies reveal that delayed financial information can be costly to
governments. Online availability of reporting and information may further improve timeliness.
Henke and Maher (2016) explore the relationship between financial reporting timeliness
and bond rating/debt costs with a randomly selected sample of 500 general obligation bonds
from 373 state and local governments from either 2013 or 2014. They find that less timely
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reporting is associated with lower bond ratings. Yields are also positively related to reporting
delay. Reducing reporting delay by 64 days (from the 75th to the 25th percentile) is found to result
in a lower interest cost by 6.8 basis points.
C. Edmonds, J. Edmonds, B. Vermeer, and T. Vermeer (2017) investigate whether the
timeliness of financial reporting influences initial bond rating and yields with a sample of 1,058
general obligation bonds from cities and counties. They find that municipalities receive lower
bond ratings and initial yields as total information delay (combined audit and post-audit delay)
grows. Additionally, a high default risk creates an even larger debt cost related to untimely
information.
Wang (2012) investigates how states’ online financial information (specifically CAFRs
and budget reports) affects debt costs. With 535 state general obligation bond issuances from
1986 to 2009, the analysis shows that providing online budget reports lowers TIC. The
relationship between online CAFR and TIC is, however, insignificant.
Instead of examining bond outcomes based on reporting information, the section’s final
paper below looks at how bond characteristics shape future financial reporting. Results provide
evidence of disclosure reductions following bond upgrades, perhaps indicating less need to
explain poor economic conditions.
Gillette, Samuels, and Zhou (2018) assess if bond rating upgrades influence municipality
financial disclosures. Using 21,085 municipality issuer-years observations from 2009 to 2014,
they find that upgraded municipalities after Moody’s 2010 ratings recalibration had less financial
disclosures compared to those rated by S&P and not recalibrated. Higher underwriter’s clientspecific knowledge and regulatory oversight minimize (and higher ex-ante issuer information

43

demand expand) the disclosure reduction relationship for municipalities with upgraded bond
ratings.

Additional Factors
This final bond research section looks at studies that investigate bond indicator
associations with other factors outside of financial reporting information or decisions. More
precisely, the associations are related to governmental demographic or bond characteristics and
bond insurance factors.

[TABLE 1.8 ABOUT HERE]

The following nine papers explore whether certain characteristics or factors help explain
credit quality. These characteristics can stem from municipal demographics or state policies, as
well as those characteristics found in the bond itself (including the rating agency and
competition). Additionally, bond characteristics can lead to other debt-related decisions.
Palumbo and Zaporowski (2012) model determinants of bond ratings using 965 cities and
counties with Moody’s ratings in 2002. They find that income per capita, population growth,
change in worker earnings, and economic base diversity is positively related to bond ratings,
while unemployment rate is negatively related to bond ratings. Additionally, full faith and credit
debt as scaled by population-weighted median housing value and per capita revenue are
positively associated with bond ratings, but state aid per capita and state tax and expenditure
limits are negatively associated with bond ratings.
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Daniels, Ejara, and Vijayakumar (2010) use a sample of 27,116 tax-exempt city or county
bonds in years 1990-2004 to find the determinants of municipal debt maturities. The analysis
indicates that higher rated bonds tend to have longer debt maturities than do lower rated bonds.
Despite this finding, and that revenue bonds are found to have longer maturities, the relationship
between revenue bond rating and debt maturity is negative.
Butler and Yi (2019) examine how population aging influences bond issuance costs with
134,465 general obligation bonds issued by state and local governments from 1991 to 2016. The
analysis demonstrates that a one standard deviation increase in proportion of population over 65
years old increases bond yield spreads by about 23 basis points. Furthermore, reduced income
tax revenues and increased pension obligations/healthcare liabilities explain about half of the
relationship’s effect.
Downing and Zhang (2004) examine how trading volume relates to price volatility with
219,902 municipal bond-week observations between 2000 and 2002. Their results show a
positive association between bond trading frequency and its price volatility. Yet the findings also
indicate that bond price volatility is negatively related to the average transaction size.
Ely, Martell, and Kioko (2013) use a sample of 4,144 insured bond issuances in Texas
between 2000 and 2009 to investigate the structure of municipal bond credit rating fees. They
find that higher rating fees are related to an issuance’s complexity and periods of market
uncertainty. Individual rating fees can be lowered with a prior relationship with a credit rating
agency or by purchasing multiple ratings. The Fitch rating fees appear to be slightly cheaper than
either S&P or Moody’s.
Allen and Dudney (2008) examine whether the S&P’s or Moody’s rating has a greater
effect on primary issue pricing using 12,562 municipal bond issues between 1986 and 2002.
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Their sample indicates that Moody’s rates more issuances and tends to give more conservative
ratings compared to S&P’s, though Moody’s superior market share has declined in the sample
period’s later years. They also find that Moody’s ratings influenced bond yields more than
S&P’s ratings; however, there is no significant difference in the latter half of years in the sample
period.
Robbins and Simonsen (2007) explore if bond interest cost differences are found between
bonds sold with and without competitive bidding. With a sample of 161 individual bond issues
from Missouri municipalities from May 2004 to May 2005, they find that only 11 percent of
municipal bond issues were subjected to competitive bidding. Bonds with competitive bidding
are found to have less TIC than those without competitive bidding.
Butler (2008) examines if the in-state presence of an investment bank leads to
comparative pricing advantages for municipal debt. Using a sample of 2,191 taxable municipal
bonds from 1997 to 2001, results demonstrate that investment banks with an in-state presence
charge municipalities lower debt fees and issue bonds at lower yields compared to investment
banks without an in-state presence (especially for lower rated or non-rated bonds). This suggests
that investment banks with an in-state presence have a comparative advantage through
incremental information from local connections.
Singla and Luby (2019) explore the factors associated with debt-related derivatives
between 2003 and 2010 for 50 large U.S. cities. Greater amounts of recently issued bonds, lower
credit ratings, and prior derivative experience are all shown to lead to greater use of debt-related
derivatives. Financial condition ratios and the form of government generally does not lead to
more debt-related derivative usage.
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I also cite some research that looks at how bond insurance factors into bond ratings and
debt costs. As well, historical data provides some evidence of important bond trends and
recessionary effects.
Brune and Liu (2011) study how municipal bonds are affected by historical insurance
company downgrades that occurred during the 2008 financial crisis. A sample of 2,540 insured
municipal bonds with maturity dates between 2009 and 2038 are analyzed. The measure of bond
risk premium is found to have increased during two of three insurer downgrades during the
crisis. Furthermore, bonds insured by other insurance companies also suffered from heightened
risk premium from each of the historical insurer downgrades.
Ely (2012) models bond insurance premiums and usage with a sample similar to Ely et al.
(2013). The analysis shows that credit spreads between higher and lower rated bond issuers have
increased over time, suggesting lower rated local governments faced greater debt costs than
before. Also, local governments with higher ratings are significantly more likely to have access
to bond insurance than those with lower ratings during crisis periods.
Liu (2012) develops a model to establish if municipal bond premiums can predict future
bond ratings. With a sample of 720 California municipal bonds issued from 2001 to 2005, the
analysis indicates that higher municipal bond insurance premiums have explanatory power on
future rating downgrades after controlling for current ratings. The association does not hold for
future rating upgrades.

Directions for Future Research
Previous literature has investigated internal determinants of debt (e.g., Palumbo and
Zaporowski 2012). Factors outside of government finances and characteristics could also be
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associated with debt. For example, bonds ratings could be associated with intergovernmental
transfers either positively as a higher governmental entity as showing a stake in the local
government or negatively as a sign of distress with reliance on outside funding. Debt risk could
also be influenced by local publicity (e.g., after a tragic event/scandal or good news).
Many debt investigating studies use objectively reported measures to assess debt
consequences (e.g., Kioko et al. 2013; Pridgen and Wilder 2013). However, textual disclosures
could provide incremental information to municipal analysts. Thereby, subjective disclosures
found in the financial report could influence bond interest costs or ratings (e.g., Maher and Deller
2011). Do analysts also detect any optimism (or pessimism) within governmental finance officer
disclosures?
Daniels et al. (2010) study the determinants of bond maturities. A potential continuation
could occur from how governments pay for the debt at maturity. As a bond reaches its maturity
date, how specifically do governments plan to cover the debt principal? Issuing more debt,
utilizing funding reserves, or implementing tax increases are several strategies that could be used
to cover the proceeds needed to close the bond obligation.
Future research could also investigate if municipal analysts recognize debt or reporting
trends. Specifically, do bond yields and ratings reflect governments’ information trends?
Disclosure trends such as continual positive (negative) budget-to-actual variances (e.g., Callahan
and Waymire 2015) could demonstrate long-term stability (instability) to bond analysts. Debt
frequency (or maturity) trends may signal overreliance, long-term uncertainty, or structural
growth that could affect debt costs.

FINANCIAL CONDITION TOPICS
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Often measured by various ratios and composite methodologies from financial reporting
information, financial condition is another important topic of research within this literature
review. Several papers build and test their financial condition models or critique existing
measures. Financial condition can result in external reactions or internal assessment. Establishing
an accurate financial condition may allow overseeing governments to appropriately react to or
prevent extreme fiscal distress. Certain government characteristics may contribute to poor
financial condition. Moreover, unsustainable finances may eventually lead to a government’s
bankruptcy. However, some common financial condition methodologies might misclassify the
fiscal health of governments due to unique or non-measurable factors. Case studies may better
analyze the individual factors associated with fiscal distress.
I separate the financial condition topics into two categories: (1) Indicators and (2) fiscal
health associations.

Indicators
Financial condition indicators seek to identify whether a state or local government has
sustainable financial management practices or is at risk to encounter fiscal distress from
unsustainable practices. Governmental reporting models (i.e., GASB 34) can offer support on
short- and long-term condition. Researchers have developed their own financial condition
indicators based on numerical and subjective data to assess prediction value. State governments
may also use their own systems to monitor local governmental fiscal health.

[TABLE 1.9 ABOUT HERE]
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With GASB 34’s updated financial reporting model, the authors in the following six
studies have chosen to develop updated governmental financial condition measures and assess
governments using these measures. More precisely, they are utilizing the information content
contained within GASB 34-based statements as enhanced financial condition indicators to detect
a government’s strengths and weaknesses.
Kloha et al. (2005a) critique previous indicators of local government fiscal distress and
build a composite ten-point binary model to predict fiscal distress in Michigan local governments
from 1993 to 2001. Their model appears better able to detect early warnings of fiscal distress
than Michigan’s current detection system. They suggest local governments could better monitor
their own financial condition before extreme distress occurs, rather than rely on state monitoring.
Rivenbark, Roenigk, and Allison (2010) analyze the financial reporting model prescribed
by GASB 34 and develop a framework for assessing the financial condition of state and local
governments. Their framework suggests measuring financial condition with aspects of both fund
and government-wide indicators, both accrual and modified accrual resources, and including
considerations of the flow and stock of resources. They view dashboards as an essential tool to
minimize unnecessary data while communicating financial condition to stakeholders regardless
of their knowledge of governmental accounting/reporting.
Kioko (2013) presents indicators of financial condition using GASB 34 information to
study how states fared over the period 2002-2010. The analysis indicates that states had the best
operating and financial positions between 2004 and 2007, while having the worst operating and
financial positions between 2009 and 2010. The recessionary effects appear to have hurt larger
states more than smaller states (partially due to selected smaller states having significant natural
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resource revenues and sustainable long-term debt). Weaker states’ financial positions postrecession is found to have downgraded bond ratings.
Wang et al. (2007) measure state financial condition based on GASB 34’s governmentwide reporting using state financial data from 2003 to 2004. They find that cash, budget, longrun, and service-level solvency dimensions based on GASB 34 provide a relatively reliable and
valid financial condition measure. They notice that short-term and long-term indicators are
interrelated in assessing the overall state fiscal condition. As well, states are found to have strong
cash solvencies, while varying significantly in other solvency areas.
Wang and Liou (2009) study how states’ financial condition changed over fiscal years
2003-2004. Results of the financial condition change analysis indicate budgetary solvency
improved over the time span, while cash solvency worsened (but remained healthy). They also
determine that the budgetary solvency improvement is related to long-term and service solvency
improvements.
Arnett (2014) builds a composite measure of fiscal condition to rank each state using
2012 CAFR data. By weighting several solvency measures targeting cash, budget, long-run, and
service-level aspects, the results indicate that the top states better balance their budgets by
matching revenues with expenses, carry sufficient liquid assets to cover short-term debt, and
have adequate strategies to manage long-term debt. The worse states tend to have one or more
fiscal condition aspects poorly managed creating an unsustainable scenario.
A couple papers cited afterward critique prior measures of financial condition. Both
recommend specific refinements or considerations of governmental characteristics to increase the
validity of detecting financial condition.
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Clark (2015) examines the validity and reliability of the composite financial condition
index developed by Groves, Godsey, and Shulman (1981). With a sample of 117 Ohio
municipalities from 2004 to 2010, the results show the financial condition index is inconsistent
in both reliability and validity. Results also show a similar pattern when divided into the four
separate sub-indices (cash, budget, long-run, and service). A more tailored indicator is suggested
to be more beneficial than developing a universal financial condition measure.
McDonald (2017) tests several financial condition measures using 150 municipalities
from the Fiscally Standardized Cities (FiSC) database. Both debt service ratio and cash ratio had
significant bankruptcy prediction power. The Brown 10-point test (Brown 1993) is found to not
be statistically significant in predicting bankruptcy decisions, while the financial condition index
from Wang et al. (2007) only showed significance in its deconstructed form. The author suggests
indicator systems that utilize a series of variables are more meaningful for describing financial
condition than systems that utilize an index.
Beyond the usual indicators built from numerical figures, two studies examine descriptive
indicators of financial condition. They attempt to find if these descriptive indicators align with
other commonly used financial condition measures (see above papers).
Maher and Deller (2011) investigate whether self-reported descriptive indicators of fiscal
condition align with commonly used measures with a sample of 320 Wisconsin municipalities
for years 2004 to 2007. The results of financial and survey data show that subjectively reported
fiscal indicators are only slightly associated with the objectively used common fiscal condition
measures. They suggest that their findings may be a result of commonly used measures being
inadequate proxies or municipalities may strategically or unintentionally overestimate their fiscal
condition.
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Maher and Deller (2013) further Maher and Deller (2011) by using financial data from 55
Wisconsin counties’ CAFRs from 2009 to examine if self-reported descriptive indicators of
fiscal condition are related to government-wide indicators from GASB 34’s guidance. Similar to
their 2011 study, they find that subjectively reported financial condition indicators have a small
association with government-wide ratios and measures. However, this sample and period
demonstrated more significant relationships between subjective measures and the measures used
in their other study (e.g., financial position, liquidity, and support rate).
The remaining research papers suggest an extension to the use of financial condition
indicators with state monitoring of local governments. Since state governments are a stakeholder
in their local governments, the research cited proposes that early detection of local government
financial condition could help states strategize and plan potential aid. These papers assess the
extent and effectiveness of state monitoring.
Kloha, Weissert, and Kleine (2005b) survey every state on how they use indicators and
monitor their local governments’ financial conditions. Respondents indicated that only 15 states
used some indicators to assess their local governments. Although, some respondents voiced a
desire to further their role in measuring and predicting local fiscal distress. They suggest the
current mix of indicators for early warning detection may still lead to Type II errors in failing to
identify local governments before financial distress occurs.
Spreen and Cheek (2016) examine if state monitoring influences their local governments’
fiscal condition with a sample of Michigan counties and municipalities between years 2006 and
2011. Using local governments from neighboring states as a non-monitoring group, they find that
Michigan’s Fiscal Stress Indicator System had minimal impact on their local government’s fiscal
condition as compared to the control group from neighboring states. However, they suggest early
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detection could allow states to provide their local governments assistance before extreme duress
occurs.
Crosby and Robbins (2013) assess Michigan’s municipal fiscal indicator monitoring
system and provide recommended changes for more effective measurement. Michigan’s measure
that focuses predominantly on the general fund shows that only between 8 and 18 percent of their
cities are under fiscal watch and between 1 and 2 percent of their cities are under fiscal stress for
years 2007 to 2009. Using the same sample of cities, they test a proposed ten-point indicator
system incorporating governmental and business-type activities and find significantly more cities
under fiscal strain (between 34 and 36 percent under fiscal watch and between 5 and 7 percent
under fiscal stress) than what Michigan’s indicator shows. This new fiscal indicator is suggested
to better detect municipalities’ ability cover both current and long-term debt.
Gerrish and Spreen (2017) test financial condition ratios in North Carolina local
governments from 2008 to 2014 to assess the effects of the state’s financial benchmarking and
monitoring tool implemented in 2010. The results indicate an isomorphic effect after 2010 where
the mean of many financial condition indicators remained steady, but standard deviations and
interquartile ranges narrowed. Moreover, a significant number of top performing governments
decreased financial condition following state monitoring.

Fiscal Health Associations
In this section, the research presented examines measures or signals of fiscal health.
Several of the studies test how well their models correctly predict fiscal distress/bankruptcies or
subsequent outcomes. Some research tests the regulatory or political environment’s effect on
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fiscal health. Other papers investigate associations between fiscal health and government
characteristics or financial information.

[TABLE 1.10 ABOUT HERE]

Seven papers below assess how financial information and government factors indicate
fiscal distress. Several reporting attributes and economic conditions are found to predict
impending distress. Certain government financial officer behaviors and spending decisions can
occur in the presence of fiscal health. Also, state action may arise from poor local government
fiscal health.
Gorina, Joffe, and Maher (2018b) select a sample of municipalities with the period 20072016 to analyze how fiscal ratios predict fiscal distress. They find evidence that unreserved
general fund balances and unrestricted net assets reduce the likelihood of municipal defaults and
bankruptcies. However, the relationship is negative for long-term liabilities and unemployment
rate. They also identify the 60 municipality-year observations with the highest predicted
likelihood of fiscal distress.
Trussel and Patrick (2009) develop and test a model of fiscal distress with a sample of
19,126 Pennsylvania municipality-year observations over years 1998 through 2005. Their fiscal
distress model constructed from hypothesized risk factors (such as revenue concentration and
debt) is found to correctly classify 91 percent of sample municipalities. Increases in
intergovernmental revenue, lack of revenue growth, decreases in administrative costs, and
increases in debt usage all increase the risk of financial distress.
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Beck and Stone (2017) critique the findings of past research on the determining factors of
failing governments. They also use GASB data to add some rationale on identified contributing
factors and highlight some weaknesses on existing going concern processes. They suggest
municipalities generally do not exclusively fail via only fiscal stress, but rather due to both not
adapting to changing conditions and lacking in opportunities and services that citizens expect.
Their promoted implication is that going concern disclosure guidance should include service
efficiency to enhance evaluating financial condition and recommendations about dissolutions.
Modlin and Stewart (2014) determine the factors within North Carolina counties that are
associated with receiving a fiscal distress notification from the state government. Analysis shows
that 34 out of the 100 sample counties received a fiscal distress notice in fiscal year 2009.
Counties with greater salaries and wages, debt service payments, and the presence of a
countywide water policy had increased the likelihood of receiving a state notice of potential
financing problems requiring immediate action. However, having higher unreserved general fund
balances decreased this fiscal distress notice probability. A majority of counties corrected their
financial issues after receiving the notice.
Trussel and Patrick (2013) develop and test a model of public service reduction with a
survival analysis. Using a sample of 37,688 municipality-year observations from 1995-2007,
their fiscal distress model correctly classifies 83 percent of sample municipalities that either
reduced public services or not. The findings demonstrate that municipalities are more likely to
reduce public services when the percentage of intergovernmental revenue rises, the amount of
debt rises, and the amount of capital spending to total liabilities and bond proceeds lowers.
Gorina, Maher, and Joffe (2018a) use a sample of about 300 city and counties from
California, Michigan, and Pennsylvania from 2007 to 2012 to test if CAFR data is associated
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with personnel-based signals of fiscal distress. The results show that both a reduced proportion
of fiscal reserves to spending (i.e., cash solvency) and an increased proportion of debt to total
revenue (i.e., long-term solvency) lead to an increased likelihood of fiscal distress. Also,
property tax reliance reduces the likelihood of fiscal distress, while budgetary solvency, socioeconomic factors, and government type appear uninformative.
Singla, Stritch, and Feeney (2018) investigate whether financial condition changes impact
cities’ entrepreneurial orientation (e.g., risk-taking and innovation). Using a 2012 survey of local
government managers and financial report data from 2008 to 2014, they find that changes in
unabsorbed resources (i.e., operating ratio) are related to a lower entrepreneurial orientation.
Since absorbed resource changes (i.e., net asset ratio) do not significantly affect entrepreneurial
orientation, the author suggests government managers react to meet short-term resource
expectations.
The next two articles explore how regulatory restrictions and bureaucracy affect
municipal fiscal health. Both factors are suggested to impact municipalities’ financial conditions.
Jimenez (2017b) utilizes a sample of 268 cities with at least 50,000 in population to
assess whether surveyed public managers’ external networking orientation (i.e., stakeholder
communication frequency) is related to fiscal health during the Great Recession (years 20082010). Results indicate that both perceptions and CAFR-based ratios of budgetary solvency are
associated with external networking. Specifically, the analysis show a nonlinear relationship
where some external networking improves government fiscal health while too much external
networking deteriorates fiscal health.
Jimenez (2017a) analyzes the effect of bureaucracy on fiscal health. With the same
survey sample as Jimenez (2017b) and including CAFRs from 2007 to 2013, budgetary solvency
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appears worse as the level of composite bureaucracy index increases. Within the bureaucracy
index, centralization (i.e., city manager authority) and formalization (i.e., rule and procedure
documentation) are significant factors in the relationship. The factor of hierarchy (i.e., number of
authority layers) is insignificant.
Shown below are two studies that use historical data to examine the value of models to
predict bankruptcies. Findings demonstrate that fiscal indicators are often unreliable at predicting
bankruptcies ex-ante.
Singla, Comeaux, and Kirschner (2014) examine whether bankrupt cities were more
financially distressed according to current fiscal health indicators than others using a sample of
three Californian cities from 2008 to 2012. As compared to 58 other cities with comparable
populations, the current models shows that the three bankrupt cities were more financially
strained than the sample median, but were not significantly different from some other financially
strained cities that avoided bankruptcy. They suggest current fiscal health indicators may not be
sensitive enough to predict bankruptcy (or may omit certain financial considerations like
unfunded pensions or OPEB liabilities).
Fischer, Marsh, and Bunn (2015) study the fiscal health of bond issuers using 85 Texas
state and local municipal entities that issued bonds in 2011 or 2012. They find that only one
entity is considered financially distressed according to Z-scores, however, ten entities (including
some of the largest cities) are considered in a financial gray zone. Additionally, only a weak
negative correlation is found between Z-scores and bond rating.
As shown previously, an overarching measure of financial condition may inappropriately
categorize whether a government is in fiscal distress. A more tailored research method may be
needed to correctly identify each government’s level of fiscal distress. Thereby, case studies are
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relevant to detect individual sources of financial decline. The two studies cited below specifically
used the Detroit area to locate specific contributing factors to municipality fiscal distress.
Stone, Singla, Comeaux, and Kirschner (2015) use a case approach to assess the
effectiveness of current financial condition indicators. By calculating financial indicators for
Detroit between fiscal years 2002 and 2012, they find that many indicators saw a gradual decline
or no concern. Leverage, taxes per capita, revenues per capita, and expenditures per capita were
the only indicators showing a sharp decline. Asset and liability, operating solvency, and business
type activity categories of indicators were most effective in identifying Detroit’s deterioration.
Clark and Gorina (2017) use a case study investigation of three Detroit area
municipalities to assess the effectiveness of emergency financial management in addressing
fiscal distress. Using CAFR data from these three municipalities, they find that emergency
financial management is able to improve financial condition in times of economic depression.
However, most improvements are short-term fixes. They suggest that administrative reforms and
long-term development investments are needed to improve financial condition in the long-run.

Directions for Future Research
States monitoring local financial conditions provide some influence on local
governments’ financial decisions and reporting (e.g., Crosby and Robbins 2013; Spreen and
Cheek 2016). On the opposite perspective, what reactions do states have in monitoring local
financial conditions? By monitoring local financial conditions, states may be more likely to issue
state aid to supplement shortfalls. States may also recognize deficiencies in specific local
government characteristics or fund types and choose to provide more restrictive-purpose
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intergovernmental funding. Conducting a survey could confirm states’ reactions, including how
these officials communicate with local finance officers on local financial condition inquiries.
In examining factors that relate to local government financial failures, Beck and Stone
(2017) find that the inability to adapt and fulfill opportunity expectations contributes to fiscal
distress. A survey design could assess how different outside stakeholders feel governments
should handle and prevent fiscal distress. Such findings may indicate what sacrifices citizens or
local businesses might be willing to make to minimize or prevent local government fiscal
distress. Additionally, would these perceptions align with finance officers’ actions (e.g., Gorina
et al. 2018a)?
As fiscal distress factors are found to be associated with service reductions (e.g., Trussel
and Patrick 2013), are there priorities to where cutbacks are made? In other words, there may be
certain fund types that are preferred or neglected (or even eliminated) during fiscal distress.
Furthermore, do governments with better financial condition create or devote more resources to
specific fund types?

CONCLUSION

This paper offers a literature review containing financial reporting and disclosure
research in the state and local general-purpose government context after GASB 34’s
establishment. The review also lists research on governmental bonds and financial condition,
which are two topics interrelated to governmental financial reporting. As GASB 34 updated the
financial reporting model for state and local governments in 1999, much of the subsequent
research investigating financial reporting choices and associations has used measures uniquely
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transformed by GASB 34’s guidance. Taken as a whole, GASB 34 reporting has not only shaped
governments’ finance managers’ reporting choices, but also the reactions of external users (e.g.,
citizen perceptions or bond market consequences) and how we measure governmental financial
condition (or fiscal distress).
There are several implications brought to light within my literature review. The
substantial impact of GASB 34 on financial reporting information suggests that user reactions
and reporting choices are based on different priorities before and after implementation. Thereby,
research results prior to GASB 34 may not generalize to periods after implementation, and viceversa. This could entail some added noise to research findings that sample both periods pre- and
post-GASB 34 (so controlling for post-GASB 34 could be helpful). Also, subsequent reporting
standards (e.g., GASB 54) may interact with GASB 34 in unexpected ways.
Besides analyzing how a newer standard supersedes an existing standard, researchers can
examine if the information environment is improved by comparing associations between
reporting information and external user reactions/perceptions (e.g., bond bid-ask spreads or
views of accountability). As well, the cited research on financial reporting show the
complementary nature of different research methods used. Even though archival methods are
useful for finding financial reporting associations, surveys and interviews provide helpful
measures unattainable through other methods (e.g., finance manager strategies) or insight to
reporting perceptions (e.g., citizens’ perceived access), while case studies are able to analyze
individual characteristics and trends lost in large sample modeling. Together, these methods help
complete the picture as we seek to further our knowledge of governmental financial reporting.
Since my paper focuses on governmental financial reporting research topics post-GASB
34, this entails other opportunities for literature reviews in other governmental accounting topics.

61

Governmental auditing and governmental pension/OPEB are two broad topics that are worthy of
an upcoming literature review. Both topics contain a unique perspective that signals
accountability and sustainability of the reporting governments. These sorts of literature reviews
would be important in summarizing the vast existing research (published or ongoing) and
guiding future research efforts.
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FIGURE 1
Topics Areas in Post-GASB 34 Governmental Accounting Research

State and Local Government
Financial Reporting

Reporting and Disclosure Topics

-Reporting Decisions
-Written Disclosures
-Reporting Associations
-Disclosure Perceptions

Bond Topics

-Information Environment
-Reporting Decisions
-Additional Factors
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Financial Condition Topics

-Indicators
-Fiscal Health Associations

TABLE 1.1
Summary of Overarching GASB 34 Evaluations and Implications
(Shown in order of presentation)

Citation
Patton and Hutchison (2013a)

Research Question(s)
How has the governmental reporting model
for states and local governments changed
over time?

Patton and Hutchison (2013b)

What developments led to GASB 34’s
implementation?

Kinnersley (2016)

How has the totals columns in governmental
balance sheets developed from prior
periods?

Mead (2002)

What are the key features of GASB 34?
How does GASB 34 address accountability?

Kravchuk and Voorhees (2001)

What are the benefits and costs of GASB
34?

Patton and Bean (2001)

What changes does GASB 34 make to
capital asset reporting?
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Key Result(s)
-Governmental reporting often contained significant
inconsistencies and measurement uncertainties under prior
financial reporting models.
-Calls for improved accountability, transparency, and
measurement shaped GASB 34’s implementation.
-A diverse set of perspectives shaped GASB 34 to include
specific measurement focuses and accounting methods for
different new and updated financial statements.
-Presentation of prior totals columns were optional or
prohibited.
-GASB 34 requires a single consolidated totals column for the
combined governmental funds.
-State and local governments’ updated reporting model is to
include the MD&A, basic financial statements, and other
required supplementary information.
-The new requirements provide flexibility in describing
financial changes and better display financial condition
measures.
-The enhanced accountability should be most beneficial to
both citizens and financial intermediaries.
-Significant costs could be incurred to measure and present
certain GASB 34 information.
-All capital assets are to be measured with the economic
resource flow method.
-Capital assets are to be reported in the statement of net assets,
while all related expenses are to be reported in the statement
of activities.

Wilson and Kattelus (2001)

How will municipal managers and bond
analysts use GASB 34 information?

Wallace (2000)

What sorts of research opportunities are
available under GASB 34?

76

-Managers can better disclose short- and long-term financial
condition in GASB 34’s reporting, though at a potential higher
cost.
-Bond analysts can better assess governments’ financial
efficiency and effectiveness to improve their decisions.
-Significant research topics include valuation, presentation,
budgeting, and auditing.
-Archival, experimental, survey, and field study methods can
be useful to examine the important questions regarding GASB
34 reporting.

TABLE 1.2
Summary of Research on Reporting Decisions in Governmental Reporting (Post-GASB 34)
(Shown in order of presentation)

Citation
Patrick (2010)

Research Design
Survey and
Archival

Research Question(s)
What factors influence local
governments to adopt GASB 34?

Carroll and Marlowe (2009)

Archival

What factors are associated with the
GAAP basis?

Khumawala et al. (2014)

Survey and
Archival

Does professionalism and awards
impact GAAP adoption?

Styles and Tennyson (2007)

Archival

What factors are associated with online
reporting?

Yusuf et al. (2013)

Survey

Beck (2018)

Archival

What is the availability of popular
reporting?
Why do local governments issue
popular reports?
Do municipalities use discretionary
accruals in their reporting?

Felix (2015)

Archival

Gore (2015)

Archival

Are inter-fund transfers used to
manage general fund balance changes
toward zero?
Do unionized municipalities hide fund
balances in less transparent funds?

77

Key Result(s)
-Smaller or rural governments are less likely to
adopt GASB 34.
-Independent auditors and occupational
specialization are positively associated with
GASB 34 adoption.
-Debt issuance and federal intergovernmental
revenues are both positively related to GAAP
usage.
-Accounting degrees and GFOA reporting
awards both increase the likelihood of GAAP
adoption.
-Larger municipalities are more likely to place
their CAFRs online.
-Income per capita and GFOA reporting awards
both increase the likelihood of online reporting.
-Three-quarters of the largest local governments
issue PAFRs and/or budgetary summaries.
-Understandability and transparency are key
rationale behind popular reporting.
-Municipalities are more likely to use
discretionary accruals when avoiding a deficit
or prior to a bond offering.
-For both positive and negative prior balances,
municipalities use inter-fund transfers to drive
general fund changes toward zero.
-Unionized municipalities have a lesser
percentage of balances in unreserved general

Gianakis and Snow (2007)

Archival

Is there a preferred financial slack
strategy in local governments?

Snow and Gianakis (2009)

Survey

What strategies do municipalities use
for stabilization funds?

Stewart et al. (2018)

Archival

What fund balance policies do county
governments use?

Modlin (2011)

Survey and
Archival

Has the use of internal service funds
declined?

Vermeer et al. (2011)

Survey and
Archival

How do states report their general
infrastructure assets under GASB 34?

78

funds and a greater percentage of balances
outside of the general fund.
-There is an overall weak association between
stabilization fund and free cash strategies.
-The use of free cash is preferred over
stabilization funds when revenues decrease.
-Despite stabilization funds being important to
maintain, respondents showed caution in using
these funds during budgetary shortfalls.
-18 percent of sampled counties have
unreserved or unassigned fund balance reserve
policies.
-Just one county met all of GFOA
recommendations on fund balance holdings.
-Only 27 percent of counties sampled used
internal service funds.
-Internal service funds were more likely to be
used when either the government’s budget was
larger or there was a cost allocation plan.
-A slight majority of states used depreciation
accounting over the modified approach.
-States often chose depreciation accounting
when lacking a sufficient asset management
system.

TABLE 1.3
Summary of Research on Written Disclosures within Governmental Reporting (Post-GASB 34)
(Shown in order of presentation)

Citation
Guo et al. (2009)

Research Design
Archival

Research Question(s)
What disclosure quality differences
exist in the MD&A?

Marsh et al. (2004)

Archival

What is the readability characteristics
of PAFRs?

Marsh et al. (2005)

Archival

Marsh and Montondon (2005)

Archival

What are the readability characteristics
of MD&As?
Are there readability differences
between PAFRs and MD&As?

Lutz et al. (2011)

Archival

Are there MD&A readability
differences based on city sizes?

Yusuf and Jordan (2017)

Archival

How accessible are MD&As to
citizens?

Rich et al. (2016)

Archival

Rich et al. (2019a)

Archival

Is MD&A tone associated with future
reporting quality?
What determinants are related to
MD&A tone?
Is MD&A tone associated with future
internal control quality?

79

Key Result(s)
-Deeper disclosure on conditions, benchmarks,
and comparisons were more common in high
disclosure quality cities.
-Mean readability of PAFRs is between a 9th
and an 11th grade level.
-Mean page length is 13 pages with about one
image per page.
-Mean readability of MD&As is between 8.7
and 12.9 grade level.
-Most readability measures detected no
significant difference between PAFRs and
MD&As.
-MD&As often have longer words and
sentences than PAFRs.
-There are no significant readability differences
between small, medium, and large cities.
-There are differences in sentence complexity.
-MD&As are found to average 13.2 pages,
above a 12th grade reading level, and issued 203
days after fiscal year-end.
-There is less future reporting delay when the
MD&A has higher positive tone.
-Council-manager form and education
positively predict tone, while deficits negatively
predict tone.
-There is a negative association between tone
and future internal control problems.

Rich et al. (2019b)

Archival

What factors lead to greater year-overyear MD&A textual content changes?

80

-Unemployment rate and auditor turnover is
positively associated with MD&A changes.
-Municipal MD&As are more similar when debt
changes and in states with GAAP requirements.

TABLE 1.4
Summary of Research on Reporting Associations within Governmental Reporting (Post-GASB 34)
(Shown in order of presentation)

Citation
Sohl et al. (2018)

Research Design
Archival

Research Question(s)
What are the determinants of local
government total reporting lag?

Rich and Zhang (2016)

Archival

Costello et al. (2017)

Archival

Are municipalities with restatements
more likely to have finance officer
turnover?
Do balanced budget requirements
influence fiscal decisions?

Marlowe (2009)

Archival

Does budget overspending increase
future expenditure budgeting?

Jordan et al. (2017)

Archival

Do states’ revenue compositions
impact revenue variances?

Jimenez (2018)

Archival

Do tax and expenditure limitations
influence city budgetary solvency?

Maher et al. (2017)

Archival

How do tax and expenditure
limitations affect state’s reserves?

81

Key Result(s)
-Lagged delay predicts audit report delay, report
submission delay, and total delay.
-Several audit factors shaped the degree of
specific delay types.
-The presence of a prior restatement increases
the likelihood of municipal finance officer
turnover.
-When under fiscal stress, asset sales, spending
cuts, inter-fund transfers, and tax increases are
more likely for states with strict balanced
budget requirements.
-Following overspending, cities are more likely
to increase the subsequent period’s budgeted
expenditures.
-General fund balance reduces this relationship,
while unreserved and enterprise funds increase
this relationship.
-Revenue diversification reduces both the
likelihood and magnitude of negative variances.
-Revenue elasticity reduces the magnitude but
increases the likelihood of negative variances.
-Cities in states with greater tax and expenditure
limitation restrictions show lower unrestricted
net position and total net position changes.
-Both expenditure limits and combined revenue
and expenditures limits show a marginal
negative relationship with total reserves.

Kim and Ebdon (2017)

Archival

Kim et al. (2018)

Archival

Gore (2009)

Archival

Arapis and Reitano (2018)

Archival

Stewart et al. (2013)

Archival

Guo and Wang (2017)

Archival

How does GASB 34 infrastructure
reporting impact capital expenditures?

-Capital spending increased following GASB 34
infrastructure implementation, but not
maintenance expenditures.
-There are not any significant differences in
capital expenditures between infrastructure
reporting methods.
Does GASB 34 infrastructure reporting -State highway condition improved after GASB
increase infrastructure condition?
34 infrastructure reporting.
-The modified approach showed higher
infrastructure quality than the depreciation
method.
What determinants influence
-Revenue variation, growth, and scarcity
municipality cash holding levels?
positively predict cash holdings.
-Population and state aid negatively predict cash
holdings.
What are the determinants of city
-Cities with higher property taxes, debt service
financial savings?
expenditures, and populations have an increased
likelihood of being below GFOA’s fund balance
recommendations.
-Cities were more likely to meet fund balance
recommendations when enterprise transfers,
general expenditures, and wealth is greater.
Do revenue sources and volatility
-Property tax, intergovernmental, and other
affect financing saving in counties?
revenue types are positively related to
unreserved fund balances.
-Unemployment negatively influences
unreserved balances.
What factors influence county
-Revenue volatility and property tax rates are
unreserved fund balances?
positively associated, while unincorporated
population is negatively associated with
Are these factors dependent on
unreserved balances.
neighboring county levels?
-Property tax and unincorporated population
factors are partially dependent on neighbor level
of these factors.

82

Stewart (2011)

Archival

Does county government type
influence unreserved fund balance
levels?

Hendrick (2006)

Archival

How does financial slack impact future
conditions and decisions?

Su and Hildreth (2018)

Archival

Johnson et al. (2012)

Archival

Does financial slack affect future note
debt issuances?
Do credit rating agencies use and
prefer certain GASB 34 information?

Davies et al. (2017)

Archival

Are net assets influenced by
nonfinancial information?

Chase and Roybark (2013)

Archival

How has GASB 54 affected fund
balance reporting?

Kelly (2013)

Archival

How have prior fund balances been
allocated into GASB 54 balances?

Plummer and Patton (2015)

Archival

Do government-wide measures show
sustainable practices in 2008?

Snow et al. (2008)

Archival and
Simulation

Can municipalities withstand
simulated economic downturns?

83

-In economic upturns, unit form counties had a
positive relationship between unreserved
balances and intergovernmental revenue, but a
negative relationship between unreserved
balances and income per capita.
-The relationships for beat form counties were
in the opposite direction.
-Revenues less expenditures and long-term
condition are positively related to the level of
unreserved fund balances.
-The likelihood of issuing short-term notes is
decreased as unreserved fund balances increase.
-Credit ratings reflect GASB 34’s governmentwide information.
-General fund information appears to be
preferred over whole government information.
-Property values and mayor-council government
form are positively related to liquid net assets.
-Violent crime and unemployment are
negatively related to liquid net assets.
-Only a slight increase has occurred from
previous unreserved fund balances to the
updated unrestricted fund balances.
-All reserved fund balances and some
unreserved fund balances were allocated to the
updated non-unassigned balance types.
-The majority of reserved amounts were
allocated to the updated committed and assigned
balances.
-Most states in 2008 have negative adjusted
total net asset balances
-A majority of states had an average deficit over
$1,000 per household for this measure.
-About 16 percent of municipalities have
insufficient slack resources to cope with a high
severity recession.

Ross et al. (2015)

Archival

How stable were large cities’ financial
balances during the Great Recession?

Stewart (2009)

Archival

Do the determinants of unreserved
fund balances change during economic
upturns and downturns?

Wang and Hou (2012)

Archival

What factors affect general fund
balances?
Do general fund balance levels impact
recessionary expenditures?

Sacco and Busheé (2013)

Archival

How did revenues and expenditures
change between recessions?

Stewart et al. (2017)

Archival

Are future expenditures influenced by
financial slack during recessions?

Rivenbark et al (2018)

Archival

How were capital asset levels and
condition impacted by the Great
Recession?

84

-Intergovernmental and other revenues
decreased during the recession.
-Deficits were minimized by raising property
taxes and reducing net assets.
-During economic upturns, property taxes and
per capita income positively predicted
unreserved balances.
-During economic downturns, population
positively predicted unreserved balances.
-Tax revenues and wealth are positively
associated with general fund levels, while
capital outlays and unemployment are
negatively associated with general fund levels.
-General fund levels do not significantly affect
the expenditure gap.
-Net assets grew between recessionary periods.
-Revenues shrunk faster than expenditures
during the 2007 recession.
-Higher unrestricted governmental activity fund
balances reduce future expenditure gaps in
economic downturns.
-The recessionary period had only a minor
effect on lowering depreciable capital asset
amounts.

TABLE 1.5
Summary of Research on Disclosure Perceptions in Governmental Reporting (Post-GASB 34)
(Shown in order of presentation)

Citation
Frank and Gianakis (2010)

Research Design
Survey

Research Question(s)
What are financial officers’
perceptions of GASB 34’s reporting
model?

Lu (2007)

Interview

How do state financial managers in
local oversight roles view GASB 34
reporting?

Frank et al. (2005)

Survey

Do finance officers believe that GASB
34 will improve forecasting?

Bloch (2016)

Survey

Do municipal analysts feel that GASB
34 improves reporting quality?

Fischer and Holmes (2018)

Survey

Does GASB 77’s tax abatement
requirements meet users’ needs?

Hunt et al. (2014)

Survey

What are municipal analysts’
perceptions of fair values within the
fund financial statements?

85

Key Result(s)
-The MD&A is viewed as beneficial in
describing financial condition.
-Some viewed the model as being costly.
-Some disagreed on the new model improving
information to bond raters.
-Participants viewed GASB 34 as easier to
follow.
-The MD&A, government-wide statements, and
reconciliation components were seen to increase
accountability.
-The presence of having an advanced degree
and forecasting software were significant in
officers viewing GASB 34 as more helpful in
forecasting.
-Reporting information and transparency is
viewed as improved.
-Respondents still view the necessity to contact
governments for clarifications.
-A majority of respondents had a favorable view
of tax abatements.
-Several requested pieces of tax abatement
information is not currently required by GASB
77.
-Investment fair values were viewed as no more
beneficial than cost information.

Kloby (2009)

Interview

What are finance officers’ views on
PAFRs?

Mead and Marlowe (2011)

Survey

How do governmental stakeholders
feel reporting timeliness influences
information usefulness?

Yusuf et al. (2017)

Survey

What are citizens’ perceptions on local
government financial disclosure?

Jordan et al. (2016)

Interview and
Survey

What are citizens’ preferences and
concerns on local government
reporting?

86

-Communication, citizen confidence, and
flexibility were viewed as important reasons to
issue PAFRs.
-Municipal analysts, finance officers, and
researchers view reporting delay to rapidly
decrease the information’s usefulness.
-Current average reporting delay is viewed as
too long to be very useful.
-Transparency and accessibility of information
were rated highly, while accountability was
rated average.
-Information dissemination was deemed very
passive.
-Information on revenues were preferred over
expenditures, while information on taxes were
preferred over fees.
-Reporting timeliness was a concern.

TABLE 1.6
Summary of Research on the Information Environment within Governmental Bonds (Post-GASB 34)
(Shown in order of presentation)

Citation
Marlowe (2010)

Research Design
Archival

Kioko et al. (2013)

Archival

Pridgen and Wilder (2013)

Archival

Benson and Marks (2014)

Archival

Reck and Wilson (2014)

Archival

Callahan and Waymire (2015)

Archival

Amrahova et al. (2017)

Archival

Baber and Gore (2008)

Archival

Research Question(s)
Does GASB 34 information influence
bond pricing differently in primary and
secondary markets?
What types of GASB 34 measures are
associated with secondary market bond
pricing?
Are types of GASB 34 financial
measures related to municipal debt
ratings?
Do GASB 34 measures influence bond
ratings and bond insurance premiums?
Does GASB 34 accrual information
better explain bond interest costs than
prior to GASB 34?
Are budget-to-actual variance
disclosures related to bond ratings?

Does municipal fiscal health influence
bond yields?
Does a GAAP reporting requirement
influence debt usage characteristics?

87

Key Result(s)
-Government-wide information is helpful in
bond pricing in the secondary market, but not
the primary market.
-Both net position and revenues less expenses
are associated with average secondary bond
pricing.
-Financial position, performance, liquidity, and
leverage measures are associated with
underlying debt ratings.
-Both unrestricted net assets and capital assets
less related debt are positively related to bond
ratings and bond insurance premiums.
-The government-wide accrual model better
explains net interest cost than the pre-GASB 34
general fund model.
-Cities strive for small favorable variances.
-Favorable expenditure variances are positively
associated with bond ratings, but negatively for
favorable revenue variances.
-Fiscal health has a small impact on secondary
market bond yields.
-GAAP states receive lower true interest costs
and utilize greater proportions of public debt.
-GAAP states show no significant differences in
overall debt usage compared to non-GAAP
states.

Gore et al. (2016)

Archival

Are internal control issues associated
with municipal bond markups?

Charles and Shon (2018)

Archival

Baber et al. (2013)

Archival and
Survey

Do debt levels impact state bond
interest costs?
Do accounting restatements affect
municipal debt characteristics?

Beck et al. (2018)

Archival

Does information ambiguity impact
bond yields?

88

-Internal control material weaknesses are
associated with larger markups.
-Bonds take longer to sell when material
weaknesses are present.
-There is an insignificant association between
debt levels and future true interest costs.
-The true interest cost tends to rise following a
restatement.
-Municipalities issue less debt after a
restatement occurs.
-The penalty on bond yields is more severe for
negative ambiguity than the reward for positive
ambiguity.

TABLE 1.7
Summary of Research on Reporting Decisions within Governmental Bonds (Post-GASB 34)
(Shown in order of presentation)

Citation
Benson and Marks (2017)

Research Design
Archival

Research Question(s)
Does the infrastructure asset reporting
method influence bond ratings?

Bloch et al. (2016)

Archival

Marlowe (2011)

Archival

Does the infrastructure asset reporting
method impact secondary bond bid
spreads?
Are credit ratings affected by the level
of slack resources?

Grizzle (2010)

Archival

Do budget stabilization funds impact
bond ratings?

Apostolou et al. (2014)

Archival

Is equilibrium spending associated
with debt costs?

Henke and Maher (2016)

Archival

Does reporting timeliness influence
both bond ratings and costs?

Edmonds et al. (2017)

Archival

How are bond ratings and yields
affected by information timeliness?

Wang (2012)

Archival

Does online reporting impact debt
costs?

89

Key Result(s)
-The interaction between the modified approach
and government-wide measures is associated
with state bond ratings.
-States using the modified approach experience
lower bond auction bid spreads compared to
those using the depreciation approach.
-There is a small positive relationship between
budgetary slack and credit quality.
-Governments can decrease the probability of a
lower rating by holding at least minimal slack.
-States with weak deposit budget stabilization
policies are positively associated with bond
ratings.
-States with weak withdrawal budget
stabilization policies are negatively associated
with bond ratings.
-True interest costs are minimized when
revenues match expenditures in the general
fund.
-Reporting delay is negatively related to bond
ratings.
-A reduced delay lowers interest costs.
-Higher combined audit and post-audit delay
leads to both lower bond ratings and initial
yields.
-True interest cost is lower when states issue
online budget reports, but not online CAFRs.

Gillette et al. (2018)

Archival

Are financial disclosures different after
a bond rating upgrade?

90

-Upgraded municipalities after Moody’s
recalibration displayed less financial disclosures
compared to those rated by S&P and not
recalibrated.

TABLE 1.8
Summary of Research on Additional Factors in Governmental Bonds (Post-GASB 34)
(Shown in order of presentation)

Citation
Palumbo and Zaporowski
(2012)

Research Design
Archival

Research Question(s)
What are the determinants of bond
ratings?

Daniels et al. (2010)

Archival

What are the determinants of
municipal debt maturities?

Butler and Yi (2019)

Archival

Does population aging affect bond
issuance costs?

Downing and Zhang (2004)

Archival

Does municipal bond trading volume
impact price volatility?

Ely et al. (2013)

Archival

What factors are related to municipal
bond credit rating fees?

Allen and Dudney (2008)

Archival

What rating agency bond rating has a
greater influence of issue pricing?

91

Key Result(s)
-Per capita income, population growth, and
worker earnings changes are positively
associated with bond ratings.
-Unemployment is negatively associated with
bond ratings.
-Bonds with higher ratings are found to have
longer maturities compared to bonds with lower
ratings.
-Higher proportions of populations over the age
of 65 increases bond yield spreads.
-Half of the relationship is explained by income
tax reductions and pension or healthcare
increases.
-Average transaction size is negatively related
to price volatility.
-Trading frequency is positively related to price
volatility.
-Issuance complexity and periods of market
uncertainty increase rating fees.
-Prior rating agency relationships and multiple
rating purchases lower rating fees.
-Moody’s ratings influence bond yields more
than S&P’s ratings.
-Moody’s ratings are more common and more
conservative than S&P’s ratings.

Robbins and Simonsen (2007)

Archival

Does competitive bidding affect bond
interest costs?

Butler (2008)

Archival

Does investment bank in-state
presence impact bond pricing?

Singla and Luby (2019)

Archival

Brune and Liu (2011)

Archival

What are the bond and financial
determinants of debt-related
derivatives?
How do historical insurance
downgrades affect municipal bonds?

Ely (2012)

Archival

What is the trend of bond insurance
premiums?

Liu (2012)

Archival

Are bond insurance premiums
associated with future ratings?

92

-Bonds with competitive bidding had lower true
interest costs than those without competitive
bidding.
-When investment banks have an in-state
presence, they charge municipalities lower debt
fees and issue bonds with lower yields.
-Higher amounts of recently issued bonds, lower
bond ratings, and more derivative experience
increases the use of debt-related derivatives.
-Several insurer downgrades were associated
with market risk premiums during the 2008
financial crisis.
-Bonds with higher ratings are more likely to
have bond insurance, especially during
economic downturns.
-Credit spreads have increased between high
and low quality issuances.
-Higher municipal bond insurance premiums are
associated with future rating downgrades.

TABLE 1.9
Summary of Research on Indicators within Governmental Financial Condition (Post-GASB 34)
(Shown in order of presentation)

Citation
Kloha et al. (2005a)

Research Design
Survey

Research Question(s)
Can a composite model predict local
government fiscal distress?

Rivenbark et al. (2010)

Review and
Case Study

Kioko (2013)

Archival

How can GASB 34 be used to develop
a measure to assess state and local
government financial condition?
What are states’ financial conditions
based on GASB 34 information?

Wang et al. (2007)

Archival

What are states’ financial conditions
based on government-wide reporting
information?

Wang and Liou (2009)

Archival

Arnett (2014)

Archival

How has states’ financial conditions
changed from 2003 to 2004?
How do states rank via a weighted
composite fiscal condition measure?

Clark (2015)

Archival

Is a prior composite financial condition
index valid and reliable?

93

Key Result(s)
-The composite model better detects early
warnings of fiscal distress than current detection
methods.
-The framework should include both fund and
government-wide, both accrual and modified
accrual, and resource flow information.
-States’ operating position and financial position
were highest prior to the 2008 recession, and
lowest afterward.
-Larger states’ financial condition measures
were lowered more than smaller states’
measures were during the recession.
-Cash, budget, long-run, and service level
solvency dimensions develop a reliable financial
condition measure.
-States tended to have strong cash solvencies,
but varied in other solvency areas.
-Budgetary solvency is found to have increased,
while cash solvency slightly decreased.
-The best states had solid measures of each
solvency factor.
-The worst state had at least one or more
solvency measure being unsustainable.
-The Groves et al. (1981) index is found to not
be reliable and valid for a sample of
municipalities.

McDonald (2017)

Archival

Do commonly used financial condition
indicators predict bankruptcies?

Maher and Deller (2011)

Survey and
Archival

Maher and Deller (2013)

Survey and
Archival

Do subjectively reported financial
condition indicators align with
objectively reported indicators?
Do subjectively reported financial
condition indicators align with
government-wide measures?

Kloha et al. (2005b)

Survey

Do states monitor local governments’
financial conditions?

Spreen and Cheek (2016)

Archival

Does state monitoring impact local
government financial conditions?

Crosby and Robbins (2013)

Archival

What changes could improve state
monitoring of local governments’
financial conditions?

Gerrish and Spreen (2017)

Archival

How did state financial benchmarking
influence local financial condition
ratios?
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-Debt service and cash ratios significantly
predicted municipality bankruptcy decisions.
-Brown’s 10-point test and the index from
Wang et al. (2007) did not significantly predict
bankruptcies.
-Reported descriptive indicators are weakly
associated with commonly used numerical
indicators.
-An overall weak relationship is found between
reported descriptive indicators and governmentwide measures.
-Financial position and liquidity measures align
with the subjective indicators.
-Only 15 states use indicators for assessing local
financial conditions.
-Respondents indicated that they were interested
in a more extensive monitoring role.
-States monitoring has only a slight influence on
local government financial condition compared
to states without monitoring.
-Including governmental and business-type
activities into a composite financial indicator
can better detect fiscal strain.
-Almost four times as many local governments
are under fiscal strain according to the tested
composite indicator.
-There was little change to mean financial
condition ratios, but standard deviations
narrowed after the state’s benchmarking tool
was implemented.
-Some top performing governments decreased
financial condition after state benchmarking.

TABLE 1.10
Summary of Research on Fiscal Health Associations within Governmental Financial Condition (Post-GASB 34)
(Shown in order of presentation)

Citation
Gorina et al. (2018b)

Research Design
Archival

Research Question(s)
What fiscal ratios and factors indicate
fiscal distress?

Trussel and Patrick (2009)

Archival

What factors predict municipality
fiscal distress?

Beck and Stone (2017)

Review and
Archival

What contributing factors influence the
failure of municipalities?

Modlin and Stewart (2014)

Survey and
Archival

What are the determinants of a county
receiving a state notice of fiscal
distress?

Trussel and Patrick (2013)

Archival

Can fiscal distress factors predict the
presence of service reductions?

Gorina et al. (2018a)

Archival

What financial officer decisions are
associated with fiscal distress?

95

Key Result(s)
-Municipalities with higher unreserved general
fund balances and unrestricted net asset are less
likely to face bankruptcy or default.
-Long-term liabilities and unemployment rates
positively predict bankruptcies and defaults.
-Debt and intergovernmental revenues are
positively associated with distress risk.
-Administrative costs and revenue growth are
negatively associated with distress risk.
-Fiscal stress is not the only cause of
municipality failure.
-Lack of economic adaptation and not fulfilling
opportunity expectations also contribute to
failure.
-Salaries and wages, debt service expenditures,
and water policies increased the likelihood of
receiving a state fiscal distress notice.
-Higher unreserved general fund balances
decreased the notice probability.
-Intergovernmental revenues and debt positively
predict service reductions.
-Capital spending and bond proceeds negatively
predict service reductions.
-The probability of fiscal distress increases
when fiscal reserve ratios are lowered and debt
ratios are raised.

Singla et al. (2018)

Survey and
Archival

Does local government financial
condition influence manager
entrepreneurial orientation?

Jimenez (2017b)

Survey and
Archival

Are cities’ fiscal health shaped by tax
and expenditure limitations?

Jimenez (2017a)

Survey and
Archival

Does bureaucracy impact cities’ fiscal
health?

Singla et al. (2014)

Archival

Did bankrupt cities show greater fiscal
distress compared to continuing cities?

Fischer et al. (2015)

Archival

Stone et al. (2015)

Case Study

Can Z-scores predict state and local
government fiscal distress?
How effective are financial condition
indicators for the Detroit case?

Clark and Gorina (2017)

Case Study

How well does emergency fiscal
management address municipal fiscal
distress?
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-Short-term resource changes are negatively
related to entrepreneurial orientation.
-Long-term resource changes are not
significantly related to entrepreneurial
orientation.
-Tax and expenditure limitation strictness is
negatively associated with unrestricted net
position and change in total net position.
-Greater bureaucracy reduces budgetary
solvency.
-Centralization and formalization are significant
bureaucratic factors.
-Bankrupt cities had fiscal strain above the
sample median, but were not significantly
different from several cities that avoided
bankruptcy.
-Few government entities are classified as
distressed according to Z-scores.
-Most indicators showed no concern or only a
gradual decline.
-Only leverage, taxes, revenues, and
expenditures showed a steep decline.
-Emergency fiscal management can improve
financial conditions, but usually only in the
short-term.

CHAPTER 2

Classification Rearrangement and Determinants of GASB 54 Governmental Fund Balances
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ABSTRACT: Imprecise classification definitions and fund purpose variability created an
environment where U.S. state and local governments inconsistently applied amounts to their fund
balances. The implementation of GASB 54 represents an attempt to improve fund balance
classification to add usefulness for reporting users. However, much of the literature retains the
use of previous fund balance categories. My study both investigates the rearrangement of prior
fund balance amounts into the updated GASB 54 fund balance classifications and the
determinants associated with these GASB 54 balances. My findings note that prior “reserved”
fund balances shifted predictably into restrictive GASB 54 categories, while prior “unreserved”
categories shifted into varying GASB 54 categories. The determinants analysis shows fund
balance flexibility to be positively related to general service charges and income per capita,
while negatively related to prior deficits, population, and unemployment. Besides this study
furthering the knowledge about GASB 54 fund balances and the factors that impact them,
findings suggest a substantial benefit of GASB 54-implemented fund balance definitions in
avoiding potential fund balance unpredictability and potential manipulation.

98

INTRODUCTION

Inconsistency in financial reporting can hinder stakeholders’ ability to compare
information, and can subsequently lead to flawed decision-making. The Governmental
Accounting Standards Board (GASB) saw this as rationale to improve state and local
government’s fund balance accounting (Brooks and Mead 2010). The publication of GASB
Statement No. 54 (GASB 54) in 2009 sought to improve fund balance reporting through more
clearly defined classifications (GASB 2009). However, few studies utilize GASB 54’s updated
fund balance categories as variables (Chase and Roybark 2013; Kelly 2013; Stewart, Hamman,
and Chapman 2018). My study furthers knowledge on GASB 54 reporting. Specifically, I
conduct a thorough analysis of how total governmental fund balances were allocated after GASB
54’s implementation and what factors significantly impact the updated fund balance amounts.
Fund financial statements reveal information about the primary government’s finances.
Before GASB 54, governments’ fund balances were measured in either reserved, unreserveddesignated, or unreserved-undesignated fund balance categories (NCGA 1979; GASB 1999).
Concerns developed that vague classification definitions and differing categorizations depending
on fund specificity were leading to fund balance inconsistencies (GASB 2006; Kelly 2013).
Addressing these concerns, GASB 54 implemented more clearly defined fund balance categories
(in order of resource constraint restrictiveness): (1) nonspendable; (2) restricted; (3) committed;
(4) assigned; and (5) unassigned (GASB 2009; Brooks and Mead 2010; Kelly 2013). In other
words, committed, assigned, and unassigned fund balances have more flexible usage than
nonspendable or restricted fund balances.
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Even though prior research both compares fund balance usage pre- and post-GASB 54
implementation (Arapis and Grady 2015) and attempts to detect the shift of amounts from
previous fund balances to GASB 54’s classifications (Chase and Roybark 2013; Kelly 2013),
these studies aggregate findings that make unclear how prior fund balances incrementally effect
GASB 54 balances. In order to investigate factors that contribute (or hinder) the level of fund
balances, several papers study determinants of fund balances under the pre-GASB 54
classifications (e.g., Hendrick 2006; Wang and Hou 2012; Grizzle, Stewart, and Phillips 2015;
Arapis and Reitano 2017). Some significant financial factors reported are funding types (e.g.,
Stewart 2009; Guo and Wang 2017) and deficits (e.g., Hendrick 2006). Other factors can include
government characteristics such as unemployment (e.g., Stewart, Phillips, and Modlin 2013;
Jimenez 2017) or population (e.g., Gianakis and Snow 2007).
Expanding on the findings of Chase and Roybark (2013) and Kelly (2013), I investigate
how prior fund balances transferred to GASB 54-mandated classifications at the total
governmental funds level. Afterward, I model the determinants of total governmental fund
balances (based on either flexible fund balance ratios to total balances or individual fund
balances per capita).
I have several predictions for economic-based determinants. As higher percentages of tax
revenues and service fees provide governments more resources for accumulating budgetary slack
(e.g., Wang and Hou 2012), I hypothesize a positive relationship with fund balance flexibility.
Conversely, higher percentages of debt proceeds and intergovernmental revenues, and the
presence of a prior year deficit suggest a lack of sustainability and fewer available funds to save
for governments (e.g., Stewart 2009; Arapis and Reitano 2017; Maher, Stallmann, Deller, and
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Park 2017). Thereby, I hypothesize a negative relationship between these three factors and fund
balance flexibility.
I also make hypotheses concerning demographic determinants. Higher populations and
unemployment entail excess service expenditures over available revenues for governments (e.g.,
Stewart, Hamman, and Pink-Harper 2017). I, therefore, expect a negative association between
population (or unemployment rate) and fund balance flexibility. Greater incomes per capita
suggest more tax revenue sources (e.g., Stewart et al. 2013), so I predict a positive relationship
between fund balance flexibility and income per capita.
To discover how total governmental fund balances shifted between pre- and post-GASB
54 classifications, I obtain a usable sample of 228 municipalities with CAFRs reporting previous
fund balance categories in fiscal year-end 2010 and updated fund balance categories in fiscal
year-end 2011. To test the determinants of GASB 54 governmental fund balances, I have a final
sample of 792 municipality-year observations from 276 distinct municipalities with CAFRs
between fiscal year-ends of 2011 and 2015.
My classification rearrangement analysis shows that prior reserved governmental fund
balances negatively relate to GASB 54 unrestricted ratio and positively relate to nonspendable
and restricted GASB 54 fund balances per capita. Prior unreserved-designated fund balances
appear to be positively related to unrestricted ratios but negatively related to unassigned ratios of
fund balances, aligning with prior research (e.g., Chase and Roybark 2013). However, prior
unreserved-designated (and to a lesser extent unreserved-undesignated) balances also display
positive associations to many GASB 54 fund balance types (including more restrictive
categories). This indicates a benefit to GASB 54 definitions in minimizing allocation
inconsistencies and avoiding varying categorization if a specifically purposed amount were
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accounted for in a fund with similar purpose (i.e., potentially manipulating flexible fund balance
information). “Non-specific” prior unreserved fund balances appear to have shifted to either
committed or unassigned balances.
For my hypothesized economic determinants, my estimated model shows flexible
governmental fund balances (and/or ratios) as having a positive relationship with municipality
general service fees and a negative relationship with prior year deficits. Results are mixed for the
association between fund balance flexibility and both property taxes and intergovernmental
revenues. I find no evidence of new long-term debt proceeds affecting fund balance flexibility.
Within my demographic determinants, municipality population varies indirectly with flexible
fund balances and ratios. My results also suggest that municipality income per capita positively
relates to unrestricted ratio, while unemployment negatively relates to unrestricted ratio.
My paper contributes to the prior literature in several ways. The majority of fund balance
determinants studies use levels of unreserved (or unassigned) fund balances (e.g., Hendrick
2006; Guo and Wang 2017). As such, these papers miss the potential information content
provided by more restrictive (i.e., less flexible) governmental fund balance categories. This paper
investigates determinants based on various measures of fund balance spending flexibility using a
comprehensive set of GASB 54 fund balance categories and fund balance ratios (Gore 2015).
Prior research also uses the general fund as a measure of a state or local government’s financial
condition or budget stabilization (e.g., Gianakis and Snow 2007; Wang and Hou 2012). This
study contributes to prior research by investigating balances at the total governmental funds
level. Furthermore, my paper offers a breakdown of how the total governmental fund balances
were incrementally allocated from before and after GASB 54’s implementation using the
updated fund balance categories (Chase and Roybark 2013; Kelly 2013). My classification
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rearrangement findings stress the importance of GASB 54’s implementation on improving fund
balance information content, encouraging better application consistency, and reducing the
likelihood of flexible fund balance manipulation.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. I provide a literature review that illustrates
the development of fund balances and examines research investigating both the rearrangement
and the determinants of GASB 54 fund balance amounts. Following that, I develop my
hypotheses. I then describe my sample and research methodology. Afterward, I report my
analysis and findings, and then give my conclusions.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The Development of Fund Balance Standards
The reporting of fund financial statements allows governments to report detailed primary
government-level finances and respective information to statement users (GASB 1999).
Governments should report fund financial statements when they have activities related to current
government resources (i.e., governmental funds), business-type charges (i.e., proprietary funds),
and assets held by a trust or agency (i.e., fiduciary funds). Per GASB Statement No. 34 (GASB
34), the Balance Sheet is one of the required statements for governmental funds (optional for
proprietary funds). The elements of the fund balance sheet for governments are similar to
financial accounting except that fund balances replace stockholder’s equity (see Figure 2.1).
Thus, the total fund balance for governments is the residual amounts after subtracting liabilities
from assets (GASB 1999). Even though the total fund balance is clearly defined, past
developments have shaped the classifications within fund balances.
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[FIGURE 2.1 ABOUT HERE]
The National Council on Governmental Accounting (NCGA) provided the preliminary
guidance on how fund balances should be classified. NCGA Statement No. 1 promoted that
governmental fund balances be classified as either reserved or unreserved (NCGA 1979). The
generally understood definitions of reserved fund balances were amounts restricted for use in
specific purposes, while unreserved fund balances were amounts freely available for
appropriation or expenditures (Tyer 1993). Some uncertainty existed from these definitions, so
confusion often occurred over specific application of amounts (Kelly 2013). Beyond reserved
and unreserved, a government may “designate” some unreserved fund balance amounts to
signify an intended usage for a certain purpose (though this intent is non-legally binding) (Tyer
1993). Kelly (2013) suggests that governments’ option to designate unreserved fund balance was
a significant issue for the GASB. “The authority to create a designation was unclear and the
likelihood that the funds would be used for the designated purpose was also unknown” (Kelly
2013).
Along with several required fund financial statements, GASB 34 requires state and local
governments to provide a Balance Sheet on their governmental funds as part of their
Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) (GASB 1999). This governmental fund
balance sheet “should report information about the current financial resources (assets, liabilities,
and fund balances) of each major governmental fund and for nonmajor governmental funds in
the aggregate” (GASB 1999). Despite a new overall state and local government reporting
structure developed by GASB 34, the classifications of fund balances remained the three NCGA
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fund balance segregations: (1) reserved, (2) unreserved-designated, or (3) unreservedundesignated (Kravchuk and Voorhees 2001). 3
These older fund balance classifications were later deemed problematic due to their
vague definitions that led to “considerable variation in how governments report fund balances
and divergence from the intent of the standards” (Brooks and Mead 2010). Besides vague
definitions, amounts for the same purpose could differ categorization based on whether
accounted for in specific or broad fund types (GASB 2006). For instance, a federal grant
restricted for highway repairs would be considered reserved amounts if the funds were accounted
for in a “general fund” or broad “capital projects fund.” If this grant were accounted for in a
“highway repairs fund,” then the amounts would be considered unreserved as the grant would
match the specific fund’s purpose. This example demonstrates a danger in assessing a
municipality’s financial condition by the amount of unreserved funds available. As such, GASB
had motivation to better define fund balance categories and enhance fund information for
financial statement users. 4
In response to the confusion and reporting issues resulting from prior fund balance
classification, GASB Statement No. 54 (GASB 54) establishes new fund balance classifications
to be used in governments’ fund balance reporting (GASB 2009). State and local governments
were required to implement the provisions of GASB 54 for fiscal years beginning after June 15,
2010. A primary goal of GASB 54 is to improve the usefulness and comparability of fund

3

Gauthier (2009a) suggests that reserved fund balances include resources not-spendable-in-form (e.g., inventory),
resources that cannot yet be spent (e.g., time restricted funds), or externally limited resources (e.g., federal grants for
economic development). Unreserved-designated balances include governing body limited resources (e.g., budgeted
construction spending by a municipality’s legislature) or resources tentatively planned by management (e.g.,
intended parks and recreation funding). Unreserved-undesignated balances contain resource without any external or
internal limitation (e.g., excess local sales tax revenues).
4
At the end of 2003, GASB began initial research that developed into a project to examine if existing fund balance
information addressed users’ needs and if changes would improve fund balance information usefulness (GASB
2009). This project eventually led to the implementation of GASB Statement No. 54 in February 2009.
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balance information through more intuitive and clear classifications of governmental fund
balance types (GASB 2009; Brooks and Mead 2010). Moreover, Chase and Roybark (2013)
believe that GASB 54 “should reduce the uncertainty about fund classifications and provide
users the necessary information to understand which constraints are imposed upon the use of
resources, thereby improving information utility to users.” These new fund balance classification
types are developed primarily based on a hierarchy of a resource’s level of constraint
restrictiveness (GASB 2009). Thus, more restrictive fund balances will entail less flexibility in
spending.
The five fund balance categories issued by GASB 54 are (in reverse order of spending
flexibility): (1) nonspendable; (2) restricted; (3) committed; (4) assigned; and (5) unassigned
fund balances (GASB 2009). GASB 54 provides formal definitions for each fund balance type.
Nonspendable fund balances include “amounts that cannot be spent because they are either (a)
not in spendable form or (b) legally or contractually required to be maintained intact.” Restricted
fund balances include “amounts that are restricted to specific purposes” when the resource
constraints are imposed by (a) external creditors, grantors, contributors, or other governments’
laws or regulations or (b) imposed by the government’s constitutional provisions or applicable
legislation. Committed fund balances include “amounts that can only be used for specific
purposes pursuant to constraints imposed by formal action of the government’s highest level of
decision-making authority.” Assigned fund balances include (a) amounts not nonspendable,
restricted, nor committed outside of the general fund, or (b) general fund amounts that are
“intended to be used for a specific purpose.” 5 Unassigned includes amounts not nonspendable,

5

The “general fund” represents financial resource amounts not reported in another fund (GASB 2009). Thus, the
general fund may be used to accumulate and report excess revenues over expenditures (i.e., positive fund equity or
budgetary slack). Other governmental funds include: special revenue funds, debt service funds, capital projects
funds, and permanent funds.
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restricted, committed, nor assigned within the general fund. These fund balances represent
amounts that are freely usable for any purpose. 6 Figure 2.2 displays an example of a
governmental fund balance pre- and post-GASB 54 (City of Harrisonburg 2010; 2011).
[FIGURE 2.2 ABOUT HERE]
These fund balance category definitions demonstrate the intended hierarchy of resource
flexibility. GASB 54 offers additional guidance on how to separate fund balance amounts. After
separating “nonspendable” from “spendable” fund balances, GASB 54 suggests a distinction be
made between “restricted” and “unrestricted” spendable fund balances (GASB 2009). Thereby,
GASB 54 considers “unrestricted” amounts to be either committed, assigned, or unassigned
balances (depending on the level of resource constraint). Gore (2015) finds that municipalities
use fund balance discretion to manipulate or hide financial slack. Specifically, these governments
have discretion within the older “unreserved” fund types (Guo and Wang 2017), suggesting that
legislatures and finance departments are able to allocate funds as needed to unassigned,
assigned, and some committed fund balance types prior to GASB 54.
Expectations of uninterrupted services “compel local governments to find methods that
guarantee continued operations, preferably without changing tax and expenditure patterns”
(Arapis and Reitano 2017). Minimizing the impact of contingencies is a major rationale for
maintaining sufficient resources within fund balances (Gauthier 2009b). Chase and Roybark
(2010) suggest that state and local governments adopting GASB 54 considered creating or
updating policies regarding governmental fund balances. These policy considerations included:

6

GASB 54 provides examples and illustrations of each fund balance type (GASB 2009). For example,
Nonspendable includes inventory, prepaid amounts, and permanent funds. Restricted includes federal/state highway
grants, capital project contracts, and law enforcement funding mandated by constitutional policies. Committed
includes legislatively authorized education funding and formalized economic stabilization funds. Assigned includes
intended parks and recreation spending or finance committee approved renovation funding. Unassigned includes
positive general fund amounts or negative residual amounts (i.e., excess liabilities over assets and the combined
nonspendable, restricted, committed, and assigned fund balances).
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(1) committed and assigned funds; (2) stabilization funds; (3) the order of spending resources; (4)
the desired level of fund balances; and (5) reviewing fund classifications. In recognizing specific
influential factors, governments can plan a system of funds designed to offer stability in their
operations. For some governments, accumulating excess revenues over expenditures and saving
these amounts into the unassigned general fund allows for flexible usage if unexpected revenue
or expenditure fluctuations occur. The unassigned balance is considered the “most readily
available resource against unforeseen events and economic uncertainty” (Arapis and Reitano
2017).
Instead of informally accumulating budgetary slack within an unrestricted fund, the
GFOA “recommends that governments establish a formal policy on the level of unrestricted fund
balance that should be maintained” (GFOA 2015). As well, governments should develop formal
procedures on how to increase or decrease the unrestricted fund balance level over a specific
period of time. 7 Ignoring other individual government factors, the GFOA’s minimum
recommendation for general-purpose governments is to “maintain unrestricted budgetary fund
balance in their general fund of no less than two months of regular general fund operating
revenues or regular general fund operating expenditures” (GFOA 2015). This two month
minimum recommendation for covering government’s operating revenues or expenditures
replaces the original GFOA guidance of a “5 to 15 percent minimum” of general fund
unrestricted balance (Gauthier 2009b).

Fund Balance Research

7

Lofton’s (2018) survey suggests only some local governments use policies that maintain general fund balance
levels. In New York State, county governments were more likely to have a policy than a city, town, or village
government.
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Pre- and Post-GASB 54 Comparisons
Several studies investigate how fund balances have progressed from pre- to post-GASB
54 implementation. Specifically, these papers compare either the usage of fund balance
classifications or the allocation of amounts from the final year under the past fund balance
guidance to the first year under GASB 54 reporting. Arapis and Grady (2015) comment on how
GASB standards have evolved governmental financial reporting, emphasizing increased
accountability, transparency, uniformity, and simplicity. They find that in the pre-GASB 54
period almost all states utilized reserved and unreserved-undesignated general fund balance
types, but many did not utilize the unreserved-designated general fund balance type. Post-GASB
54, between 80 and 100 percent of states are utilizing nonspendable, committed, and unassigned
general fund balances, while between 60 and 80 percent of states are utilizing restricted and
assigned general fund balances. This suggests GASB 54 has increased accountability and clarity
in reporting fund balances based on spending flexibility.
Chase and Roybark (2013) describe the history and content of GASB 54’s
implementation and compare previous fund balance classifications to the new GASB 54 fund
balances using 51 Virginia city and county governments. Their analysis of the general fund
indicates a slight increase from 26.7 percent in average unrestricted fund balance as a percent of
general fund revenue in 2011 as compared to 25.2 percent in average unreserved fund balance
(both designated and undesignated) as a percent of general fund revenue in 2010. They find a
similar increase when comparing 2011 unassigned balances to 2010 unreserved-undesignated
balances, suggesting that governments had approximately fit both committed and assigned fund
balances into the old unreserved-designated fund balance.
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Kelly (2013) describes the features of GASB 54 and examines potential budget
stabilization usage and fund balance comparisons pre- and post-implementation. The majority of
sampled observations did comply with GASB 54 after the recommended deadline. The analysis
of a sample of medium-sized cities (between 100,000 and 250,000 in population) reveals that 68
percent of fiscal year 2010 unreserved fund balances were allocated to fiscal year 2011
unassigned fund balances. Also, all of the fiscal year 2010 reserved fund balances and remaining
32 percent of unreserved fund balances (i.e., combined 132 percent) were distributed 21 percent
to nonspendable, 6 percent to restricted, 43 percent to committed, and 62 percent to assigned
fund balances in fiscal year 2011. Additionally, supplemental disclosures were found to more
easily identify fund balances used for stabilization purposes.

Fund Balance Determinants
This subsection reviews literature that finds associations between fund balances and
governmental characteristics or factors. Many studies utilize pre-GASB 54 fund balance
categories in their samples. 8 In their fiscal savings article, Arapis and Reitano (2017) show that
the local government literature has highlighted many determinants of unreserved fund balance
types. Property taxes, local sales taxes, enterprise transfers, income per capita, and councilmanager form is suggested to be positively associated with unreserved fund balances.
Intergovernmental aid, debt per capita, general government expenditures, capital spending,
population, ethnic diversity, and teen or senior population is suggested to be negatively
associated with unreserved balances.

8

As several studies have sample years both before and after GASB 54 implementation, these researchers often
decide to select pre-GASB 54 balances (e.g., “unreserved”) for comparability.
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Two papers study the determinants of county government general fund balances within
three different states. Wang and Hou (2012) examine the factors that contribute to North
Carolina county governments’ general fund balances. They find positive associations between
general fund balance as a percent of total revenues and both property and sales taxes. There are
also negative associations between the general fund balance ratio and both capital outlay
expenditures and population. Guo and Wang (2017) investigate the factors influencing
unreserved general fund balance sizes in Florida county governments. Unreserved fund balance
scaled by general fund expenditures is found to be positively associated with property tax rate
and population but negatively associated with intergovernmental transfers scaled by general fund
revenue.
Similarly, several studies seek to determine the characteristics and financial conditions
that lead to higher unreserved fund accumulations. Hendrick (2006) studies the factors
associated with accumulating slack in unreserved fund balances with a sample of suburban
Chicago municipalities. The results show that the unreserved fund balance of governmental
funds is positively related to operating surpluses and capital spending and negatively related to
deficits, debt per capita, and total expenditures (i.e., municipality size). Su (2016) examines the
factors that influence municipalities’ financial slack accumulation in the general fund. Greater
tax revenue volatility, debt service expenditures, and capital expenditures are found to be
positively associated with greater amounts of accumulated unreserved general fund balance,
while population is negatively associated with accumulated unreserved general fund amounts.
Flick (2018) shows that county governments with reserve policies, higher prior expenditures, and
greater services provided had greater amounts of spendable fund balances.
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As an extension to other determinants studies, Stewart (2009) suggests that fund balance
determinants may depend on the overall economic environment. Thereby, Stewart (2009) studies
factors related to Mississippi counties’ unreserved fund balances during periods of economic
upturns and downturns. During upturns, changes in property tax revenue, other revenues, and per
capita income were related to unreserved fund increases, while changes in population and debt
per capita were related to unreserved fund decreases. During downturns, changes in nonwhite
population and population in general were related to unreserved fund increases, while county
governments with separate political and administrative responsibilities (i.e., a council-manager
form) and those with changes in debt per capita were related to unreserved fund decreases.
As seen in the aforementioned research, unreserved (or the more recent unassigned) fund
balances are often used to flexibly accumulate excess revenues beyond expenditures to reduce
the impact of unforeseen circumstances (Gauthier 2009b; Chase and Roybark 2010). However,
the GFOA’s recommendation suggested a formalized policy (such as a budget stabilization fund
or required general fund balance level) to hold governments accountable for maintaining their
“safety net.” Arapis and Reitano (2018) use Florida cities to examine the factors associated with
financial savings behavior relative to GFOA recommendations. Most sample cities are shown to
have maintained their unassigned general fund balance levels (i.e., not falling below the GFOA’s
recommendation) both inside and outside of the Great Recession. The main results indicate that
higher property taxes, population, and debt service expenditures increased the likelihood of
falling below the GFOA’s recommendation; while net enterprise transfers, general government
expenditures, and wealth decreased the likelihood of falling below the recommendation.
Multiple papers look at governmental factors associated with “rainy day fund” and
similar policies. Grizzle et al. (2015) investigate the factors associated with states’ adoption of a
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formal rainy day fund (such as policies on unreserved fund balance levels). They find that states
were more likely to adopt a rainy day fund when a neighboring state had a rainy day fund. Also,
revenue volatility was found to increase the likelihood of implementing a rainy day fund policy.
Stewart et al. (2018) determine factors that are associated with Illinois county unreserved fund
balance policies. Only 18 percent of Illinois counties are found to have unreserved or unassigned
reserve fund policies. Also, counties with larger median incomes and higher Democratic voting
in the 2016 presidential race were associated with a higher likelihood to adopt an
unreserved/unassigned fund balance policy.
In comparing two budgetary accumulation strategies (budget stabilization funds and
unreserved general fund balance), Gianakis and Snow (2007) examine how Massachusetts’ local
governments build and use their accumulated budgetary slack. They find a relatively weak
association between stabilization funds and free cash (i.e., unreserved general fund balances),
suggesting that these two stabilization tools are utilized for different purposes. They find some
significant determinants of free cash being positively related to population change and general
government expenditures, but negatively related to state aid.
Beyond finding factors related to budget accumulation, other government characteristics
could shape the level of fund balances. Stewart (2011) expands upon Stewart (2009) in
examining if the determinants of unreserved fund balance changes depend upon county
government type. Results are generally similar to Stewart (2009) during economic upturns,
except that unreserved balances decrease (increase) when both intergovernmental revenues
increase and when the county government has separate (non-separate) political and
administrative responsibilities. Stewart et al. (2013) investigate if revenue and expenditure
volatility impact changes in Illinois, North Carolina, and Mississippi counties’ unreserved fund
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balances scaled by general fund expenditures. Revenue volatility measures of property tax
revenue and other revenue increases led to higher unreserved balances, while intergovernmental
revenue increases led to lower unreserved balances. The only overall significant expenditure
volatility measure was rising unemployment leading to lower unreserved balances.
Jimenez (2017) studies if measures of bureaucracy impact municipality financial health.
The analysis indicates that municipalities with greater centralization of decisions and formalized
administrative policies have lower ratios of unrestricted net assets to expenses. These
relationships are insignificant for ratios of unreserved general fund balance to expenditures.
Population, unemployment growth, and debt per capita are found to be negatively related to
unreserved general fund balance ratios.
Governmental characteristics could also impact the classification and specific fund
locations for fund balances. Gore (2015) investigates if unionized municipalities are more likely
to utilize fund balances to hide resources. The results demonstrate that unionized municipalities
report lower (higher) percentages of fund balances inside (outside) of the general fund than nonunionized municipalities. Additionally, unionized municipalities tend to hold more general fund
resources in reserved and unreserved-designated balances than non-unionized municipalities.
These findings suggest discretionary resources may be hidden in less transparent funds.
Beyond local government-level characteristics, state funding and policies could also
influence local fund balances. Ványolós (2005) studies how New York State school district
budgeting is influenced by state aid uncertainty. Compared to changes in either revenues or
expenditures, changes to fund balances are found to better stabilize school district finances as
state aid differences occur. Greater state aid uncertainty appears to promote budgeting strategies
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such as accumulating larger unreserved-unappropriated fund balances. 9 Maher et al. (2017)
investigate how states’ tax and expenditure limitations influence state reserves (i.e., budget
stabilization funds and/or unreserved fund balance). Only a weak negative relationship is found
between tax and expenditure limitations and either percentage of unreserved fund balance or
percentage of total reserves, both scaled by expenditures. Revenue volatility is found to
positively predict unreserved balance percentage, while percentage of intergovernmental revenue
and Democratic Party control negatively predict unreserved balance percentage.

HYPOTHESES

The first goal of this paper is to assess how GASB 54 has shaped governmental fund
amounts. My model assesses how each previous fund balance category flows into the updated
fund balance categories (and percentages of flexible fund balance categories). Chase and
Roybark (2013) examine the fund balance shift in Virginia local governments’ general funds and
find evidence that unreserved-designated balances shifted predominantly into GASB 54’s
committed and assigned balances, while unreserved-undesignated balances flowed into GASB
54’s unassigned balances. Reserved balances tended to be made up of nonspendable, restricted,
and some committed fund balances. Similarly, Kelly (2013) uses a sample of medium-sized cities
to find that the majority of unreserved fund balances end up in unassigned fund balances.
However, reserved and the remaining unreserved fund balances are found to mainly fill either

9

Also at the school district level, Arapis, Reitano, and Bruck (2017) examine determinants of unassigned general
fund balances. Both higher property taxes and state aid is related to higher future unassigned balance per student.
Higher expenditures such as salaries and benefits, long-term debt, and transportation can lead to lower future per
pupil unassigned balances.
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committed or assigned balances. This suggests a significant amount of the previous reserved
balances included amounts that were more flexible than nonspendable or restricted balances.
As demonstrated by Chase and Roybark (2013) and Kelly (2013), there is some question
as to where prior fund balances have been allocated. One reason for slightly different findings
could be that Chase and Roybark (2013) analyzed the general fund alone, where Kelly (2013)
utilized the total governmental funds. To ensure that all governmental funds are accounted for, I
will analyze the fund balance amount shift using the total governmental fund balances that
include all major (e.g., general fund and capital projects funds) and other governmental funds.

Research Question 1: How do governmental fund balance amounts change between preand post-GASB 54 classifications?

After measuring the transfer of governmental fund balances, I seek to find determinants
of both separate fund balance categories and ratios of fund balance flexibility. I separate the
hypothesized determinants of governmental fund balances into either financial or demographic
factors. The financial factors look into either different revenue compositions (Zhang and Rich
2016) or prior year deficits that could incrementally explain fund balance flexibility. The
demographic factors investigate population, income, and unemployment characteristics.
Property taxes are found to be associated with greater unreserved fund balances (Arapis
and Reitano 2017) and larger general fund ratios (Wang and Hou 2012). Also, larger property tax
rates are found to be positively related to unreserved fund balances (Guo and Wang 2017). These
suggest governments with greater percentages of tax revenues accumulate budgetary slack in
flexible fund balances. Furthermore, Stewart (2009) finds evidence that property tax increases
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help build budgetary slack within unreserved fund balances during economic upturns. Thereby,
governments are more likely to accumulate excess revenues during prosperous times in case of
future uncertainties. Based on this evidence, I propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Municipalities with greater property tax revenues have more flexible
governmental fund balances.

Governments can also accumulate revenues from service fees (e.g., water and
transportation usage) (Zhang and Rich 2016). Charges and fees can be major supplemental
revenue sources to taxes that impact budgetary slack (Su 2016). Increases in other revenue
sources that include service fees are found to increase unreserved fund balances (Stewart 2009).
Stewart et al. (2013) also find that the volatility measure of other revenue sources (e.g., user fees)
is positively associated with unreserved funding levels. Additionally, counties with a greater
number of services are related to higher spendable fund balances (Flick 2018). Much like
property taxes, these findings suggest municipalities can build flexible funding reserves from
user fees and charges. Accordingly, I propose the related hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Municipalities with greater service fee revenues have more flexible
governmental fund balances.

Unlike property taxes and service fee revenues, debt proceeds are a funding source that
has an internally costly usage (e.g., interest costs). Governments may utilize debt to help cover
large investments or budgetary shortfalls. This entails that governments will be less likely to
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accumulate reserve funding through debt issuances. Many papers support this by discovering that
higher (lower) debt per capita is associated with lower (higher) unreserved or general fund
balances (Hendrick 2006; Gore 2015; Arapis and Reitano 2017; Jimenez 2017). Debt service
expenditures are also shown to increase the chances of falling below the GFOA’s recommended
unrestricted balances (Arapis and Reitano 2018). Furthermore, Stewart (2009) determines that
the negative relationship between debt changes and unreserved fund balance changes are robust
to both periods of economic upturns and downturns. These findings demonstrate that
governments with higher debt have significant obligations that limit their ability to save amounts
into flexible fund balances. Thereby, I suggest the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: Municipalities with greater debt proceeds have less flexible governmental
fund balances.

Intergovernmental revenues are another revenue source attributed to lower unreserved
fund balances (Stewart et al. 2013; Arapis and Reitano 2017; Guo and Wang 2017; Maher et al.
2017). Local governments with poorer finances may rely on higher government funding (e.g.,
federal or state aid) for sustainability (Gianakis and Snow 2007). This suggests that governments
with greater intergovernmental revenues are more resource dependent on external funding
sources and will have lower excess revenues to accumulate in flexible fund balances. As well,
intergovernmental revenues may include restrictive provisions that limit how the funds are spent.
Following this logic, I suggest the hypothesis below:
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Hypothesis 4: Municipalities with greater intergovernmental revenues have less flexible
governmental fund balances.

Research also points to governments reporting deficits as leading to lower unreserved or
general fund balances (Hendrick 2006; Gore 2015). A deficit entails that a government incurred
more expenditures than the revenues collected over the period. A past period deficit would then
be offset against any positive unassigned fund balance in the current period. 10 Intuitively,
governments running a deficit would be less likely to have future excess funding remaining in
flexible fund balances. Accordingly, I suggest the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 5: Municipalities with prior deficits have less flexible governmental fund
balances.

Two studies find a positive relationship between a government’s population (or changes
in population) and unreserved general fund balances (Gianakis and Snow 2007; Guo and Wang
2017), suggesting that governments have more citizens to tax when population is larger. A
greater number of papers, however, determined that increased populations are associated with
decreased unreserved or general fund balances (Stewart 2009; Wang and Hou 2012; Gore 2015;
Su 2016; Arapis and Reitano 2017; Jimenez 2017). Arapis and Reitano (2018) also highlight
population as a factor that reduces the probability of meeting GFOA fund balance
recommendations. This relationship could show that governments with larger populations have
greater obligations to provide services. These incremental expenditures may hinder

10

Current period deficits and current fund period balances are likely contemporaneous factors. To avoid violating a
strict exogeneity assumption, lagged deficits are used to test the effect on current fund balances.
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governments’ efforts to accumulate fund balances in flexible categories. Thereby, I propose the
hypothesis below:

Hypothesis 6: Municipalities with greater populations have less flexible governmental fund
balances.

Governments with wealthier citizens suggest a benefit of greater tax revenues per person.
In line with this, Arapis and Reitano (2017; 2018) find evidence that local governments with
higher income per capita have higher unreserved fund balances and are more likely to meet
GFOA recommended fund balance levels, respectively. Stewart et al. (2018) also finds a positive
association between per capita income and unreserved fund balance policies. During economic
upturns, governments with higher median or positive changes in per capita income are also found
to have higher unreserved or total governmental fund balances (Stewart 2009; Stewart et al.
2017). This higher per capita income suggests that governments are more likely to accumulate
excess revenues from constituents with higher tax burdens beyond the service expenditures that
governments are required to provide. This leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 7: Municipalities with greater incomes per capita have more flexible
governmental fund balances.

On the opposite side of citizen wealth, unemployment represents a reduction of income
for governments to benefit from. Research finds a negative relationship between unemployment
rates and unreserved or unrestricted fund balances (Stewart et al. 2013; Jimenez 2017; Stewart et
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al. 2017). Unemployment entails lower revenues from citizens per capita due to the average
citizen having less disposable spending or taxable income. Thereby, governments with higher
unemployment should have lower amounts in their flexible fund balances. Furthermore,
governments may still be required to provide a standard level of services despite this revenue
reduction. Following this rationale, I hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 8: Municipalities with greater unemployment have less flexible governmental
fund balances.

METHOD

Sample
As I examine how prior fund balances have rearranged into the updated GASB 54 fund
balances (i.e., RQ1), I gather CAFRs from a sample of 2010 fiscal year-end municipalities using
pre-GASB 54 fund balances that also utilize GASB 54 fund balances in their 2011 fiscal yearend. With GASB 54’s required implementation date being fiscal years beginning June 15, 2010,
the fiscal year-end 2011 represents the first year under GASB 54 guidance for most
municipalities. I start with the 364 unique municipalities used in Rich, Roberts, and Zhang
(2016). 11 After removing observations missing GASB 54 fund balances in 2011, adopting GASB
54 early in 2010, or missing necessary data, my final sample for fund balance reclassification
analysis is 228 municipalities from 45 states (see Table 2.1, Panel A).

11

Rich et al. (2016) limits their sample by restricting observations to municipalities that have 25,000 or more in
population, responded to the International City/County Management Association’s 2011 Municipal Form of
Government survey (ICMA 2011), and had the necessary financial and control data (i.e., CAFR, Federal Audit
Clearinghouse, and governance information).
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[TABLE 2.1 ABOUT HERE]
To find the determinants of GASB 54 percentages or levels of fund balances based on
spending flexibility (i.e., H1-H8), I use a panel data sample of municipalities with ending fiscal
years between 2011 and 2015. Using the same 364 municipalities as my reclassification analysis
(Rich et al. 2016), I obtain 1,456 potential municipality-year observations between 2012 and
2015. 12 My final municipality-year sample for my determinants model is 792 from 274 unique
municipalities in 45 states once observations missing the necessary CAFR, demographic, and
financial data are omitted (see Table 2.1, Panel B).
I consider the municipality-level government interesting for analyzing fund balance
determinants since many municipal governments collect revenues from a variety of sources such
as citizens with property taxes or state governments with intergovernmental revenues.
Additionally, municipalities may have some important characteristics with population, wealth, or
government type that could be increasingly noisy at the state-level.

Design
For assessing RQ1 (i.e., how municipalities allocated their prior total governmental fund
balance category amounts to the updated GASB 54 balances), I estimate Equation (1) using a
pooled ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression:

𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 ) = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

12

Since I have a lagged (t-1) deficit control variable, I drop fiscal-year 2011 fund balance observations.
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(1)

Equation (1) utilizes a sample of municipalities with 2011 fiscal year-end that changed to
GASB 54 fund balance categories from the pre-GASB 54 categories in 2010 fiscal year-end.
Furthering the general fund balance ratios shown in Gore (2015), my dependent variable
(FBPcnt) separately uses ratios (j) based on either the percentage of discretionary (unrestricted)
fund balances to total governmental fund balances (UnrestrictedPcnt; i.e., combined committed,
assigned, and unassigned balances to total balances) or the percentage of most flexible
(unassigned) balance to total unrestricted balances (UnassignedPcnt; i.e., unassigned balances to
combined committed, assigned, and unassigned balances). 13 By using the FBPcnt dependent
variables, any significant positive parameter estimates for the independent variables would
indicate that a determinant is associated with more flexible total governmental fund balance
types, while any significant negative parameter estimates would infer that a determinant is
associated with less flexible total governmental fund balance types.
Alternatively, I run Equation (1) with FB that denotes each GASB 54 total governmental
fund balance category (k) amount per capita (i.e., NonspendablePC, RestrictedPC,
CommittedPC, AssignedPC, and UnassignedPC) for a given municipality in the fiscal year-end
2011. 14 I also include a composite unrestricted governmental fund balance per capita (i.e.,
UnrestrictedPC) within (k). Each dependent variable category amount will be inserted into the

13

Some municipality-years feature negative governmental unassigned fund balance amounts (i.e., a negative
residual fund balance after allocating amounts to other fund balance classifications). In other words, this represents
combined total governmental liabilities and nonspendable, restricted, committed, and assigned fund balances
exceeding their total governmental assets. These observations are omitted from the analysis since including negative
unassigned amounts in percentage variables (i.e., UnrestrictedPcnt and UnassignedPcnt) can result in illogical
mathematical values (i.e., “negative” or “greater than 100-percent” percentage values).
14
I choose to use per capita transformations of fund balances instead of logarithmic transformations due to some
observations having fund balances with values below zero (e.g., negative unassigned balances). Scaling fund
balances by per capita also helps limit the influence of extreme fund balance values of some municipalities (i.e.,
very large fund balances in major cities).
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model separately. These fund balance amounts are found in each municipality’s Governmental
Funds Balance Sheet.
The independent variables of interest (time t-1) in Equation (1) are separately inserted
PreFB. This represents each of the prior total governmental fund balance category (l) amounts in
thousands of dollars per capita for a given municipality in the fiscal year-end 2010 (i.e., preGASB 54 balances). ReservedPC, UnreservedDPC, and UnreservedUPC represents reserved,
unreserved-designated, and unreserved-undesignated total governmental fund balances. Since
some municipalities report “unclear” unreserved fund balances in their governmental funds
balance sheets (i.e., neither designated nor undesignated amounts), I also run Equation (1) with a
separate prior independent variable of interest (l) for unreserved-nonspecific funds in thousands
of dollars per capita (i.e., UnreservedNPC). 15
Equation (1) contains five economic-based control variables. The first four control
variables are gathered from U.S. Census Bureau government finance data compiled by Pierson,
Hand, and Thompson (2015). PropTaxPC is the total property tax revenues, ServFeesPC is the
total general service charges, DebtIssPC is the total new long-term debt proceeds acquired, and
IGRevPC is the total intergovernmental revenues. Each funding source variable is in thousands
of dollars per capita. The final economic control variable, Deficit, is based on CAFR information
within the Statement of Revenues, Expenditures, and Changes in Fund Balances for
governmental funds. This indicator variable is equal to one if the municipality has a prior year
excess of expenditures over revenues at the governmental funds level (after other financing
sources and uses), otherwise the value is zero.

15

Note that unreserved-nonspecific fund balances are not an officially defined category by either the GASB or
NCGA. I use this category to avoid allocating indistinct unreserved balances to other categories.
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Moreover, I have three demographic control variables in Equation (1). LogPopul is the
natural log of a municipality’s population from the U.S. Census Bureau. IncomePC is the income
per capita (in thousands of dollars) within the county of the municipality as found in the
American Community Survey by the U.S. Census Bureau. Unemp is the unemployment rate (in
percentage form) within a municipality’s county from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics
via the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Stewart et al. 2017).
I also include Educ that represents the percentage of citizens with a bachelor’s degree
within a municipality’s county from the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (Rich et
al. 2016). Another control variable added is CouncilMgr representing an indicator variable equal
to one if the municipality has a council-manager form of government, equal to zero otherwise
(i.e., strong-mayor form) according to the ICMA (2011) Municipal Form of Government Survey
(Rich et al. 2016). A council-manager form of government represents a system where an elected
council appoints a governmental administrator, while a strong-mayor form represents a system
where the elected mayor also runs the operations of the government. 16 State indicator variables
(d) are inserted in Equation (1) as well.
To test H1-H8 (i.e., finding the economic and demographic determinants of GASB 54
total governmental fund balance category amounts), I will use pooled OLS in Equation (2):

16

Even though career finance officers in council-manager forms are expected to have greater expertise and less
political pressures for managing government finances than elected officials in strong-mayor forms, Stewart (2009)
finds an unexpected relationship between lower unreserved balances and the council-manager form. This evidence is
not enough to suggest any directional hypotheses within the paper.
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𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 )

= 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

+ 𝛽𝛽5 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝛽6 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽10 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(2)

The sample used in Equation (2) consists of municipality-year observations from fiscal
year-end 2012 to fiscal year-end 2015. 17 As described above, my dependent variables are
separate fund balance flexibility ratios (FBPcnt) or subsets of total governmental fund balance
amounts per capita (FB) under GASB 54’s guidance. The dependent variables in this
determinants model are specified in time t, similar to most independent variables.
The economic characteristics of interest (i.e., PropTaxPC, ServFeesPC, DebtIssPC,
IGRevPC, and Deficit) and demographic variables of interest (i.e., LogPopul, IncomePC, and
Unemp) within Equation (2) are the same as described in Equation (1). Additional control
variables (i.e., Educ and CounMgr) are also similar to those described earlier. Equation (2)
includes state indicator variables (d) and yearly indicator variables (t). My estimates incorporate
municipality-clustered standard errors. As explained in H1-H8, I predict that PropTaxPC,
ServFeesPC, and IncomePC will be positively related to flexible fund balances, but DebtIssPC,
IGRevPC, Deficit, LogPopul, and Unemp will be negatively related to flexible fund balances.

RESULTS

17

Since Equation (2) has a lagged independent variable (i.e., Deficit), I cannot analyze GASB 54 fund balance
dependent variables for 2011 (i.e., the fiscal year-end after the GASB 54 implementation required date).
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Univariate Results
Table 2.2 contains summary statistics for all variables. With UnrestrictedPcnt having a
mean of 51.59 percent, this suggests that about half of all governmental fund balances in the
sample fall into the combined committed, assigned, and unassigned balances. Similarly,
UnassignedPcnt having a mean of 50.45 percent demonstrates that about half of all sample
unrestricted governmental fund balances can be found in the unassigned category. 18 To assess
the magnitude of raw fund balance amounts, I include all municipality-year observations (n =
792). I find means of $5.18 million, $38.66 million, $13.81 million, $11.38 million, and $13.81
million for Nonspendable, Restricted, Committed, Assigned, and Unassigned governmental fund
balances, respectively. However, the medians are $1.03 million, $19.85 million, $3.28 million,
$4.36 million, and $10.21 million, respectively. This suggests a right skew in my data where
some larger municipalities are driving the means larger than the medians. With GFOARecRev
having a mean of 0.41 and GFOARecExp having a mean of 0.42, this indicates that just under
half of municipality-year observations follow GFOA fund balance reserve recommendations at
the total governmental funds level.
[TABLE 2.2 ABOUT HERE]
In regards to the pre-GASB 54 funds, Reserved balances represent larger amounts than
unreserved-designated (i.e., UnreservedD), unreserved-undesignated (i.e., UnreservedU), and
“non-specific” unreserved balances (i.e., UnreservedN). 19 With sample means of $48.18 million,
$44.87 million, $35.32, and $49.32 million for PropTax, ServFees, DebtIss, and IGRev,
respectively, property taxes, general service charges, and intergovernmental revenues appear to

18

Note that the variables UnrestrictedPcnt and UnassignedPcnt only include observations with non-negative
unassigned governmental fund balances (n = 712).
19
Note that the pre-GASB 54 fund balances only include fiscal-year 2010 amounts (t-1) from the usable sample that
is run in Equation (1) (n = 228).
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be more prominent sources of funding than new long-term debt proceeds for the average
municipality. Prior Deficit observations appear to make up 45 percent of my prior municipalityyear sample. The typical municipality also has about 105,000 in population (i.e., Popul), about
$45,000 in county-level per capita income (i.e., IncomePC), and unemployment of 6.98 percent
(i.e., Unemp).
Table 2.3 provides pairwise correlations for variables used in the study. Panel A shows
variables used in Equation (1) (n = 228). I find significant correlations at the five percent level
between ReservedPC and UnrestrictedPcnt (-0.25), and also between UnreservedDPC and
UnassignedPcnt (-0.32) (n = 196). These findings give initial evidence that most reserved
balances went outside of unrestricted categories after GASB 54, while most unreserveddesignated balances were not allocated to the unassigned balance after GASB 54. ReservedPC
seems to have significantly positive relationships to all future GASB 54 fund balances per capita,
but the highest correlation (0.75) is with restricted balances (i.e., RestrictedPC). UnreservedDPC
also shows positive correlations with all GASB 54 balances, but has the highest correlation
(0.76) with assigned balances (i.e., AssignedPC). Unreserved-undesignated balances (i.e.,
UnreservedUPC) only shows a significant positive correlation (0.18) with unassigned per capita
balances (i.e., UnassignedPC), while “non-specific” unreserved balances (i.e. UnreservedNPC)
are positively correlated with committed (0.24) and unassigned (0.40) balances (i.e.,
CommittedPC and UnassignedPC, respectively). These stated correlations tend to follow
findings from Chase and Roybark (2013) and Kelly (2013).
[TABLE 2.3 ABOUT HERE]
Panel B displays pairwise correlations for variables run in Equation (2) for H1-H8 (n =
792). Using observations with non-negative unassigned balances (n = 712), I find a significant
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positive correlation at the five percent level (0.16) between UnrestrictedPcnt and PropTaxPC,
supporting H1. With the full Equation (2) sample, I find some evidence for H6 in significant
negative correlations between LogPopul and both flexible fund balance ratios. IncomePC,
Unemp, and the Educ control variables show significant swapped signs when correlated with
different measurements of fund balance flexibility percentages (i.e., UnrestrictedPcnt and
UnassignedPcnt), suggesting mixed results for H7 and H8. As estimated in Equation (2), the
only pairwise correlations shown above 0.40 (or -0.40) for independent variables run
simultaneously is between PropTaxPC and IGRevPC, PropTaxPC and StIGRevPC, and
IncomePC and Educ (at 0.55, 0.57, and 0.46, respectively).

Multivariate Results
I estimate Equation (1) with OLS to investigate GASB 54’s reclassification of fund
balances (i.e., RQ1). Table 2.4, Panel A analyzes the relationship between pre- and post-GASB
54 fund balance relationships with flexibility ratios (i.e., UnrestrictedPcnt and UnassignedPcnt)
for dependent variables in time t and separately inserted independent variables of interest for
NCGA-defined prior fund balance per capita categories (i.e., ReservedPC, UnreservedDPC, and
UnreservedUPC) in time t-1. In Column [1], I find a significant negative coefficient estimate (18.832; p = 0.001) for ReservedPC that suggests prior reserved balances were allocated in more
restrictive funds (i.e., nonspendable or restricted) than unrestricted balances under GASB 54. An
insignificant relationship in Column [2] suggests that ReservedPC has little information within
the unassigned balances. A significant positive estimate (14.804; p = 0.013) in Column [3] and a
significant negative estimate (-23.605; p =0.001) in Column [4] for UnreservedDPC indicates
that prior unreserved-designated fund balances were generally appropriated to the new
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unrestricted balances, but not towards the unassigned category. Both insignificant estimates of
UnreservedUPC in Columns [5] and [6] demonstrate contrary results to Chase and Roybark
(2013) and Kelly (2013) in that amounts within the prior unreserved-undesignated classifications
were actually spread throughout various GASB 54 fund balances (e.g., undesignated highway
funding in a highway fund now considered restricted under GASB 54).
[TABLE 2.4 ABOUT HERE]
Table 2.4, Panel B tests Equation (1) with fund balance flexibility ratio dependent
variables in time t and a non-specifically disclosed unreserved governmental funds independent
variable (i.e., UnreservedNPC) in time t-1. Both coefficients for UnreservedNPC show
insignificance at predicting UnrestrictedPcnt and UnassignedPcnt, again suggesting that preGASB 54 governmental fund balances had inconsistent application depending on fund purposes.
Based on my fund balance flexibility percentages, there appears to be predictability with
allocating prior reserved and unreserved-designated, but not unreserved-undesignated nor
unreserved-nonspecific balances.
To assess the relative allocation of fund balance amounts per capita from prior categories
in 2010 (time t-1) to GASB 54 categories in 2011 (time t), I also estimate Equation (1) in Table
2.5 with separate dependent variables for each GASB 54 fund balance (i.e., NonspendablePC,
RestrictedPC, CommittedPC, AssignedPC, and UnassignedPC) and one with a composite
unrestricted fund balance (i.e., UnrestrictedPC). Panel A first tests the association of
ReservedPC on GASB 54 balances per capita. I find positive significant coefficients in Columns
[1] and [2] (both p < 0.001). This indicates that, other things held constant, a $1,000 increase in
prior reserved balances per capita would separately increase nonspendable balances per capita by
$180 and increase restricted balances per capita by $623. No other coefficient for flexible fund

130

balances is significant in Columns [3]-[6], which suggests that prior reserved amounts were
allocated to nonspendable and especially restricted fund balances.
[TABLE 2.5 ABOUT HERE]
Table 2.5, Panel B assesses the relationship between UnreservedDPC and GASB 54
balances. Throughout Columns [1]-[6] I detect significant coefficients (all p < 0.05) for
UnreservedDPC with all separate GASB 54 fund balances per capita and UnrestrictedPC.
Others things equal, a $1,000 increase in prior unreserved-designated governmental fund
balances would increase nonspendable by $77, restricted by $324, committed by $67, assigned
by $406, and unassigned balances by $96. Panel C looks at how UnreservedUPC impacts the
newer fund balance categories. I find significant positive estimates for RestrictedPC in Column
[2] and UnassignedPC in Column [5] at the five percent level (increases of $191 and $207,
respectively, with a $1,000 increase in UnreservedUPC). The panel also displays a negative
coefficient for NonspendablePC in Column [1] and a positive coefficient for CommittedPC in
Column [3] significant at the ten percent level. Both of these panel results highlight more
evidence that specific fund purposes obfuscated the actual fund balance flexibility of amounts
prior to GASB 54.
Panel D of Table 2.5 checks the association of non-specific unreserved prior balances per
capita (i.e., UnreservedNPC) on GASB 54 balances. The findings suggest a less noisy prior
category than NCGA-defined fund balance classifications (i.e., UnreservedDPC or
UnreservedUPC). The only significant coefficients are for CommittedPC in Column [3] and
UnassignedPC in Column [5] (both p < 0.01). A $1,000 increase in prior non-specific
unreserved fund balance is associated with a $103 increase in committed and $192 increase in
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unassigned balances. I do not detect any significance with NonspendablePC nor RestrictedPC
(nor AssignedPC).
Equation (2) addresses H1-H8 and will use a pooled OLS model with municipalityclustered standard errors to assess the associations between determinants in time t and GASB 54
per capita fund balance classification amounts (or percentages of more flexible fund balances) in
time t. PropTaxPC, ServFeesPC, and IncomePC (i.e., H1, H2, and H7 respectively) are expected
to be positively related to flexible fund balances. DebtIssPC, IGRevPC, Deficit, LogPopul, and
Unemp (i.e., H3, H4, H5, H6, and H8 respectively) are expected to be positively related to
flexible fund balances.
Table 2.6 estimates Equation (2) with my fund balance flexibility ratios. I detect few
results that my economic variables of interest influence flexibility percentage measures. For
PropTaxPC, there is an insignificant coefficient when the dependent variable is UnrestrictedPcnt
in Column [1] and a significant negative coefficient (-21.105; p = 0.004) when the dependent
variable is UnassignedPcnt in Column [2]. This evidence suggests property taxes are generally
allocated for specific purposes (not slack accumulation) and goes against H1. At the ten percent
significance level, the coefficient for ServFeesPC is 4.255 (p = 0.097) in Column [1] (and no
significance in Column [2]). This gives only some support to H2 in that general service charges
can be used for discretionary spending, but not as much for slack accumulation (Stewart et al.
2013).
[TABLE 2.6 ABOUT HERE]
My demographic independent variables of interest show more statistically significant
parameter estimates. With significant negative estimates (p < 0.05) of LogPopul in both Columns
[1] and [2], this points to evidence that municipalities with larger populations are associated with
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less governmental fund balance flexibility (e.g., Stewart 2009; Wang and Hou 2012). IncomePC
having a positive coefficient (0.251; p = 0.021) in Column [1] suggests that wealthier
municipalities have both a higher tax base and expectations towards internally-appropriated
spending (i.e., higher community investment) (e.g., Arapis and Reitano 2017). The negative
coefficient for Unemp (-1.243; p = 0.026) in Column [1] suggests internal spending cuts in the
presence of higher unemployment conditions (Stewart et al. 2013; Jimenez 2017). Thereby, these
findings indicate support for H6-H8. Also interestingly, I find a significant negative relationship
(-0.299; p = 0.016) between Educ and UnassignedPcnt in Column [2] inferring that perhaps
more educated citizenry expects greater usage of fund balances and not financial accumulation.
Table 2.7 shows results of my determinants model (i.e., Equation (2)) with separate
GASB 54 fund balance per capita dependent variables. Within Column [1] for NonspendablePC,
there is a positive coefficient with IGRevPC (16.788; p = 0.049) and a negative coefficient with
prior Deficit (-12.577; p = 0.030) at the five percent level. This could indicate that highergovernment level grants may provide funding for inventory for specific projects, and that prior
deficits reduce municipalities’ ability to replenish its inventory or prepaid expenses. At the ten
percent significance level, there is some evidence that wealthier municipalities (IncomePC 1.388; p = 0.063) hold fewer not-spendable-in-form funds. For RestrictedPC in Column [2], a
significant positive coefficient is found for IGRevPC (103.424; p = 0.002), suggesting that higher
level governments may place restrictions on funding usage. There is also some evidence of
higher property taxes per capita (PropTaxPC 159.319; p = 0.091) being partially allocated to
restricted purposes (e.g., capital projects or debt service). More educated municipalities (i.e.,
Educ) are also found to be related to higher restricted balances.
[TABLE 2.7 ABOUT HERE]
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For Column [3], both PropTaxPC (279.506; p = 0.002) and ServFeesPC (43.457; p =
0.050) are positively associated with CommittedPC. This indicates that municipalities use
property taxes and service fees to pay for internally mandated spending functions (e.g., police or
library budgeted items). At the ten percent significance level, using AssignedPC in Column [4]
shows a negative relationship with DebtIssPC (-45.337; p = 0.082), but a positive relationship
with IGRevPC (89.450; p = 0.054). These findings may infer that debt proceeds are typically not
used for intended-only purposes, and that intergovernmental revenues may give some flexibility
to use for intended purposes. As well, there is a positive relationship between Educ and
AssignedPC.
UnassignedPC is the dependent variable in Column [5]. I see significant positive
coefficients for ServFeesPC (102.965; p = 0.011) and IGRevPC (152.098; p = 0.006). These
funding sources are suggested to allow municipalities to build financial slack (e.g., fees beyond
service costs or state tax sharing). This provides support for H2 but not H4. Showing evidence
for H5, a prior Deficit (-27.552; p = 0.006) appears to reduce unassigned fund balances in the
subsequent year. LogPopul having a coefficient of -59.237 (p = 0.011) indicates larger
populations reduce financial flexibility (supporting H6).
Column [6] runs Equation (2) with an UnrestrictedPC dependent variable. Support for
H1 and H2 is found with positive estimates for PropTaxPC and ServFeesPC (p < 0.05),
suggesting internal government flexibility with these funding sources. IGRevPC (260.250; p =
0.002) also follows this suggestion, but goes against my H4. A prior Deficit (-36.455; p = 0.063)
is shown to be negatively related to UnrestrictedPC at a ten percent level following H5. Similar
to UnassignedPC, larger population municipalities (i.e., LogPopul) demonstrate a lack of fund
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balance flexibility with UnrestrictedPC (-73.630; p = 0.042), again supporting H6. Additionally,
Educ (6.688; p = 0.024) is found to be positively related to UnrestrictedPC.
Based on my results from Tables 2.6 and 2.7, only some of my economic-based
hypotheses are supported. I find mixed evidence for H1. A negative estimate on PropTaxPC
when the dependent variable is UnassignedPcnt and positive estimates when dependent variables
are CommittedPC and UnrestrictedPC suggest property tax revenues tend to fund internallyimposed purposes. H2 appears supported as ServFeesPC is significantly positive for dependent
variables CommittedPC, UnassignedPC, and UnrestrictedPC (and UnrestrictedPcnt at the ten
percent level) indicating general service charges as fund source for both financial accumulation
and municipality mandated purposes. There is a lack of support for H3 since only DebtIssPC is
negatively related to AssignedPC at the ten percent significance level. This could entail
municipalities use long-term debt proceeds for both restrictive purposes (e.g., capital projects)
and financial flexibility. Results are also mixed for H4. Both coefficients of IGRevPC are
insignificant for flexible fund balance ratio dependent variables, but also both coefficients are
significantly positive during RestrictedPC and Unrestricted PC. These conflicting findings may
suggest different characteristics with certain types of intergovernmental transfers (e.g., state tax
sharing or federal redevelopment grants). Based on negative estimates of prior Deficit when the
dependent variables are UnassignedPC and UnrestrictedPC lend some support for H5. It appears
that many fund balance categories are affected by prior deficits, but predominantly the most
flexible unassigned balances.
In general, Tables 2.6 and 2.7 generally demonstrates evidence for my demographic
hypotheses. When dependent variables are UnrestrictedPcnt, UnassignedPcnt, UnrestrictedPC,
and UnassignedPC, all coefficient estimates of LogPopul are significantly negative, which lends
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evidence towards H6. Even though larger municipalities may have more people to provide
services for, they may also have higher efficiencies due to more densely clustered populations
requiring less investment per person. H7 shows only some support. IncomePC is positively
related to UnrestrictedPcnt, but does not show any significance toward any specific flexible fund
balance category. This could entail wealthier municipalities enjoy financial flexibility to adjust
specific fund balances as required. Similarly with H8 on slight support, Unemp is only
significantly negatively related to UnrestrictedPcnt, but not other flexible funds balances per
capita. This points to a lack of spending flexibility to adjust specific fund balance types.

Supplemental Analyses
In addition to modeling determinants of fund balances and flexibility, I follow Arapis and
Reitano (2018) and examine the factors that may contribute to municipalities adhering to the
GFOA’s (2015) recommendation to hold two months of total estimated revenues (or
expenditures) within unrestricted fund reserves. I test Equation (2) with alternate dependent
variables either GFOARecRev or GFOARecExp. 20 This variable is estimated by taking total
revenues (or expenditures) from Census government data in Pierson et al. (2015) and dividing
the amount by six (i.e., for two months’ worth). GFOARecRev (or GFOARecExp) represents an
indicator variable equal to one if a municipality-year observation has an unrestricted
governmental fund balance greater than or equal to the approximate two months’ worth of total
annual revenues (or expenditures), equal to zero otherwise. A linear probability model is run to
analyze relationships with these new dependent variables. As the GFOA’s recommendation

20

Even though the GFOA’s recommended ratio is measured at the “general fund” level (GFOA 2015), I argue that
the total governmental funds provides greater information content for analyzing fund balance reserves.
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encourages accumulating unrestricted reserves, I would expect similar association directions as
the determinants and flexible balance relationships in Equation (2).
[TABLE 2.8 ABOUT HERE]
As shown in Table 2.8, most hypothesized determinants do not seem to predict adherence
to GFOA recommended reserves at the governmental funds level. Surprisingly, coefficients for
ServFeesPC are both significantly negative (p < 0.05) in Columns [1] and [2] suggesting that
general services fees hinder municipalities’ ability to accumulate reserves compared to operating
revenues or expenditures. Perhaps this reflects service costs exceeding usage revenues. At the ten
percent significance level, there is a negative association between prior Deficit and
GFOARecExp (-0.055; p = 0.077) in Column [2]. This could indicate both a decrease in reserves
and a relatively inelastic degree of citizen service expectations. Both significantly positive
estimates of IncomePC (p < 0.01) signal that wealth assists municipalities in building reserves to
withstand potential financial hardships (Arapis and Reitano 2018). Positive coefficients found for
both Educ and CouncilMgr could indicate higher financial accountability with a relatively more
educated population, and greater financial and operational expertise with a council-manager form
of government.
As demonstrated by the significant results of IGRevPC with several conflicting fund
balance types, there could be underlying characteristics with different types of intergovernmental
revenues. The federal government could provide grants for specific restrictive purposes (e.g.,
crime or highway repairs) or on a “needs basis” (e.g., struggling school district performance or
depressed downtown redevelopment funds). On the other hand, some state intergovernmental
transfers could be due to returns of taxes and revenues collected by the municipality’s state.
Accordingly, I estimate Equation (2) by separating IGRevPC into total federal intergovernmental
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revenues (i.e., FedIGRevPC) and total state intergovernmental revenues (i.e., StIGRevPC) each
per capita in thousands of dollars.
[TABLE 2.9 ABOUT HERE]
In Table 2.9, Panel A uses the flexible fund balance percentages as dependent variables.
FedIGRevPC shows insignificance for both columns, while StIGRevPC is positively related to
UnassignedPcnt (8.294; p = 0.097) in Column [2]. Panel B utilizes dependent variables for
GASB 54 fund balance types per capita. In Columns [4] and [6], FedIGRevPC is positively
associated with AssignedPC (270.662; p = 0.085) and UnrestrictedPC (464.439; p = 0.079). This
suggests some federal transfers allow municipalities discretion in spending. Somewhat
remarkably, there is no evidence that federal intergovernmental revenues (i.e., restrictive use
grants) build restricted fund balances. Columns [2], [5], and [6] shows positive estimates for
StIGRevPC (all p < 0.01) with RestrictedPC, UnassignedPC, and UnrestrictedPC dependent
variables, respectively. Outside of flexible use revenue sharing, states appear to also provide
restrictively purposed funding. Overall, higher level governments appear to make
intergovernmental transfers for a variety of reasons and a range of restrictiveness.

CONCLUSION

My paper has two primary research objectives. Firstly, I investigate the rearranging of
newly implemented GASB 54 fund balances from the prior year’s pre-GASB 54 fund balances.
The classification rearrangement model indicates that prior reserved governmental fund balances
are directly associated with nonspendable and restricted GASB 54 fund balance types. Despite
unreserved-designated prior balances being positively associated with flexible fund balance
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ratios, those balances (and somewhat unreserved-undesignated balances) are also positively
associated with both more restrictive and flexible GASB 54 fund balance categories, suggesting
a wide variation of fund balance classification depending on fund purpose. Any “non-specific”
unreserved balances appear to be related to committed and unassigned fund balances.
Secondly, I seek to find the determinants of GASB 54-based fund balances based on
spending flexibility. The determinants model shows general service fees being positively
associated with fund balance flexibility and prior period deficits being negatively associated with
fund balance flexibility. Long-term debt proceeds shows no predictive value of flexible fund
balances, while results are mixed for both property tax and intergovernmental revenues. Also,
population indicates a negative relationship with fund balance flexibility. Some evidence is
found that flexible fund balances are directly associated with income per capita and indirectly
associated with unemployment.
This study offers several contributions to previous research. Instead of limiting the
research design to one subset of fund balances (e.g., Hendrick 2006), my analysis finds
determinants of GASB 54’s comprehensive set of fund balance categories and their respective
spending flexibility. Additionally, my design incorporates information from the entire primary
government by measuring fund balances with the total governmental funds amounts (e.g., Wang
and Hou 2012). Finally, I conduct a more comprehensive analysis of the realignment of prior
fund balance amounts by analyzing each updated fund category (e.g., Chase and Roybark 2013;
Kelly 2013), and suggesting significant benefits to GASB 54’ implementation.
Even though my paper furthers governmental fund balance knowledge, it contains some
inherent limitations. Some municipalities may have been inconsistent in their applications of
fund balances for items before GASB 54 (Brooks and Mead 2010), which includes the option not
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to use unreserved-designated balances or make “non-specific” unreserved balances (Tyer 1993).
Thus, this adds noise to my analysis in finding the relative compositions of newly implemented
GASB 54 fund balances. As well, there could be other unobserved individual municipality
factors that influence the necessity of different fund balances and respective flexibility (e.g.,
officials’ pressures to fulfill campaign promises or propensity towards short- or long-term
planning).
Since municipalities could potentially manipulate fund balance categories by shifting
balances to similarly purposed funds pre-GASB 54, analyzing unreserved fund balance
information may have been less reliable in the past. Future research could investigate whether
GASB 54 fund balance information better predicts fiscal distress and bankruptcies than in years
prior to the standard’s implementation. Furthermore, another study could investigate fund
balance manipulation prior to debt issuances (i.e., municipal bonds) in the pre-GASB 54 period
to see if municipalities shifted funds from reserved to unreserved before debt was acquired to
potentially gain favorable debt outcomes (i.e., lower bond interest costs or higher ratings).
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FIGURE 2.1
Comparison of FASB and GASB Balance Sheets

FASB
Company A
Balance Sheet
December 31, 20XX
ASSETS
Total assets

XXX,000

LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY
Liabilities:
Total liabilities
Stockholders’ equity:

XXX,000

Total stockholders’ equity
Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity

XXX,000

XXX,000

GASB
City B
Balance Sheet
Governmental Funds
December 31, 20XX
ASSETS
Total assets

XXX,000

LIABILITIES AND FUND BALANCES
Liabilities:
Total liabilities
Fund balances:

XXX,000

Total fund balances
Total liabilities and fund balances

XXX,000

144

XXX,000

FIGURE 2.2
Governmental Fund Balance Sheet Example Pre- and Post-GASB 54
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TABLE 2.1
Sample Selection

Panel A: Equation (1) Classification Rearrangement Model Sample
Potential Year 2011 municipality observations from Rich et al. (2016)
Less observations missing 2011 GASB 54 fund balances
Less observations with early 2010 GASB 54 adoption
Less observations missing unemployment and income data
Less observations missing Census financial data
Final sample of municipality observations

364
(9)
(36)
(53)
(38)
228

Panel B: Equation (2) Determinants Model Sample
Potential municipality-year observations from Rich et al. (2016) between 20112015 (364 x 5)
Less 2011 observations for prior-specified deficit independent variable (t-1)
Less observations with missing CAFRs
Less observations missing unemployment and income data
Less observations missing Census financial data
Final sample of municipality-year observations
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1,820
(364)
(12)
(341)
(311)
792

TABLE 2.2
Descriptive Statistics

Variable
UnrestrictedPcnt(
UnassignedPcntt
Nonspendablet
Restrictedt
Committedt
Assignedt
Unassignedt
Unrestrictedt
GFOARecRevt
GFOARecExpt
Reserved(t-1)
UnreservedD(t-1)
UnreservedU(t-1)
UnrestrictedN(t-1)
PropTaxt
ServFeest
DebtIsst
IGRevt
FedIGRevt
StIGRevt
Deficit(t-1)
Popult
IncomePCt
Unempt
Educt
CouncilMgrt

Mean
51.59
50.45
5.18
38.66
13.81
11.38
13.81
39.00
0.41
0.42
30.47
19.96
19.21
9.39
48.18
44.87
35.32
49.32
8.60
35.18
0.45
105.42
45.18
6.98
30.20
0.73

Std. Dev.
21.80
26.59
12.68
62.77
29.95
23.24
28.52
56.21
0.49
0.49
45.51
59.60
40.32
25.69
87.74
65.37
113.30
115.32
15.10
100.74
0.50
113.77
12.33
2.48
13.48
0.45

Q1
34.25
30.11
0.23
7.96
0.04
1.05
3.55
11.14
0.00
0.00
4.65
0.00
0.00
0.00
13.53
15.24
0.00
9.07
1.07
4.90
0.00
48.12
36.66
5.20
20.30
0.00

Median
50.17
49.79
1.03
19.85
3.28
4.36
10.21
22.69
0.00
0.00
13.35
2.10
8.42
0.00
24.58
25.90
8.22
18.54
3.16
9.98
0.00
74.90
41.87
6.60
26.80
1.00

Q3
67.53
72.14
4.04
47.69
14.47
11.41
19.63
46.67
1.00
1.00
32.81
15.24
24.68
5.78
49.87
47.01
32.13
40.45
9.48
22.99
1.00
116.81
49.71
8.15
36.85
1.00

____________
Table 2.2 shows descriptive statistics for all variables used within the study. UnrestrictedPcnt and UnassignedPcnt
only includes observations with non-negative unassigned balances (n = 712). Nonspendable, Restricted, Committed,
Assigned, Unassigned, and Unrestricted (i.e., combined total committed, assigned, and unassigned) governmental
fund balances are in millions of dollars. Reserved, UnreservedD, UnreservedU, and UnreservedN represent the preGASB 54 reserved, unreserved-designated, unreserved-undesignated, and unreserved-nonspecific governmental
fund balances in millions of dollars, respectively. Note that these pre-GASB 54 variables’ statistics are based on the
Equation (1) sample (n = 228). PropTax, ServFees, DebtIss, IGRev, FedIGRev, and StIGRev is the total property tax
revenues, general service charges, long-term debt issued, intergovernmental revenues, federal intergovernmental
revenues, and state intergovernmental revenues, respectively, in millions of dollars. Popul the municipality’s
population in thousands of people. The remaining variable descriptions can be found in Appendix 2A.
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TABLE 2.3
Pairwise Correlations

1.00
0.18*
-0.05
0.43*
0.14*
0.30*
0.26*
0.35*
0.13
-0.12
0.18*
0.05
0.21*
0.16*
0.02
-0.03
0.03
0.18*
-0.02
0.03

1.00
-0.02
0.30*
0.19*
0.25*
0.75*
0.35*
0.14
0.07
0.18*
0.08
0.18*
0.10
0.04
0.11
0.03
0.13
0.17*
0.18*

Table 2.3, Panel A is continued on the next page.
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1.00
0.10
0.22*
0.57*
0.15*
0.26*
0.10
0.24*
0.26*
0.34*
0.18*
0.20*
0.06
0.11
0.20*
-0.28*
0.14*
-0.10

1.00
0.30*
0.79*
0.34*
0.76*
0.06
-0.02
0.16*
0.05
0.24*
0.06
-0.03
0.02
0.09
0.08
0.23*
0.06

1.00
0.67*
0.29*
0.17*
0.18*
0.40*
0.30*
0.36*
0.13
0.20*
-0.03
-0.12
0.10
-0.07
0.25*
0.05

1.00
0.39*
0.66*
0.15*
0.24*
0.33*
0.32*
0.28*
0.20*
-0.00
0.01
0.18*
-0.09
0.30*
0.02

1.00
0.26*
-0.01
0.04
0.26*
0.16*
0.18*
0.09
-0.03
0.07
0.09
0.04
0.13
0.04

UnreservedDPC(t-1)

ReservedPC(t-1)

UnrestrictedPCt

UnassignedPCt

AssignedPCt

CommittedPCt

1.00
-0.09
-0.02
-0.41*
-0.32*
0.33*
-0.25*
-0.10
-0.32*
-0.02
0.03
-0.07
-0.02
-0.03
-0.06
-0.07
-0.17*
-0.12
0.02
-0.09
0.06

RestrictedPCt

1.00
-0.20*
-0.12
-0.57*
0.41*
0.20*
0.34*
0.43*
-0.25*
0.08
0.07
0.11
0.06
0.10
-0.05
0.03
-0.06
-0.09
-0.13
-0.21*
0.11
-0.11

NonspendablePCt

UnassignedPcntt

UnrestrictedPcnt(
UnassignedPcntt
NonspendablePCt
RestrictedPCt
CommittedPCt
AssignedPCt
UnassignedPCt
UnrestrictedPCt
ReservedPC(t-1)
UnreservedDPC(t-1)
UnreservedUPC(t-1)
UnrestrictedNPC(t-1)
PropTaxPCt
ServFeesPCt
DebtIssPCt
IGRevPCt
Deficit(t-1)
LogPopult
IncomePCt
Unempt
Educt
CouncilMgrt

UnrestrictedPcnt(

Panel A: Equation (1) Classification Rearrangement Model Sample (n = 228)

1.00
0.00
-0.19*
0.14*
0.03
0.21*
0.11
0.03
0.14*
0.08
0.10
0.20*
0.10

1.00

1.00
0.07
0.13
0.05
-0.08
-0.00
-0.24*

1.00
0.10
-0.03
0.05
-0.03

1.00
-0.32*
0.43*
-0.02

____________
* represents significant correlations at the 5% level.
Table 2.3, Panel A shows pairwise correlations for all variables used in Equation (1) (i.e., RQ1). Variable
descriptions can be found in Appendix 2A.
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Unempt

1.00
0.04
-0.04
0.11
-0.01
-0.07

IncomePCt

IGRevPCt

DebtIssPCt
1.00
0.13
-0.13
0.18*
-0.07
-0.11
0.06
0.06

LogPopult

1.00
0.09
0.29*
0.05
-0.00
0.12
-0.07
0.17*
0.06

Deficit(t-1)

1.00
0.43*
0.19*
0.51*
0.09
0.08
0.33*
-0.09
0.30*
-0.04

ServFeesPCt

UnrestrictedNPC(t-1)

1.00
0.09

PropTaxPCt

UnreservedUPC(t-1)

1.00
0.09
0.42*
-0.06
0.03
0.10
-0.06
0.11
-0.00
0.11
-0.01

CouncilMgrt

Educt
CouncilMgrt

1.00
-0.38*
0.12
-0.06
0.04
0.15*
-0.02
-0.03
0.01
-0.08
0.12
0.10

Educt

UnreservedUPC(t-1)
UnrestrictedNPC(t-1)
PropTaxPCt
ServFeesPCt
DebtIssPCt
IGRevPCt
Deficit(t-1)
LogPopult
IncomePCt
Unempt
Educt
CouncilMgrt

1.00
-0.33*
0.14*

1.00
0.16*
0.07
0.31*
0.14*
0.27*
0.07
0.04
0.09*
0.15*
0.10*
0.07
0.12*
0.05
-0.05
0.00
-0.02
0.18*
0.03
0.01

1.00
0.09*
0.27*
0.22*
0.30*
0.03
0.05
0.08*
0.31*
0.13*
0.12*
0.17*
0.12*
-0.03
0.10*
0.05
0.04
0.16*
0.14*

Table 2.3, Panel B is continued on the next page.
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1.00
0.02
0.25*
0.58*
0.37*
0.35*
0.41*
0.23*
0.18*
0.19*
0.24*
0.16*
-0.09*
0.09*
0.31*
-0.20*
0.23*
0.02

1.00
0.31*
0.70*
0.26*
0.25*
0.12*
0.18*
-0.02
0.06
0.15*
0.02
-0.01
-0.02
0.09*
0.02
0.27*
0.09*

1.00
0.75*
0.27*
0.27*
0.36*
0.31*
0.16*
0.30*
0.25*
0.27*
-0.05
-0.09*
0.12*
-0.04
0.21*
0.08*

1.00
0.44*
0.42*
0.42*
0.35*
0.14*
0.26*
0.31*
0.21*
-0.07
-0.01
0.25*
-0.10*
0.35*
0.09*

1.00
0.91*
-0.03
-0.12*
-0.03
-0.18*
-0.12*
-0.16*
-0.09*
0.04
0.20*
-0.05
0.30*
0.11*

GFOARecExpt

GFOARecRevt

UnrestrictedPCt

UnassignedPCt

AssignedPCt

CommittedPCt

1.00
-0.08*
-0.02
-0.40*
-0.31*
0.30*
-0.21*
-0.26*
-0.24*
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.01
-0.03
0.03
0.02
-0.15*
-0.15*
0.09*
-0.18*
-0.01

RestrictedPCt

1.00
-0.18*
-0.17*
-0.54*
0.32*
0.23*
0.33*
0.42*
0.39*
0.39*
0.16*
0.01
-0.01
0.06
-0.05
0.04
-0.02
-0.12*
0.15*
-0.15*
0.15*
-0.03

NonspendablePCt

UnassignedPcntt

UnrestrictedPcnt(
UnassignedPcntt
NonspendablePCt
RestrictedPCt
CommittedPCt
AssignedPCt
UnassignedPCt
UnrestrictedPCt
GFOARecRevt
GFOARecExpt
PropTaxPCt
ServFeesPCt
DebtIssPCt
IGRevPCt
FedIGRevPCt
StIGRevPCt
Deficit(t-1)
LogPopult
IncomePCt
Unempt
Educt
CouncilMgrt

UnrestrictedPcnt(

Panel B: Equation (2) Determinants Model Sample (n = 792)

1.00
-0.01
-0.14*
-0.06
-0.17*
-0.12*
-0.15*
-0.11*
0.05
0.20*
-0.08*
0.30*
0.08*

1.00
0.49*
0.95*
0.05
0.04
0.07*
-0.08*
-0.00
-0.17*

1.00
0.32*
-0.02
0.04
0.04
-0.09*
0.01
0.08*

1.00
0.08*
0.07
0.09*
-0.06
-0.01
-0.19*

1.00
0.02
-0.08*
0.15*
-0.08*
0.02

1.00
0.13*
-0.10*
0.07
-0.01

1.00
-0.30*
0.46*
-0.02

1.00

____________
* represents significant correlations at the 5% level.
Table 2.3, Panel B shows pairwise correlations for all variables used in Equation (2) (i.e., H1-H8). Variable
descriptions can be found in Appendix 2A.
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Unempt

IncomePCt

LogPopult

Deficit(t-1)

StIGRevPCt

FedIGRevPCt

1.00
0.14*

1.00
0.15*
0.14*
0.15*
0.06
0.10*
0.04
-0.04
0.04
0.05

IGRevPCt

Educt
CouncilMgrt

DebtIssPCt

ServFeesPCt
1.00
0.20*
0.32*
0.36*
0.29*
0.05
-0.10*
0.07
0.10*
0.07
0.11*

CouncilMgrt

PropTaxPCt
1.00
0.33*
0.16*
0.55*
0.35*
0.57*
0.01
-0.01
0.34*
-0.10*
0.26*
-0.04

Educt

PropTaxPCt
ServFeesPCt
DebtIssPCt
IGRevPCt
FedIGRevPCt
StIGRevPCt
Deficit(t-1)
LogPopult
IncomePCt
Unempt
Educt
CouncilMgrt

1.00
-0.24*
0.11*

TABLE 2.4
The Relationship between Pre-GASB 54 Funds Balances and Future Fund Balance Flexibility

Panel A: Fund Balance Flexibility with Specific Pre-GASB 54 Categories
IVs\DVs
ReservedPC(t-1)

[1]
UnrestrictedPcntt
-18.832***
(0.001)

[2]
UnassignedPcntt

[3]
UnrestrictedPcntt

[4]
UnassignedPcntt

14.804**
(0.013)

-23.605***
(0.001)

UnreservedUPC(t-1)

ServFeesPCt
DebtIssPCt
IGRevPCt
Deficit(t-1)
LogPopult
IncomePCt
Unempt
Educt
CouncilMgrt
Constant

Observations
Adj R-squared

12.817
(0.217)
3.100
(0.174)
-2.806
(0.504)
2.887
(0.583)
-3.318
(0.334)
-1.659
(0.536)
0.256
(0.218)
-0.605
(0.665)
0.058
(0.706)
-6.395
(0.168)
67.201*
(0.070)
196
0.266

[6]
UnassignedPcntt

-6.154
(0.390)

UnreservedDPC(t-1)

PropTaxPCt

[5]
UnrestrictedPcntt

-18.359
(0.152)
1.855
(0.509)
1.411
(0.785)
2.648
(0.683)
-2.298
(0.587)
-6.550**
(0.049)
-0.174
(0.497)
-1.277
(0.460)
-0.072
(0.705)
4.467
(0.435)
146.692***
(0.002)
196
0.109

-5.180
(0.606)
4.039*
(0.084)
-5.557
(0.193)
-2.917
(0.585)
-1.753
(0.615)
-0.683
(0.800)
0.384*
(0.071)
-0.143
(0.920)
0.012
(0.942)
-5.713
(0.224)
49.522
(0.183)
196
0.244

152

-13.322
(0.259)
0.810
(0.766)
2.834
(0.570)
5.836
(0.353)
-3.324
(0.416)
-6.182*
(0.052)
-0.268
(0.281)
-1.355
(0.415)
0.043
(0.819)
4.596
(0.404)
143.136***
(0.001)
196
0.172

6.198
(0.411)
-0.019
(0.999)
3.875
(0.114)
-4.300
(0.319)
-1.059
(0.845)
-2.567
(0.468)
-0.609
(0.825)
0.317
(0.140)
-0.281
(0.846)
0.063
(0.693)
-6.343
(0.191)
49.965
(0.188)
196
0.214

1.508
(0.867)
-22.511*
(0.061)
2.063
(0.480)
0.919
(0.859)
1.425
(0.826)
-2.051
(0.628)
-6.211*
(0.061)
-0.154
(0.547)
-1.170
(0.499)
-0.069
(0.719)
4.533
(0.434)
141.119***
(0.002)
196
0.104

____________
*, **, and *** represent significant coefficients at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Table 2.4, Panel A shows pooled OLS estimates for RQ1 for defined pre-GASB 54 fund balances (in time t-1) using Equation (1). The unit of observation is a
municipality in Year 2011 (time t) with non-negative unassigned balances. The dependent variable within Columns [1], [3], and [5] is the ratio of unrestricted to
total governmental fund balances (UnrestrictedPcnt), while the dependent variable within Columns [2], [4], and [6] is the ratio of unassigned to unrestricted
governmental fund balances (UnrestrictedPcnt). All specifications include absorbed state indicator variables. Variable descriptions can be found in Appendix 2A.
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Panel B: Fund Balance Flexibility with Non-Specific Unreserved Category
IVs\DVs
UnreservedNPC(t-1)
PropTaxPCt
ServFeesPCt
DebtIssPCt
IGRevPCt
Deficit(t-1)
LogPopult
IncomePCt
Unempt
Educt
CouncilMgrt
Constant

Observations
Adj R-squared

[1]
UnrestrictedPcntt
1.779
(0.784)
0.731
(0.942)
3.027
(0.247)
-4.340
(0.316)
-0.174
(0.974)
-2.621
(0.461)
-0.598
(0.829)
0.307
(0.156)
-0.312
(0.831)
0.075
(0.641)
-5.601
(0.247)
50.530
(0.184)
196
0.211

[2]
UnassignedPcntt
6.217
(0.421)
-21.587*
(0.072)
0.857
(0.783)
0.938
(0.855)
1.953
(0.760)
-2.285
(0.590)
-6.016*
(0.069)
-0.176
(0.492)
-1.338
(0.441)
-0.080
(0.674)
5.238
(0.363)
140.775***
(0.002)
196
0.108

____________
*, **, and *** represent significant coefficients at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Table 2.4, Panel B shows pooled OLS estimates for RQ1 for “non-specific unreserved” pre-GASB 54 fund balances
(in time t-1) using Equation (1). The unit of observation is a municipality in Year 2011 (time t) with non-negative
unassigned balances. The dependent variable within Column [1] is the ratio of unrestricted to total governmental
fund balances (UnrestrictedPcnt), while the dependent variable within Column [2] is the ratio of unassigned to
unrestricted governmental fund balances (UnrestrictedPcnt). All specifications include absorbed state indicator
variables. Variable descriptions can be found in Appendix 2A.
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TABLE 2.5
The Relationship between Pre- and Post-GASB 54 Funds Balances

Panel A: Reserved Fund Balances to GASB 54 Fund Balances
IVs\DVs
ReservedPC(t-1)
PropTaxPCt
ServFeesPCt
DebtIssPCt
IGRevPCt
Deficit(t-1)
LogPopult
IncomePCt
Unempt
Educt
CouncilMgrt
Constant

Observations
Adj R-squared

[1]
NonspendablePCt

[2]
RestrictedPCt

[3]
CommittedPCt

[4]
AssignedPCt

179.554***
(0.000)
37.810
(0.571)
-9.416
(0.539)
-6.121
(0.822)
-1.481
(0.964)
9.278
(0.680)
9.767
(0.565)
-0.540
(0.687)
-5.563
(0.551)
-1.378
(0.180)
-37.536
(0.192)
21.583
(0.928)

623.126***
(0.000)
131.098
(0.272)
-45.710*
(0.096)
58.749
(0.227)
92.409
(0.113)
11.760
(0.769)
-25.005
(0.409)
-5.092**
(0.034)
-0.939
(0.955)
4.240**
(0.021)
8.346
(0.870)
467.706
(0.276)

-0.746
(0.983)
77.797
(0.220)
55.189***
(0.000)
29.256
(0.258)
2.348
(0.939)
8.980
(0.673)
7.944
(0.622)
0.736
(0.563)
-7.690
(0.385)
0.588
(0.545)
-5.266
(0.846)
-24.483
(0.914)

86.796
(0.146)
297.116***
(0.007)
-38.501
(0.127)
97.424**
(0.030)
134.305**
(0.013)
-44.441
(0.228)
-46.423*
(0.097)
-0.239
(0.913)
17.597
(0.251)
4.738***
(0.005)
-4.436
(0.925)
172.245
(0.662)

-75.973
(0.123)
122.893
(0.174)
49.013**
(0.019)
33.099
(0.369)
121.487***
(0.006)
-24.539
(0.419)
-60.660***
(0.009)
-0.711
(0.695)
0.897
(0.943)
3.732***
(0.008)
-31.271
(0.420)
640.951**
(0.050)

10.078
(0.912)
497.805***
(0.003)
65.700*
(0.089)
159.779**
(0.020)
258.140***
(0.002)
-60.000
(0.288)
-99.139**
(0.021)
-0.215
(0.949)
10.805
(0.645)
9.057***
(0.001)
-40.973
(0.569)
788.713
(0.192)

228
0.176

228
0.530

228
0.391

228
0.085

228
0.130

228
0.275
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[5]
UnassignedPCt

[6]
UnrestrictedPCt

____________
*, **, and *** represent significant coefficients at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Table 2.5, Panel A shows pooled OLS estimates for RQ1 for “reserved” pre-GASB 54 fund balances (in time t-1) using Equation (1). The unit of observation is
a municipality in Year 2011 (time t). The dependent variable within Columns [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], and [6] is NonspendablePC, RestrictedPC, CommittedPC,
AssignedPC, UnassignedPC, and UnrestrictedPC, respectively. These variables represent the per capita governmental fund balances for nonspendable,
restricted, committed, assigned, unassigned, and unrestricted categories, respectively. All specifications include absorbed state indicator variables. Variable
descriptions can be found in Appendix 2A.
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Panel B: Unreserved-Designated Fund Balances to GASB 54 Fund Balances
IVs\DVs
UnreservedDPC(t-1)
PropTaxPCt
ServFeesPCt
DebtIssPCt
IGRevPCt
Deficit(t-1)
LogPopult
IncomePCt
Unempt
Educt
CouncilMgrt
Constant

Observations
Adj R-squared

[1]
NonspendablePCt

[2]
RestrictedPCt

[3]
CommittedPCt

[4]
AssignedPCt

[5]
UnassignedPCt

[6]
UnrestrictedPCt

77.190**
(0.039)
117.768*
(0.087)
-6.214
(0.703)
1.382
(0.962)
20.164
(0.555)
10.509
(0.659)
5.359
(0.765)
-0.562
(0.694)
-8.746
(0.374)
-2.217**
(0.043)
-33.820
(0.266)
115.256
(0.648)

324.162***
(0.000)
377.680***
(0.006)
-31.477
(0.332)
80.414
(0.160)
158.281**
(0.021)
19.518
(0.680)
-39.467
(0.268)
-4.834*
(0.090)
-11.246
(0.565)
1.089
(0.615)
24.775
(0.681)
772.533
(0.125)

67.264**
(0.042)
40.353
(0.508)
58.925***
(0.000)
23.971
(0.348)
-8.844
(0.771)
13.164
(0.533)
8.969
(0.572)
1.138
(0.370)
-6.791
(0.436)
0.304
(0.753)
-1.039
(0.969)
-49.192
(0.826)

406.215***
(0.000)
133.195
(0.142)
-16.485
(0.444)
72.378*
(0.058)
84.170*
(0.063)
-20.983
(0.504)
-43.060*
(0.070)
1.946
(0.303)
20.889
(0.108)
2.765*
(0.055)
20.519
(0.609)
84.778
(0.799)

96.258**
(0.043)
18.269
(0.834)
54.811***
(0.009)
19.904
(0.587)
91.152**
(0.037)
-17.070
(0.574)
-56.874**
(0.013)
0.065
(0.971)
3.932
(0.753)
3.539**
(0.011)
-24.751
(0.522)
554.925*
(0.086)

569.736***
(0.000)
191.817
(0.177)
97.251***
(0.004)
116.253*
(0.052)
166.478**
(0.019)
-24.889
(0.613)
-90.964**
(0.015)
3.149
(0.287)
18.030
(0.375)
6.608***
(0.004)
-5.271
(0.933)
590.510
(0.259)

228
0.082

228
0.349

228
0.406

228
0.339

228
0.138

228
0.452

____________
*, **, and *** represent significant coefficients at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Table 2.5, Panel B shows pooled OLS estimates for RQ1 for “unreserved-designated” pre-GASB 54 fund balances (in time t-1) using Equation (1). The unit of
observation is a municipality in Year 2011 (time t). The dependent variable within Columns [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], and [6] is NonspendablePC, RestrictedPC,
CommittedPC, AssignedPC, UnassignedPC, and UnrestrictedPC, respectively. These variables represent the per capita governmental fund balances for
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nonspendable, restricted, committed, assigned, unassigned, and unrestricted categories, respectively. All specifications include absorbed state indicator variables.
Variable descriptions can be found in Appendix 2A.

158

Panel C: Unreserved-Undesignated Fund Balances to GASB 54 Fund Balances
IVs\DVs
UnreservedUPC(t-1)
PropTaxPCt
ServFeesPCt
DebtIssPCt
IGRevPCt
Deficit(t-1)
LogPopult
IncomePCt
Unempt
Educt
CouncilMgrt
Constant

Observations
Adj R-squared

[1]
NonspendablePCt

[2]
RestrictedPCt

[3]
CommittedPCt

[4]
AssignedPCt

[5]
UnassignedPCt

[6]
UnrestrictedPCt

-72.604*
(0.094)
159.361**
(0.016)
-13.917
(0.396)
7.496
(0.794)
41.924
(0.221)
7.603
(0.750)
1.527
(0.933)
-1.123
(0.429)
-9.552
(0.333)
-1.597
(0.146)
-33.540
(0.273)
174.927
(0.491)

190.723**
(0.033)
557.769***
(0.000)
-40.479
(0.231)
105.310*
(0.076)
187.676***
(0.008)
-5.504
(0.911)
-37.252
(0.317)
-6.498**
(0.027)
-16.029
(0.430)
1.698
(0.452)
-9.040
(0.886)
805.399
(0.125)

65.333*
(0.090)
78.003
(0.182)
58.271***
(0.000)
29.097
(0.254)
-5.966
(0.844)
7.305
(0.730)
10.380
(0.517)
0.829
(0.510)
-7.857
(0.369)
0.327
(0.736)
-9.874
(0.716)
-53.688
(0.812)

31.772
(0.636)
356.605***
(0.001)
-37.527
(0.142)
103.901**
(0.021)
146.924***
(0.006)
-46.980
(0.206)
-47.937*
(0.089)
-0.428
(0.846)
15.480
(0.313)
4.363**
(0.011)
-7.225
(0.879)
216.997
(0.583)

207.391***
(0.000)
73.392
(0.365)
59.239***
(0.004)
27.060
(0.444)
81.026*
(0.055)
-28.399
(0.333)
-50.649**
(0.023)
-0.219
(0.900)
2.086
(0.863)
3.113**
(0.022)
-45.435
(0.228)
498.457
(0.112)

304.495***
(0.003)
507.999***
(0.001)
79.982**
(0.035)
160.058**
(0.017)
221.984***
(0.005)
-68.074
(0.216)
-88.205**
(0.035)
0.182
(0.956)
9.710
(0.669)
7.803***
(0.002)
-62.534
(0.375)
661.766
(0.259)

228
0.074

228
0.294

228
0.401

228
0.074

228
0.189

228
0.313

____________
*, **, and *** represent significant coefficients at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Table 2.5, Panel C shows pooled OLS estimates for RQ1 for “unreserved-undesignated” pre-GASB 54 fund balances (in time t-1) using Equation (1). The unit
of observation is a municipality in Year 2011 (time t). The dependent variable within Columns [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], and [6] is NonspendablePC, RestrictedPC,
CommittedPC, AssignedPC, UnassignedPC, and UnrestrictedPC, respectively. These variables represent the per capita governmental fund balances for
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nonspendable, restricted, committed, assigned, unassigned, and unrestricted categories, respectively. All specifications include absorbed state indicator variables.
Variable descriptions can be found in Appendix 2A.

160

Panel D: Unreserved-Nonspecific Fund Balances to GASB 54 Fund Balances
IVs\DVs
UnreservedNPC(t-1)
PropTaxPCt
ServFeesPCt
DebtIssPCt
IGRevPCt
Deficit(t-1)
LogPopult
IncomePCt
Unempt
Educt
CouncilMgrt
Constant

Observations
Adj R-squared

[1]
NonspendablePCt

[2]
RestrictedPCt

[3]
CommittedPCt

[4]
AssignedPCt

[5]
UnassignedPCt

[6]
UnrestrictedPCt

-58.931
(0.171)
154.969**
(0.020)
-1.216
(0.945)
5.326
(0.854)
31.045
(0.360)
6.710
(0.779)
2.576
(0.887)
-0.905
(0.526)
-8.571
(0.388)
-1.701
(0.121)
-43.276
(0.159)
149.353
(0.557)

60.099
(0.501)
560.974***
(0.000)
-58.928
(0.109)
107.706*
(0.074)
213.364***
(0.003)
-1.576
(0.975)
-42.630
(0.257)
-6.882**
(0.021)
-16.700
(0.418)
2.273
(0.317)
9.127
(0.886)
882.737*
(0.096)

103.026***
(0.006)
86.355
(0.135)
38.967**
(0.012)
32.794
(0.194)
5.350
(0.856)
7.273
(0.727)
10.822
(0.493)
0.533
(0.668)
-9.746
(0.261)
0.260
(0.785)
2.799
(0.917)
-36.038
(0.871)

6.535
(0.922)
356.833***
(0.001)
-40.053
(0.145)
104.179**
(0.021)
151.097***
(0.005)
-46.268
(0.213)
-48.929*
(0.082)
-0.485
(0.826)
15.439
(0.316)
4.470***
(0.009)
-4.471
(0.925)
230.253
(0.559)

191.688***
(0.000)
87.994
(0.281)
19.280
(0.376)
34.073
(0.339)
112.815***
(0.008)
-26.239
(0.374)
-52.997**
(0.018)
-0.888
(0.613)
-1.186
(0.923)
3.335**
(0.014)
-15.797
(0.676)
569.002*
(0.071)

301.249***
(0.003)
531.182***
(0.001)
18.193
(0.654)
171.046**
(0.011)
269.262***
(0.001)
-65.233
(0.236)
-91.105**
(0.029)
-0.840
(0.798)
4.507
(0.843)
8.065***
(0.002)
-17.469
(0.804)
763.217
(0.192)

228
0.069

228
0.277

228
0.417

228
0.073

228
0.180

228
0.313

____________
*, **, and *** represent significant coefficients at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Table 2.5, Panel D shows pooled OLS estimates for RQ1 for “non-specific unreserved” pre-GASB 54 fund balances (in time t-1) using Equation (1). The unit of
observation is a municipality in Year 2011 (time t). The dependent variable within Columns [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], and [6] is NonspendablePC, RestrictedPC,
CommittedPC, AssignedPC, UnassignedPC, and UnrestrictedPC, respectively. These variables represent the per capita governmental fund balances for
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nonspendable, restricted, committed, assigned, unassigned, and unrestricted categories, respectively. All specifications include absorbed state indicator variables.
Variable descriptions can be found in Appendix 2A.
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TABLE 2.6
The Determinants of GASB 54 Fund Balance Flexibility

IVs\DVs
PropTaxPCt
ServFeesPCt
DebtIssPCt
IGRevPCt
Deficit(t-1)
LogPopult
IncomePCt
Unempt
Educt
CouncilMgrt
2013.year
2014.year
2015.year
Constant

Observations
Adj R-squared

[1]
UnrestrictedPcntt
-1.639
(0.758)
4.255*
(0.097)
-0.520
(0.726)
0.318
(0.926)
-0.243
(0.857)
-3.704**
(0.031)
0.251**
(0.021)
-1.243**
(0.026)
0.184
(0.133)
-0.155
(0.958)
0.534
(0.600)
-2.463*
(0.089)
-2.149
(0.297)
84.799***
(0.000)
712
0.373

[2]
UnassignedPcntt
-21.105***
(0.004)
4.178
(0.237)
-0.735
(0.681)
1.592
(0.683)
-0.285
(0.868)
-5.998**
(0.014)
-0.089
(0.575)
-0.541
(0.536)
-0.299**
(0.016)
3.172
(0.423)
-1.411
(0.356)
-0.315
(0.889)
-1.469
(0.652)
140.323***
(0.000)
712
0.217

____________
*, **, and *** represent significant coefficients at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Table 2.6 shows pooled OLS estimates in H1-H8 for determinants of GASB 54 fund balance ratios (in time t) using
Equation (2). The unit of observation is a municipality-year with non-negative unassigned balances. The dependent
variable within Column [1] is the ratio of unrestricted to total governmental fund balances (UnrestrictedPcnt), while
the dependent variable within Column [2] is the ratio of unassigned to unrestricted governmental fund balances
(UnrestrictedPcnt). All specifications include yearly indicator variables, absorbed state indicator variables, and
municipality-clustered standard errors. Variable descriptions can be found in Appendix 2A.
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TABLE 2.7
The Determinants of GASB 54 Fund Balances

IVs\DVs
PropTaxPCt
ServFeesPCt
DebtIssPCt
IGRevPCt
Deficit(t-1)
LogPopult
IncomePCt
Unempt
Educt
CouncilMgrt
2013.year
2014.year
2015.year
Constant

Observations
Adj R-squared

[1]
NonspendablePCt

[2]
RestrictedPCt

[3]
CommittedPCt

[4]
AssignedPCt

63.153
(0.144)
8.966
(0.584)
9.885
(0.267)
16.788**
(0.049)
-12.577**
(0.030)
-5.294
(0.535)
-1.388*
(0.063)
1.453
(0.683)
0.494
(0.376)
-21.087
(0.274)
3.485
(0.521)
9.562
(0.238)
17.803*
(0.076)
121.443
(0.236)

159.319*
(0.091)
80.210
(0.117)
22.791
(0.403)
103.424***
(0.002)
-14.973
(0.401)
17.382
(0.473)
-2.553
(0.130)
15.262
(0.238)
3.598**
(0.016)
47.043
(0.190)
-13.872
(0.349)
22.395
(0.383)
33.083
(0.366)
-136.615
(0.691)

279.506***
(0.002)
43.457**
(0.050)
32.866
(0.199)
18.702
(0.541)
-4.358
(0.661)
9.035
(0.484)
2.166
(0.129)
-6.983
(0.277)
0.172
(0.825)
49.377
(0.153)
2.515
(0.795)
-10.575
(0.514)
-17.644
(0.420)
-222.125
(0.251)

208.599
(0.170)
33.549
(0.625)
-45.337*
(0.082)
89.450*
(0.054)
-4.545
(0.657)
-23.428
(0.100)
-1.377
(0.441)
4.362
(0.522)
4.203**
(0.036)
3.711
(0.901)
16.761
(0.207)
14.080
(0.473)
34.844
(0.212)
137.184
(0.422)

108.567
(0.325)
102.965**
(0.011)
28.610
(0.472)
152.098***
(0.006)
-27.552**
(0.031)
-59.237**
(0.011)
-0.632
(0.661)
-7.355
(0.216)
2.312*
(0.072)
26.689
(0.436)
30.613***
(0.007)
10.129
(0.404)
12.907
(0.487)
650.223**
(0.013)

596.672***
(0.004)
179.971**
(0.015)
16.140
(0.749)
260.250***
(0.002)
-36.455*
(0.063)
-73.630**
(0.042)
0.157
(0.956)
-9.976
(0.417)
6.688**
(0.024)
79.777
(0.193)
49.888**
(0.011)
13.634
(0.621)
30.107
(0.469)
565.282
(0.172)

792
0.151

792
0.287

792
0.427

792
0.194

792
0.334

792
0.421

____________
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[5]
UnassignedPCt

[6]
UnrestrictedPCt

*, **, and *** represent significant coefficients at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Table 2.7 shows pooled OLS estimates in H1-H8 for determinants of GASB 54 fund balances (in time t) using Equation (2). The unit of observation is a
municipality-year. The dependent variable within Columns [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], and [6] is NonspendablePC, RestrictedPC, CommittedPC, AssignedPC,
UnassignedPC, and UnrestrictedPC, respectively. These variables represent the per capita governmental fund balances for nonspendable, restricted, committed,
assigned, unassigned, and unrestricted categories, respectively. All specifications include yearly indicator variables, absorbed state indicator variables, and
municipality-clustered standard errors. Variable descriptions can be found in Appendix 2A.
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TABLE 2.8
The Determinants of GFOA Fund Balance Reserve Recommendations

IVs\DVs
PropTaxPCt
ServFeesPCt
DebtIssPCt
IGRevPCt
Deficit(t-1)
LogPopult
IncomePCt
Unempt
Educt
CouncilMgrt
2013.year
2014.year
2015.year
Constant

Observations
Adj R-squared

[1]
GFOARecRevt

[2]
GFOARecExpt

0.156
(0.214)
-0.127**
(0.018)
-0.017
(0.650)
-0.041
(0.509)
-0.048
(0.112)
-0.028
(0.504)
0.007***
(0.003)
0.011
(0.442)
0.007***
(0.006)
0.143**
(0.044)
-0.002
(0.937)
-0.014
(0.702)
0.023
(0.659)
0.039
(0.938)

0.192
(0.130)
-0.148***
(0.007)
-0.062
(0.103)
-0.047
(0.459)
-0.055*
(0.077)
-0.017
(0.718)
0.006***
(0.007)
0.018
(0.203)
0.008***
(0.003)
0.142**
(0.043)
0.028
(0.272)
0.010
(0.767)
0.034
(0.520)
-0.120
(0.830)

792
0.254

792
0.256

____________
*, **, and *** represent significant coefficients at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Table 2.8 shows linear probability model estimates in H1-H8 for determinants of GFOA reserve recommendations
(in time t) using Equation (2). The unit of observation is a municipality-year. The dependent variable within Column
[1] is an indicator variable equal to one if the unrestricted governmental funds balance is greater or equal to two
months’ average of total annual revenues, otherwise equal to zero (GFOARecRev), while the dependent variable
within Column [2] is an indicator variable equal to one if the unrestricted governmental funds balance is greater or
equal to two months’ average of total annual expenditures, otherwise equal to zero (GFOARecExp). All
specifications include yearly indicator variables, absorbed state indicator variables, and municipality-clustered
standard errors. Variable descriptions can be found in Appendix 2A.
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TABLE 2.9
Determinants of GASB 54 Fund Balance Flexibility with Separate Intergovernmental Revenues

Panel A: Determinants of Fund Balance Ratios
IVs\DVs
PropTaxPCt
ServFeesPCt
DebtIssPCt
FedIGRevPCt
StIGRevPCt
Deficit(t-1)
LogPopult
IncomePCt
Unempt
Educt
CouncilMgrt
2013.year
2014.year
2015.year
Constant

Observations
Adj R-squared

[1]
UnrestrictedPcntt
-1.507
(0.795)
4.271
(0.105)
-0.530
(0.724)
-0.174
(0.985)
0.516
(0.924)
-0.251
(0.853)
-3.717**
(0.032)
0.250**
(0.021)
-1.245**
(0.027)
0.183
(0.141)
-0.131
(0.965)
0.534
(0.601)
-2.469*
(0.095)
-2.165
(0.310)
84.926***
(0.000)
712
0.372

[2]
UnassignedPcntt
-16.951**
(0.025)
5.129
(0.148)
-0.975
(0.584)
-19.466
(0.122)
8.294*
(0.097)
-0.513
(0.767)
-6.186**
(0.012)
-0.101
(0.524)
-0.653
(0.459)
-0.326***
(0.008)
4.350
(0.266)
-1.429
(0.349)
-0.767
(0.736)
-2.452
(0.459)
141.747***
(0.000)
712
0.224

____________
*, **, and *** represent significant coefficients at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Table 2.9, Panel A shows pooled OLS estimates in H1-H8 for determinants of GASB 54 fund balance ratios (in time
t) using Equation (2) and separate intergovernmental revenue types. The unit of observation is a municipality-year
with non-negative unassigned balances. The dependent variable within Column [1] is the ratio of unrestricted to
total governmental fund balances (UnrestrictedPcnt), while the dependent variable within Column [2] is the ratio of
unassigned to unrestricted governmental fund balances (UnrestrictedPcnt). All specifications include yearly
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indicator variables, absorbed state indicator variables, and municipality-clustered standard errors. Variable
descriptions can be found in Appendix 2A.
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Panel B: Determinants of Fund Balances
IVs\DVs
PropTaxPCt
ServFeesPCt
DebtIssPCt
FedIGRevPCt
StIGRevPCt
Deficit(t-1)
LogPopult
IncomePCt
Unempt
Educt
CouncilMgrt
2013.year
2014.year
2015.year
Constant

Observations
Adj R-squared

[1]
NonspendablePCt

[2]
RestrictedPCt

[3]
CommittedPCt

[4]
AssignedPCt

59.357
(0.177)
7.262
(0.649)
9.779
(0.272)
46.646
(0.296)
10.326
(0.399)
-12.537**
(0.032)
-5.677
(0.517)
-1.386*
(0.063)
1.662
(0.639)
0.539
(0.332)
-22.773
(0.234)
3.771
(0.494)
10.715
(0.203)
19.807*
(0.061)
126.447
(0.223)

187.390**
(0.049)
83.396
(0.107)
20.899
(0.446)
-34.045
(0.753)
166.356***
(0.004)
-17.079
(0.334)
10.950
(0.667)
-2.576
(0.125)
14.888
(0.246)
3.551**
(0.022)
55.128
(0.139)
-13.601
(0.366)
20.510
(0.432)
27.978
(0.457)
-77.609
(0.825)

275.198***
(0.002)
42.312*
(0.056)
32.800
(0.203)
45.826
(0.627)
9.733
(0.810)
-4.310
(0.664)
8.920
(0.492)
2.161
(0.128)
-6.792
(0.293)
0.215
(0.787)
47.808
(0.179)
2.790
(0.774)
-9.422
(0.567)
-15.601
(0.486)
-218.608
(0.265)

189.499
(0.195)
21.365
(0.730)
-46.148*
(0.080)
270.662*
(0.085)
64.337
(0.208)
-4.379
(0.671)
-26.901*
(0.090)
-1.326
(0.439)
5.631
(0.381)
4.473**
(0.035)
-6.349
(0.846)
18.451
(0.179)
20.666
(0.315)
46.089
(0.123)
173.301
(0.328)

117.373
(0.304)
99.580***
(0.008)
26.646
(0.500)
147.951
(0.218)
178.624***
(0.004)
-29.164**
(0.023)
-65.904***
(0.005)
-0.647
(0.649)
-6.890
(0.246)
2.442*
(0.069)
27.167
(0.449)
31.919***
(0.006)
12.923
(0.305)
16.255
(0.388)
717.743***
(0.007)

582.070***
(0.006)
163.257**
(0.014)
13.298
(0.794)
464.439*
(0.079)
252.694***
(0.002)
-37.853*
(0.056)
-83.885**
(0.022)
0.188
(0.945)
-8.050
(0.506)
7.130**
(0.022)
68.626
(0.291)
53.160***
(0.009)
24.167
(0.415)
46.743
(0.302)
672.436
(0.111)

792
0.193

792
0.338

792
0.155

792
0.284

792
0.426

792
0.420

____________
169

[5]
UnassignedPCt

[6]
UnrestrictedPCt

*, **, and *** represent significant coefficients at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Table 2.9, Panel B shows pooled OLS estimates in H1-H8 for determinants of GASB 54 fund balances (in time t) using Equation (2) and separate
intergovernmental revenue types. The unit of observation is a municipality-year. The dependent variable within Columns [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], and [6] is
NonspendablePC, RestrictedPC, CommittedPC, AssignedPC, UnassignedPC, and UnrestrictedPC, respectively. These variables represent the per capita
governmental fund balances for nonspendable, restricted, committed, assigned, unassigned, and unrestricted categories, respectively. All specifications include
yearly indicator variables, absorbed state indicator variables, and municipality-clustered standard errors. Variable descriptions can be found in Appendix 2A.
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APPENDIX 2A
Variable Descriptions

Variable
Dependent Variables
FBPcnt

UnrestrictedPcnt

UnassignedPcnt

FB

NonspendablePC
RestrictedPC
CommittedPC
AssignedPC
UnassignedPC
UnrestrictedPC

GFOARecRev

GFOARecExp

Description
Represents ratios of a subset of GASB 54
governmental fund balances (i.e.,
UnrestrictedPcnt or UnassignedPcnt)
Ratio of unrestricted (combined
committed, assigned, and unassigned)
governmental fund balance to total
governmental fund balance
Ratio of unassigned governmental fund
balance to unrestricted (combined
committed, assigned, and unassigned)
governmental fund balance
Represents subsets of GASB 54 fund
balances per capita at the total
governmental funds level (i.e.,
NonspendablePC, RestrictedPC,
CommittedPC, AssignedPC,
UnassignedPC, and UnrestrictedPC)
Nonspendable governmental fund balance
per capita from total governmental funds
Restricted governmental fund balance per
capita from total governmental funds
Committed governmental fund balance per
capita from total governmental funds
Assigned governmental fund balance per
capita from total governmental funds
Unassigned governmental fund balance
per capita from total governmental funds
Unrestricted (combined committed,
assigned, and unassigned) governmental
fund balance per capita from total
governmental funds
Indicator variable equal to one if the
unrestricted (combined committed,
assigned, and unassigned) governmental
fund balance is greater than or equal to
total annual revenues divided by six,
otherwise equal to zero
Indicator variable equal to one if the
unrestricted (combined committed,
assigned, and unassigned) governmental
fund balance is greater than or equal to
total annual expenditures divided by six,
otherwise equal to zero

171

Data Source
CAFR-governmental funds
balance sheet
CAFR-governmental funds
balance sheet

CAFR-governmental funds
balance sheet

CAFR-governmental funds
balance sheet

CAFR-governmental funds
balance sheet
CAFR-governmental funds
balance sheet
CAFR-governmental funds
balance sheet
CAFR-governmental funds
balance sheet
CAFR-governmental funds
balance sheet
CAFR-governmental funds
balance sheet

CAFR-governmental funds
balance sheet and U.S. Census
Bureau government finance
data via Pierson et al. (2015)

CAFR-governmental funds
balance sheet and U.S. Census
Bureau government finance
data via Pierson et al. (2015)

Independent Variables
PreFB

ReservedPC

UnreservedDPC

UnreservedUPC

UnreservedNPC

PropTaxPC

Represents subsets of Year 2010 preGASB 54 fund balances in thousands of
dollars per capita from total governmental
funds (i.e., ReservedPC, UnreservedDPC,
UnreservedUPC, and UnreservedNPC)
Year 2010 reserved governmental fund
balance in thousands of dollars per capita
from total governmental funds
Year 2010 unreserved-designated
governmental fund balance in thousands
of dollars per capita from total
governmental funds
Year 2010 unreserved-undesignated
governmental fund balance in thousands
of dollars per capita from total
governmental funds
Year 2010 non-specific unreserved
governmental fund balance in thousands
of dollars per capita from total
governmental funds
Total property tax revenues in thousands
of dollars per capita

ServFeesPC

Total general service charges in thousands
of dollars per capita

DebtIssPC

Total new long-term debt issued in
thousands of dollars per capita

IGRevPC

Total intergovernmental revenues in
thousands of dollars per capita

FedIGRevPC

Total federal intergovernmental revenues
in thousands of dollars per capita

StIGRevPC

Total state intergovernmental revenues in
thousands of dollars per capita

Deficit

Indicator variable equal to one if the
municipality has greater governmental
funds expenditures over revenues in the
prior year (after other financing
sources/uses), otherwise equal to zero
The natural logarithm of a municipality’s
population
The county-level per capita income for a
municipality in thousands of dollars

LogPopul
IncomePC
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CAFR-governmental funds
balance sheet

CAFR-governmental funds
balance sheet
CAFR-governmental funds
balance sheet

CAFR-governmental funds
balance sheet

CAFR-governmental funds
balance sheet

U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)
U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)
U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)
U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)
U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)
U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)
CAFR-statement of revenues,
expenditures, and changes in
fund balances for
governmental funds
U.S. Census Bureau
American Community Survey
from the U.S. Census Bureau

Unemp

The county-level unemployment
percentage for a municipality

Educ

The county-level percentage of citizens
holding a bachelor’s degree for a
municipality
Indicator variable equal to one if the
municipality incorporates a councilmanager government form, otherwise
equal to zero

CouncilMgr
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Local Area Unemployment
Statistics from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics
American Community Survey
from the U.S. Census Bureau
ICMA (2011) Municipal Form
of Government Survey

CHAPTER 3

Outcomes of GASB 54 Governmental Fund Balances
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ABSTRACT: Stakeholders care that governments act both as responsible financial stewards and
maintain sufficient resources to meet ongoing obligations and plan for possible contingencies.
One source of information to assess a government’s financial condition is in the governmental
fund balance amounts. External parties or governments themselves may react differently
depending on resource constraint restrictiveness in certain fund balance categories. This study
investigates the financial outcomes and updated fund balance reporting under GASB 54. The
results indicate that flexible governmental fund balances (e.g., “unrestricted” or “unassigned”
balances) are negatively related to future bond true interest costs and positively related to future
bond ratings. Changes in flexible fund balances (especially “unrestricted” balances) are
positively associated with future operating expenditure changes, but are negatively associated
with property tax, service charge, and specific intergovernmental revenue changes. These
findings suggest that fund balance flexibility information influences decisions of both external
parties and municipalities. This study extends prior research by studying the effect of updated
GASB 54-based fund balance classifications on future debt and spending or revenue
characteristics.
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INTRODUCTION

State and local governments’ fund financial statements help demonstrate the financial
stewardship of governmental management. Finance officers are accountable to efficiently utilize
revenues to fulfill service expectations. The fund financial statements are also one information
source to evaluate if sufficient resources are being maintained (Kloha, Weissert, and Kleine
2005). The fund balance updates required by Governmental Accounting Standards Board
Statement No. 54 (GASB 54) allows stakeholders to better utilize fund financial statements to
assess a government’s fiscal condition and subsequently improve decision-making (GASB
2009). Fund balances represent a government’s residual funding after subtracting their liabilities
from their assets (similar to “stockholders’ equity” in the corporate sector). Even though these
fund balances are often considered as budgetary slack (i.e., a safety net), the government itself or
an external party may impose restrictions on the use of certain funds. Thereby, the degree of
“spending flexibility” may be an important factor in analyzing the financial condition of a state
or local government. My study analyzes multiple outcomes of GASB 54-based fund balances for
municipalities. More specifically, I examine if municipalities with greater GASB 54-defined
flexible governmental fund balances are associated with future bond interest costs, bond ratings,
or expenditure/revenue compositions.
GASB 54 updated the previous fund balance categories (reserved, unreserveddesignated, and unreserved-undesignated) to five updated fund balance categories listed in
reverse order of spending flexibility (nonspendable, restricted, committed, assigned, and
unassigned) (GASB 2009). These classifications are designed to be more clearly defined based
on resource constraints and spending flexibility to encourage consistent reporting application
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(Brooks and Mead 2010). Financial reporting users are able to gain improved information
content from the GASB 54 fund balances to analyze ratios of unassigned fund balances that
measure the amount of reserves maintained to cope with contingencies (Gauthier 2009; Chase
and Roybark 2013; Waymire, Sohl, and Howard 2015). The GFOA accordingly recommends
holding at least two months of operating revenues or expenditures in the general fund as reserves
(GFOA 2015). Governments with greater amounts of flexible fund balances can demonstrate that
they are sustainable and can handle the effects of unforeseen circumstances.
Research has found that the level of unreserved fund balances impacts its future
expenditures (Hendrick 2006) and signals fiscal stress (Modlin and Stewart 2014; Gorina, Joffe,
and Maher 2018). Higher levels of such flexible fund balance types also have benefits in limiting
expenditure gaps (Hou 2003), reducing exposure to service cuts (Reitano 2017), and funding
pensions better (Chaney, Copley, and Stone 2002). These findings suggest that governments’
future financial decisions are influenced by their current fund balance compositions. External
stakeholders are also found to react accordingly to governments with higher (or lower) levels of
flexible fund balances. Governments with higher amounts of unreserved fund balances are found
to require lower bond yields (Amrahova, Bluestone, Hildreth, and Larson 2017), pay lower
interest costs (Reck and Wilson 2014), and gain higher bond ratings (Marlowe 2011). This
suggests that municipal analysts and the bond market perceive governments with higher levels of
flexible fund balances as financially healthier and at a lower risk of defaulting on their upcoming
debt obligations.
Prior research guides my predictions on several outcomes related to flexible fund
balances. As municipalities with greater (lower) amounts of unreserved fund balances reflect
lower (higher) credit risk (e.g., Apostolou, Apostolou, and Dorminey 2014; Reck and Wilson
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2014), I anticipate municipalities with higher (lower) amounts of flexible fund balances to face
lower (higher) future bond interest costs. Moreover, bond rating agencies likely recognize
governments having larger unreserved fund balances as more likely to fulfill their debt
obligations via sufficient budgetary slack (e.g., Marlowe 2011). Thus, I expect a positive
relationship between flexible fund balances and future municipality bond ratings.
Municipal governments with lower unreserved fund balances are found to lower future
expenditures (e.g., Hendrick 2006), experience service or personnel cutbacks (Jimenez 2014),
and spend less on flexible savings or investments (e.g., Su 2016). As well, capital spending
decisions may be influenced by the level of discretionary spending resources (Hendrick 2006).
Therefore, I examine associations between flexible fund balances and future operating
expenditure or capital outlay categories. Since different taxes, fees, and other funding sources are
found to be affected by budgetary slack, I also assess if flexible fund balances impact future
revenue sources (i.e., property tax, service fees, debt proceeds, and intergovernmental revenues)
(Jimenez 2014; Modlin and Stewart 2014; Zhang and Rich 2016).
As my paper’s purpose is to assess the outcomes of the updated fund balance
classifications, I collect a sample of municipal comprehensive annual financial reports (CAFRs)
that report their fund balances under the guidance of GASB 54 (specifically, having fiscal years
ending 2011-2015). My analyzed sample consists of 540 municipality-year observations having
the required data. For my bond outcomes hypotheses, 232 future individual general obligation
bond issuances occurred for my municipality sample during the period.
My pooled OLS regression models test how flexible governmental fund balance amounts
impact each of the hypothesized future bond outcomes and assesses my research questions on
future revenue or expenditure components. I find evidence that both higher per capita

178

unrestricted (i.e., combined committed, assigned, and unassigned) and unassigned fund balances
lead to lower future true interest costs. The results also show a positive relationship between
unassigned per capita balances and future bond ratings. These findings suggest that municipal
analysts and bond rating agencies may use the new fund balance category information to assess
default risk for subsequent bond decisions.
My analyses also show some evidence of a positive association between changes in
unrestricted balances and changes in future operating expenditures, and a negative association
between changes in unassigned balances and changes in future capital outlays. This could
indicate that growth (decline) of flexible fund balance types impacts operating expenditures
instead of potentially inelastic capital spending. Additionally, negative relationships between per
capita unrestricted fund balance growth and changes in both future property tax revenues or
service fees provides evidence that municipalities adjust their own-source revenues in response
to fund reserve changes. This could be motivation for municipalities to lower citizens’ future tax
burden when excess flexible funds are present, or raise extra funding when reserves are lowered.
Long-term debt proceed changes do not appear to be influenced by flexible balance changes
suggesting that debt is used for other purposes than stabilizing financial condition. My findings
also demonstrate that both flexible fund balance change measures negatively predict federal
intergovernmental revenue changes, signaling that financial condition may be a significant factor
in higher government aid decisions (i.e., needs-based considerations). Intergovernmental revenue
results are weaker when measured at the state-level.
Several contributions are made in this paper. First, I investigate a broad range of fund
balance outcomes including future governmental and bond-related decisions (e.g., Hendrick
2006; Reck and Wilson 2014). Second, I utilize the updated GASB 54 fund balance categories
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based on fund balance flexibility to test each outcome. As GASB 54 classifications promote
more consistent application of governments’ funds, my analyses of outcomes should be less
noisy compared to prior studies using pre-GASB 54 measures (e.g., Hou 2003; Marlowe 2011).
Last, my specifications utilize fund balance amounts based on the governmental fund balance
sheet that incorporates all governmental fund activities. As such, these measures may add
incremental information about a municipal government’s overall financial condition beyond
what measures of only the general fund may provide (e.g., Marlowe 2009).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The subsequent section offers a
literature review that discusses the content and strategies surrounding GASB 54’s updated fund
balances and examines research providing evidence of fund balance measures associated with
several important outcomes. Afterward, my hypotheses are developed. Next, I explain my
sample and method of analysis. The results are reported, and then I give my concluding remarks.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Fund Balance Standards and Expectations
Fund balances represent the residual amounts on the governmental balance sheet after
taking the difference of assets and liabilities. National Council on Governmental Accounting
(NCGA) Statement No. 1 offered initial guidance on how fund balances should be classified
(NCGA 1979). GASB Statement No. 34 (GASB 34) retained NCGA’s suggested three fund
balance categories (in reverse order of spending flexibility: reserved, unreserved-designated, and
unreserved-undesignated) despite updating the financial reporting model for state and local
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governments (GASB 1999, Kravchuk and Voorhees 2001). 21 Unfortunately, the NCGA’s
outdated and vague fund balance category definitions led to inconsistencies in fund balance
application in governments (Brooks and Mead 2010). Additionally, the fund balances could shift
categories if allocated to differently purposed funds (GASB 2006). 22
Acknowledging the confusion and reporting concerns regarding the NCGA-based fund
balances, GASB initiated a project to improve fund balance reporting that resulted with the
publication of GASB 54 (GASB 2009). GASB 54 was suggested to reduce the uncertainty about
fund categorization by providing clearly defined criteria based on the imposed resource
constraints and spending flexibility and would result in reporting that improves the informational
usefulness for statement users (Chase and Roybark 2013). From the three prior fund balance
classifications, GASB 54 mandates five new categories. In reverse order of spending flexibility,
these new classifications are nonspendable, restricted, committed, assigned, and unassigned. 23
Committed, assigned, and unassigned fund balances represent the updated “unrestricted” fund
balances per GASB 54 (i.e., relatively “flexible” balances compared to nonspendable and
restricted types). State and local governments are required to report GASB 54 fund balance
classifications for fiscal years beginning after June 15, 2010. See Figure 2.2 for an example of a
governmental funds balance sheet before and after GASB 54 (City of Harrisonburg 2010; 2011).

21
Reserved fund balances are generally defined as amounts restricted for use in specific purposes, while unreserved
fund balances are generally defined as amounts freely available for appropriation or expenditures. Although,
governments have the option to designate amounts from unreserved balances that are intended, but not legally
restricted, for a certain purpose (Tyer 1993).
22
Prior to GASB 54, if school repair funds were put into a “general fund,” the amounts would be considered
reserved. If those funds were put into a “school construction fund,” the amounts would be considered unreserved.
23
According to GASB 54, nonspendable fund balances are amounts that are not spendable in that form or that must
be maintained in perpetuity. Restricted fund balances are amounts limited to spending on specific purposes as
required by external parties or by the government’s constitutional guidance. Committed fund balances are amounts
that are limited to specific purposes due to formal action by the government’s highest decision-making authority.
Assigned fund balances are amounts not applicable to the other fund balance categories but are “intended” for a
specific purpose. Unassigned fund balances are amounts inside of the general fund that do not fall under the other
fund balance categories (i.e., amounts that are freely usable for any purpose) (GASB 2009).
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In regards to reporting usefulness, Waymire et al. (2015) suggest that citizens or other
financial statement users can take the ratio of unassigned fund balance to annual expenditures to
assess how many months of reserves are amassed in case of financial hardship. Unassigned
balance acts as an accessible resource to cover potential economic uncertainty (Arapis and
Reitano 2017). Accordingly, the unassigned fund balance appears to be preferred in evaluating a
state or local government’s ability to cover upcoming obligations. Other fund balance
classifications could be interesting to financial statement users to assess the amounts and
compliance with various legal restrictions.
An overarching goal of fund balance policy is to “maintain adequate resources to cope
with contingencies” (Gauthier 2009). A state or local government may either hold reserve funds
(i.e., financial slack) through a mandated contingency fund (e.g., budget stabilization fund) or
simply maintain an unreserved fund balance (Tyer 1993). The GFOA “recommends that
governments establish a formal policy on the level of unrestricted fund balance that should be
maintained in the general fund for GAAP and budgetary purposes,” including setting a guideline
for how the government will increase or decrease the unrestricted fund balance level over a
specific period of time (GFOA 2015). 24 Holding funding in reserve can help minimize the
impact from underestimated revenues and/or overestimated expenditures (Tyer 1993).
Kloha et al. (2005) suggest that general fund balances as a percent of general fund
revenues of less than 13 percent should be one signal that a local government is in fiscal distress.
In response to this, Crosby and Robbins (2013) suggest that an increase to 25 percent from 13

24

Municipalities may formally state a desired fund balance level or maintain a stabilization fund. For example, “The
City will maintain an unassigned fund balance component for budget stabilization which is 15% of the next year’s
budget” (City of Eden Prairie, MN 2015). Also, “the City has established a (“restricted”) budget stabilization
fund…may be used to cover any General Fund deficit, prevent a reduction in the level of services when revenues are
not being collected in sufficient manner or when the subsequent year budget indicates a shortfall…” (City of Troy,
MI 2014).
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percent of unreserved general fund balance as a percentage of general fund revenues (or
expenditures) would be a better fiscal indicator of budget solvency for Michigan’s municipality
fiscal stress monitoring system. In their evaluation of Michigan’s monitoring system for
municipal fiscal stress and sustainability during the economic downturn between 2007 and 2009,
Crosby and Robbins (2013) found that the aggregated general fund unreserved-undesignated
balance sharply decreased during the recent economic crisis (from a combined $324.9 million in
2007 to $110.3 million in 2009 for their sample). Thereby, budgetary reserves can deplete
relatively quickly when governments face economic recessions. Snow, Gianakis, and Fortess
(2008) examine if Massachusetts municipalities have sufficient resources to withstand simulated
recessionary effects from reduced state aid. They found that 8 percent of Massachusetts
municipalities lacked sufficient slack resources (stabilization fund balance plus free cash and
excess capacity) to cover a minor simulated state-aid reduction scenario, while 25 percent of
these municipalities lacked the slack resources to cover an extreme state-aid reduction scenario.
Thus, maintaining a sufficient “safety net” is critical for withstanding periods of economic
downturns.
At a minimum, the GFOA recommends that general-purpose governments “maintain
unrestricted budgetary fund balance in their general fund of no less than two months of regular
general fund operating revenues or regular general fund operating expenditures” (GFOA 2015).
The two month minimum target for covering operating revenues or expenditures replaces the
original GFOA recommendation of a “5 to 15 percent minimum” of general fund unreserved
balance (Gauthier 2009). Instead of advising a certain percentage of fund balance in reserve that
may be impractical or irrelevant for some state and local governments, this updated
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recommendation allows governments to consider their own characteristics and demographics
when establishing enough reserves for a period of time.
However, there could be other factors that influence governments to maintain a higher (or
lower) levels of excess funding balance. To determine the appropriate unrestricted general fund
level, the GFOA suggests that governments should consider their individual factors including:
(1) the predictability of its revenues and the volatility of its expenditures; (2) the exposure to
significant one-time outlays (e.g., disasters, immediate capital needs, state budget cuts); (3) the
potential drain on general fund resources from other funds; (4) the potential impact on the
entity’s bond ratings and corresponding increased cost of borrowed funds; and (5) committed
and/or assigned fund amounts (GFOA 2015).
In summarizing indicators of financial condition and stress for local governments to
utilize as monitoring tools, Maher (2013) suggests one financial condition indicator that uses the
governmental fund financial statement is “unreserved general fund balance divided by general
fund expenses.” When analyzing a government’s fund financial statements, unreserved fund
balances are one component that may signal to municipal analysts that a government has
“superior management and prudent fiscal policy” (Wilson and Kattelus 2001). As GASB 54
updated the fund balance classifications, Maher (2013) recommends using the combined
assigned and unassigned fund balance in place of unreserved general fund balance as these
classifications allow for greater spending flexibility. These suggestions indicate that the reported
level of unreserved (or unassigned) fund balance is a significant factor that demonstrates how
well a government can endure difficult financial hardships.

Fund Balance Outcomes
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When governments have smaller budgetary reserves, this limits the degree of future
decisions. Conversely, larger budgetary reserves lead governments to pursue additional
opportunities. Research finds that governments’ current level of fund balances influences how
their resources are spent in the future. Hendrick (2006) investigates the future economic
decisions made based on the level of slack for suburban Chicago municipalities. The analysis
reveals lower (higher) unreserved fund balances are found to result in lower (higher) future
expenditures. J. Park, S. Park, and Maher (2018) also note that municipalities’ unreserved fund
balances are positively related to general expenses. Some examples of expenditures that
available flexible funds are spent on are: capital projects and land purchases (Hendrick 2006),
responses to localized emergencies like natural disasters or economic downturns (Wang and Hou
2012), flexible investments (Su 2016), early debt payments (Marlowe 2005), or transfers to other
funds (Marlowe 2009).
Su’s (2016) analysis of municipal financial slack accumulation reveals that increases in
unreserved general fund balance is associated with decreases in total general fund expenditure
growth, suggesting that reserve saving limits the amount of funding for expenditures. Marlowe
(2009) tests if budgetary slack reduces the additional expenditures in future periods after
overspending in the current period using Minnesota cities. The type of budgetary slack shapes
this relationship. High levels of total general fund balances appear to reduce the ratcheting of
expenditures after overspending, while high levels of unreserved general fund balance appear to
promote municipalities to continue overspending into future periods.
The accumulation of unreserved funds suggests that governments can maintain
expenditure levels when economic conditions result in lower revenues. Thereby, unreserved or
unassigned fund balances could be used counter-cyclically. Most prior literature finds evidence
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in support of excess fund balances minimizing the impact of economic downturns suggesting a
future benefit of maintaining balances for stabilization. 25 Reitano (2017) investigates whether
Pennsylvania school districts allocated stabilization funding to specific expenditure categories
during the Great Recession. The results show that higher logged unassigned fund balances
significantly reduce the likelihood (and also the amount) of cutbacks in salaries/benefits,
transportation, operations and maintenance, and other expenditures. There appears to be no
significant reduction of debt service expenditures with higher unassigned balances. Hou (2003)
assesses both budget stabilization reserve funds and general fund unreserved-undesignated
balances in stabilizing general fund expenditures in periods of economic downturns. Results
show that both states’ budget stabilization funds and general fund unreserved-undesignated
balances are found to minimize the general fund expenditure gap (as measured by the difference
between actual and predicted expenditures divided by predicted expenditures). However,
stabilization funds appear to be a better counter-cyclical tool in reducing negative general fund
expenditure gaps than unreserved-undesignated balances.
Two other studies also support the stabilization role of excess fund balances during
economic downturns, but also find differing counter-cyclical effects during economic upturns.
Stewart, Hamman, and Pink-Harper (2017) study if current year expenditure gaps are affected by
prior year governmental activity fund balances in Illinois county governments. They find that
unreserved governmental activity fund balances tend to be used counter-cyclically to stabilize
expenditure gaps when economic downturns (but not when economic upturns) occur. By

25

One study notes differing findings from other studies. Wang and Hou (2012) study if the general fund balances
have a stabilizing effect on expenditures during periods of economic downturns. General fund balances do not
appear to be used counter-cyclically (i.e., no significant positive influence on expenditures during downturns). The
effect of higher prior year general fund balance leading to greater current year total expenditures only holds when
also including economic upturns.
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investigating how general fund balances stabilize expenditures with a sample of Minnesota
cities, Marlowe (2005) shows that unreserved general fund balance helps stabilize expenditures
during economic downturn years, but not build revenues during economic upturn years. Reserved
general fund balances appear to expand the negative expenditure gap during upturn years.
Beyond having an effect on future expenditures, the level of flexible fund balances are
found to have additional benefits or drawbacks. Feng and Neely (2017) find evidence that fund
deficiencies (e.g., general fund and enterprise fund) are often cited as rationale for auditors
issuing going concern opinions. This suggests municipalities with lower fund balances are
perceived to be at greater risk of continuing service failures. Supporting this evidence, Gorina et
al. (2018) analyze the ability of fiscal information and ratios to predict local government
bankruptcies and identify significant differences in both general and overall governmental
unreserved fund ratios between distressed and non-distressed local governments. In their
regression analysis, there is similar evidence that unreserved general fund balances decrease the
likelihood of fiscal distress.
Blackwell, Crotts, Litvin, and Styles (2006) study county and municipality compliance
with disbursements of South Carolina’s accommodations tax (i.e., for the purpose of promoting
tourism). Local governments with greater ratios of unreserved-undesignated general fund
balance to total general fund expenditures are found to have higher percentages of compliant tax
disbursements. Chaney et al. (2002) investigate how pension funding status for public employee
retirement systems are impacted by state fiscal stress and balanced budget requirements. States
with greater (lower) unreserved general fund balances per capita tend to have a higher excess
(deficit) of pension plan net assets available for pension benefits over the pension benefit
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obligation, especially with the presence of balanced budget requirements. This suggests that
fiscal stress can lead to underfunded pension plans.
Interactions with higher levels of government may also occur when local governments
have various fund balance amounts. Modlin and Stewart (2014) examine the factors related to
county governments receiving a notice of impending fiscal stress from the Local Government
Commission (North Carolina’s financial oversight body). Counties with lower levels of
unreserved general fund balances as a percentage of total government expenditures were more
likely to receive a notice of impending fiscal stress requiring immediate action. Ványolós (2009)
investigates how New York State school districts estimate their state aid (i.e., intergovernmental
revenues). The analysis shows that districts with higher fund balance ratios can lead to larger
state aid estimation errors (in either direction). This may suggest that governments with lower
fund balances may better predict receiving greater amounts of intergovernmental revenues to
help offset any financial strain.
Outside of the government-based reactions, research has indicated that external parties
react to greater amounts of flexible fund balances. Specifically, municipal analysts and the bond
market are influenced by governments’ fund balance levels. Beck (2018) shows that
municipalities use discretionary accruals prior to bond offerings. Since more flexible fund
balances offer discretion in spending, greater amounts of flexible balance types could also lead to
favorable bond outcomes.
Amrahova et al. (2017) investigate if fiscal health impacts secondary bond yields. Among
their evidence, they show that higher unreserved or undesignated general fund balance scaled by
total assets results in lower bond yields, suggesting a perceived benefit for municipalities with
better financial health. Reck and Wilson (2014) assess the impact of GASB 34’s reporting of
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financial condition on municipal bond interest costs. They find a negative association between
net interest cost and the ratio between unreserved and total general fund balance. This suggests
that municipal bond analysts view municipalities with better long-term financial condition (or
greater slack) as having less risk and charging less interest.
In addition to receiving lower interest costs and bond yields, governments with higher
levels of unreserved (or unassigned) fund balances also are deemed to have lower credit risks.
Marlowe (2011) examines whether the level of budgetary slack impacts bond ratings. In general,
unreserved general fund balance is found to be positively associated with bond ratings. A rise
from a minimal to a large level of unreserved general fund balance increases the likelihood of the
top bond rating by ten percent. However, the effect of slack level is dampened when trying to
avoid a lower bond rating. These findings infer that municipal analysts prefer governments with
greater amounts of accumulated reserve funds and resultantly signal their confidence in the
ability of these governments to fulfill their debt obligations.
Besides gaining benefits on debt issuances, governments with more budgetary slack
generally have a lower likelihood of needing to acquire debt in the first place. Su and Hildreth
(2018) investigate if financial slack influences the likelihood and amount of short-term debt with
California cities. They find that a higher level of unreserved general fund balance both leads to a
lower probability of obtaining municipal note debt and a lower note principal amount. This
suggests that municipalities prefer to utilize internal funding sources in financial slack over
external funding sources in obtaining debt. Additionally, cities with short-term note debt are
more likely to use recursive borrowing (i.e., strategically issuing short-term notes to cover cash
flow deficits and pay off the short-term notes once anticipated revenues are collected). Thereby,
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higher reserves help drive governments to utilize responsible and sustainable policies on funding
sources.

HYPOTHESES

Municipal debt analysts are an external party hypothesized to react to municipalities’
finances. Several papers look into the effect of fund balance levels on governmental debt.
Municipalities with higher (lower) ratios of unreserved general fund balances are found to issue
bonds with lower net interest costs (Reck and Wilson 2014). Prior literature also determines that
the negative association between flexible fund balances (e.g., unreserved balances) and interest
costs holds when measured by true interest costs (Apostolou et al. 2014; Hickey 2017; Raglund
2017). The results from these papers suggest that bond analysts integrate fund balances into their
credit assessments and deem governments with greater levels of flexible (unreserved or
unassigned) fund balances as having less risk. Accordingly, I consider the hypothesis below:

Hypothesis 1: Municipalities with more flexible governmental fund balances have lower
future bond interest costs.

Beyond bond interest costs, higher levels of fund balances are also potential
considerations for municipal bond rating agencies. Marlowe (2011) finds an overall positive
association between unreserved general fund balances and governments’ bond ratings. Also,
states having higher levels of unreserved general fund balances are less likely to experience a
negative change in S&P’s rating outlook (Martell, Kioko, and Moldogaziev 2013). This evidence
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demonstrates that bond rating agencies recognize the amount of financial slack held when
evaluating the likelihood that a government will cover its debt obligations. I, therefore, suggest
the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Municipalities with more flexible governmental fund balances have higher
future bond ratings.

Research has found that fund balance levels affect governments’ future decisions.
Hendrick (2006) provides initial evidence of a positive relationship between unreserved fund
balances and future expenditures at the municipality level. Operating expenditures (e.g., salaries
and wages, service costs) and capital outlays (e.g., construction and fixed asset purchases)
represent two significant spending categories for municipalities (Pierson, Hand, and Thompson
2015). In relation to operating expenditures, research indicates that lower unreserved fund
balances (as a percentage of general fund expenditures) contribute to more eliminated or reduced
services, more laid off or furloughed staff, and more revised union contracts (Jimenez 2014).
Contrary to this positive relationship between flexible fund balances and future expenditures, Su
(2016) finds a negative association between unreserved general fund growth and general fund
expenditure growth. This could entail that building surpluses limits future expenditures.
Similar to operating costs, fund balance flexibility could influence future capital project
spending. For example, municipalities may be more (less) likely to fund new capital projects
(Hendrick 2006) or have greater (lower) net capital investments (Park et al. 2018) when they
have sufficient (insufficient) budgetary slack (Hendrick 2006). Additionally, governments could
sell capital assets to obtain funding. This may suggest lower amounts of flexible fund balances
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lead to lower future percentages of capital assets. Jimenez (2014), however, finds an insignificant
relationship between unreserved fund balances and the probability of deferring capital projects.
The insignificance could be due to grant requirements or citizenry pressures to initiate
improvement projects. As well, substantial time to complete projects could add noise to the level
of capital asset spending (i.e., sunk costs after starting projects). The findings related to both
operating expenditures and capital outlays suggest that governments consider their level of
budgetary slack and spending flexibility when making future decisions. As the relationship
direction is unclear with either spending category, I propose the following research question:

Research Question 1: How does a change in flexible fund balances affect municipalities’
future changes in expenditure categories?

In response to a given flexible fund balance level, a municipality could adjust future
expenditures (i.e., RQ1) or adjust future own-source revenues (Hendrick 2006). Literature
suggests three different methods for funding generation: (1) taxes, (2) service fees, and (3) debt
proceeds (Zhang and Rich 2016; Amrahova et al. 2017). Wang and Hou (2012) show that higher
property or sales tax revenues are associated with higher available fund balance percentages.
Jimenez (2014) also finds that higher unreserved fund balances decrease the likelihood of
increasing either property taxes or user fees. However, Park (2017) notes an insignificant
relationship between unreserved fund balances and non-tax revenue sources (e.g., service fees or
fines).
On the debt side, higher unreserved general fund balances are found to be associated with
lower debt service expenditures (Park et al. 2018) and a reduction in the likelihood of issuing
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note debt (Su and Hildreth 2018). All three funding options have associated costs. Raising
property taxes and service fees may lower usage or lower public satisfaction. Debt has interest
costs and significant future obligations. Since municipalities have several funding and revenue
options, I investigate the subsequent research question:

Research Question 2: How does a change in flexible fund balances affect municipalities’
future changes in own-source funding categories?

Alternatively, municipality fund balance amounts could also influence decisions by
higher levels of government (i.e., federal or state), leading to another potential funding source for
municipal governments with intergovernmental revenues. For intergovernmental allocations,
literature suggests that federal and state governments tend to target local governments with
higher relative tax burdens (Stein and Hamm 1987) and provide more intergovernmental
revenues to local governments having higher fiscal stress (Johnson 1985). However, poor fiscal
management by a municipality could encourage higher-level governments to withhold some of
their transfer aid (e.g., Modlin and Stewart 2014). These intergovernmental transfers may have
limited predictability (e.g., Ványolós 2009). Thereby, it is also interesting to find how future
funding sources are impacted by fund balance flexibility amounts.
When assessing intergovernmental revenues, state and federal aid to municipalities can
be given for different purposes (Johnson 1985). States may share taxes and revenues with
municipalities as part of intergovernmental transfers, not merely as financial needs-based
allocation (Stewart et al. 2017). Federal aid may be given to municipalities to support nationwide
policy priorities or to address other nonfinancial municipal characteristics (e.g., crime). As
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characteristic differences may exist, I propose another research question that assesses the effect
of fund balances on intergovernmental revenue types (i.e., at the total, federal, and state
intergovernmental levels):

Research Question 3: How does a change in flexible fund balances affect municipalities’
future changes in intergovernmental funding categories?

METHOD

Sample
To analyze the outcomes of GASB 54 fund balances, I collect municipality CAFRs with
fiscal year-ends from 2011 to 2015. 26 As GASB 54’s required implementation date was for fiscal
years beginning June 15, 2010, this panel data sample includes municipality-year observations
that utilize GASB 54 fund balances in their governmental fund financial statements. The precise
selection of municipalities comes from Rich, Roberts, and Zhang (2016). 27 With the 364
municipalities from Rich et al. (2016), I have 1,092 potential observations with fund balances
between 2012 and 2014. 28 After omitting observations with missing required data, my final

26

I choose to investigate governmental fund balance outcomes at the municipality level since most studies on fund
balance associations use municipalities or other local governments (e.g., Hendrick 2006; Marlowe 2009). Also, there
could be factors (e.g., local economic conditions or demographic characteristics) that average out when measured at
the statewide level adding noise to my analysis.
27
The sample selection of Rich et al. (2016) starts with municipalities over 25,000 in population that also responded
to the International City/County Management Association’s 2011 Municipal Form of Government survey (ICMA
2011). Missing CAFR, Federal Audit Clearinghouse data, and governance data reduce the final sample to 364
unique municipalities.
28
Despite having fund balance information for 2015, my research question analyses are bounded to end in 2014
since the expenditure and revenue dependent variables are in future form (t+1). Also, my fund balance independent
variables of interest are in “changes” form (i.e., [t-1] – [t]), which prevents the using observations in 2011.
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sample is 540 municipality-year observations from 241 unique municipalities within 45 different
states (see Table 3.1, Panel A).
[TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE]
For H1 and H2, I collect individual general obligation (GO) bond issuance observations
via SDC Platinum that occur within my municipality sample period based on sale date. 29 With
my bond outcome dependent variables being specified in the future period (t+1), the examined
GO bond issuances will have sale dates within fiscal years 2012-2016 for each sample
municipality. Each analyzed observation requires both data on true interest costs and Moody’s
long-term rating. From the potential 364 municipalities, my final bond issuance sample is 232
individual bond observations within the future time period (t+1) from 65 unique municipalities
from 27 distinctive states (see Table 3.1, Panel B). 30

Design
For testing H1 and H2, I employ an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression in Equation
(1):

𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡+1)

= 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

29

(1)

General obligation (GO) bonds are backed by the full faith and credit of state and local governments and paid with
various tax sources, while revenue bonds are paid for through specific revenue streams (e.g., tolls on a bridge)
(Downing and Zhang 2004). Marlowe (2011) deems GO bonds to better reflect issuers’ overall financial condition.
Several governmental bond papers use GO bonds because of being more homogeneous than revenue bonds (e.g.,
Apostolou et al. 2014; C. Edmonds, J. Edmonds, B. Vermeer, and T. Vermeer 2017; Hickey 2017). Thus, I also
choose to focus on GO bonds to examine H1 and H2.
30
Note that a given municipality-year may have more than one bond issuance observation.
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H1’s dependent variable is TIC. This represents each GO bond issuance’s true interest
cost in percentage form. For H2, the dependent variable is Rating. This variable is the Moody’s
long-term bond rating for each bond observation. 31 SDC Platinum provides the data for each
bond outcome variable. Note that both dependent variables are one year into the future (t+1). My
rationale is that these outcome decisions are based on reported fund balances occurring in the
following year, since CAFRs are published in the period after its fiscal year-end.
Equation (1) implies that a bond sale occurs after CAFR release (i.e., municipal bond
analysts and raters are reacting to reporting information). However, there could be considerable
report delay (i.e., the time between the fiscal year-end and CAFR publication date) that could
result in some future bond issuances occurring before the actual CAFR release if bond
observations are based on the prior fiscal year-end date. To minimize this possibility, I will
compare the bond sale date with the CPA signing date from the Federal Auditing Clearinghouse
database to help ensure that the bond sale follows the CAFR release. By aligning each bond
issuance observation to the period after the CPA signing date, I should reduce substantial noise
in analyzing H1 and H2.
The independent variables of interest in Equation (1) are flexible types of governmental
fund balances per capita (in thousands of dollars) based on GASB 54’s fund balance definitions
measured in current fiscal year (t). 32 The fund balance information is reported on municipalities’
“Governmental Funds Balance Sheet” within the CAFR. The first measure, UnrestrictedPC, is

31

Several bond articles (e.g., Beaver, Shakespeare, and Soliman 2006; Plummer, Hutchison, and Patton 2007; Baber
and Gore 2008; Palumbo and Zaporowski 2012; Wang and Zhang 2014) use an ordinal variable system of the
following bond ratings as measured by Moody’s long-term ratings: Aaa=21, Aa1=20, Aa2=19, Aa3=18, A1=17,
A2=16, A3=15, Baa1=14, Baa2=13, Baa3=12, Ba1=11, Ba2=10, Ba3=9, B1=8, B2=7, B3=6, Caa1=5, Caa2=4,
Caa3=3, Ca=2, C=1.
32
Since some municipality-year observations have negative balances in the unassigned category, I use a per capita
transformation instead of logarithms.
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the combined GASB 54 unrestricted (i.e., total committed, assigned, and unassigned) balances
(in thousands of dollars) per capita. This measure allows me to assess amounts of fund balances
that permits some degree of internal government spending discretion (i.e., those balances with
greater relative spending flexibility than nonspendable or externally-imposed restricted
balances). The second measure, UnassignedPC, is the total GASB 54 unassigned balances (in
thousands of dollars) per capita. This variable is selected to measure amounts of fund balances
that represent freely usable unassigned amounts as compared to those with some internallyimposed resource constraints (i.e., committed and assigned). Each measure describing flexible
fund balances may contain information content on municipality finances, which could influence
future outcomes.
I also include several control variables in Equation (1). In consideration of municipal
wealth, IncomePC is the county-level income per capita (in thousands of dollars) for a given
municipality. DebtOutPC is the municipality’s per capita total debt outstanding (in thousands of
dollars), which controls for prior debt issuances or default risk. Economic uncertainty is
controlled by Unemp representing the annual unemployment percentage rate in the county of the
municipality. A proxy for municipal financial and operational expertise is used with CouncilMgr
as an indicator variable equal to one if the municipality is run with a council-manager form of
government, otherwise equal to zero (Rich et al. 2016). A council appointed governmental
administrator runs municipal operations under a council-manager form, whereas an elected
mayor simultaneously runs municipal operations under a strong-mayor form.
As Equation (1) includes bond-related dependent variables, I add bond control variables
to the specification. IssueAmt is the individual bond’s issue amount (in millions of dollars).
Maturity is the years to maturity for each bond. Since my bond dependent variables are measured
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during the future fiscal year (t+1), the listed bond control variables will also be at the future
fiscal year (t+1). Other specifications included in Equation (1) are absorbed state indicator
variables (d) and yearly indicator variables (t).The estimates will incorporate municipalityclustered standard errors. 33
To analyze my research questions (i.e., RQ1-RQ3), I estimate pooled OLS again in
Equation (2):

∆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡+1) �𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡+1) �

= 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∆𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ∆𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

(2)

Equation (2) investigates how a prior year change in flexible fund balances (i.e., from t-1
to t) impacts each of a municipality’s future changes in expenditure and revenue categories (i.e.,
from t to t+1). 34 RQ1’s dependent variable, ΔExpCat, denotes two separate forms (j): (1)
ΔLogOpExp signifies the future change in natural log of total operating expenditures
(representing total expenditures less capital outlays and intergovernmental expenditures) and (2)
ΔLogCapOut is the future change in natural log of capital outlays (including capital asset
purchases and construction spending). 35

33

I do not include “insured bond” or “competitive bidding” indicator variables as control variables because of little
variation. Almost all sample GO bonds lacked insurance while virtually all were subject to competitive bidding. I
also omit a “callable” bond indicator due to a very high positive correlation with Maturity.
34
To reduce potential noise from using levels, I incorporate “changes” for my dependent variables and independent
variables of interest that should be beneficial to assess the incremental effect between flexible fund balance changes
and specific revenue/expenditure changes.
35
Operating expenditures include items such as salaries and wages expenses and service costs.
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The dependent variable for RQ2 and RQ3, ΔRevCat, takes six different forms (k). As
used in RQ2, the first three forms of k are: (1) ΔLogPropTax represents the future change in the
natural log of property tax revenues; (2) ΔLogServFees is future change in the natural log of total
general service charges; and (3) ΔLogDebtIss is future change in the natural log of total longterm debt issued. RQ3 uses the last three forms of k. These are (in future changes form): (4)
ΔLogIGRev denotes the natural log of total overall intergovernmental revenues; (5)
ΔLogFedIGRev is the natural log of total federal intergovernmental revenues; and (6)
ΔLogStIGRev is the natural log of total state intergovernmental revenues. Each expenditure or
revenue category variable can be obtained by U.S. Census Bureau data compiled by Pierson et al.
(2015).
The flexible fund balances described in Equation (1) remain the independent variables of
interest in Equation (2). Control variables are also similar to those described in Equation (1)
minus any individual bond specific control variables. To account for the percentage of each
expenditure or revenue composition within a municipality, I include additional control variables
in Equation (2). For RQ1 control variables, OpExpPcnt is the percentage of total operating
expenditures to total expenditures, while CapOutPcnt denotes the percentage of total capital
outlays to total expenditures. RQ2 inserts as control variables a percentage of total revenues for
the following: sales tax revenues (SalesTaxPcnt), property tax revenues (PropTaxPcnt), general
service charges (ServFeesPcnt), newly issued long-term debt proceeds (DebtIssPcnt), and
intergovernmental revenues for total, federal only, and state only amounts (IGRevPcnt,
FedIGRevPcnt, and StIGRevPcnt, respectively). 36 This equation also includes the state indicator

36

SalesTaxPcnt does not have a corresponding dependent variable because some municipalities do not have local
sales taxes within the sample period (e.g., those in Connecticut or Michigan).
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variables (d), yearly indicator variables (t), and estimates using standard errors clustered by
municipality.

RESULTS

Univariate Results
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics for my analyzed variables in the study. Panel A
shows variables utilized in my bond outcomes model (Equation 1). TIC has a mean of 2.46 and
median of 2.52 percent. The median Rating of 19 (i.e., Aa2 rating) suggests that a majority GO
bonds within the sample are rated highly. Unrestricted fund balances have a mean of $65.01
million, while Unassigned fund balances have a mean of $23.66 million. This entails that
roughly a third of Unassigned balances are contained in Unrestricted balances. Since the median
of Unrestricted and Unassigned is $29.61 million and $12.72 million, respectively, there are
some influential large municipality observations within the sample (i.e., a right-sided skewness
in the data). Taking per capita transformations of such variables should reduce the effect of
larger outliers.
[TABLE 3.2 ABOUT HERE]
Panel B of Table 3.2 displays all variables’ summary statistics from the
expenditure/revenue category model (Equation 2) based on municipality-year observations.
OpExp and CapOut have sample means of $205.45 million and $42.06 million, respectively.
This demonstrates that normal operating expenditures account for much more spending than
capital outlays for a typical municipality. The means of PropTax, ServFees, and IGRev are very
similar for the average municipality ($49.88 million, $45.63 million, and $52.37 million,
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respectively), which suggests relatively even importance for each revenue source. DebtIss with a
mean of $35.41 million is lower than the former three funding sources. Within IGRev, StIGRev
(at a mean of $37.67 million) accounts for a greater amount of intergovernmental revenues than
FedIGRev (at a mean of $8.51 million). Each expenditure and revenue category variable having
higher mean than median again indicates right skew. The means of Unrestricted and Unassigned
in the full municipality-year sample ($39.47 million and $14.02 million, respectively) are lower
than the bond issuance sample in Panel A, perhaps indicating that bond issuing municipalities
tend to be larger in size or rely on bond proceeds for fund balance stabilization.
Table 3.3 offers the pairwise correlations for my analyzed variables. Panel A again shows
correlations for the variables within the bond issuance sample, and Panel B presents correlations
within the full municipality-year changes sample. In Panel A, there is a -0.09 correlation between
UnrestrictedPC and TIC, and a -0.06 correlation between UnassignedPC and TIC. However,
each pairwise correlation is insignificant at the five percent level. I find a significant 0.19
pairwise correlation between UnrestrictedPC and Rating, but a non-significant 0.13 correlation
between UnassignedPC and Rating. This provides slight evidence to support H2. No
independent variables included simultaneously in Equation (1) are above 0.40 (or -0.40) with
pairwise correlations. Panel B does not show any significant pairwise correlations between
changes in logged expenditure/revenue categories and changes in fund balances per capita at the
five percent level, suggesting changes in revenues and expenditures are not associated with
changes in future fund balances. The only independent variables included simultaneously in my
Equation (2) with pairwise correlations greater than 0.40 (or -0.40) are OpExpPcnt and
CapOutPcnt.
[TABLE 3.3 ABOUT HERE]
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Multivariate Results
Equation (1) tests H1 and H2 by using pooled OLS to analyze how GASB 54 flexible
fund balances (in thousands of dollars per capita) are associated with future debt characteristics.
Rating (i.e., H2) is anticipated to have a positive relationship with flexible fund balances, while
TIC (i.e., H1) is expected to have a negative relationship with flexible fund balances.
Table 3.4 displays regression results for Equation (1). When TIC is the dependent
variable, I find a significant negative coefficient in Column [1] at the five percent level for
UnrestrictedPC (-0.199; p = 0.014). This lends some support for H1 and suggests that a $1,000
increase in per capita unrestricted fund balance reduces the TIC by 0.199, other things constant.
When the independent variable of interest is measured with UnassignedPC in Column [2], I also
find evidence of support for H1 with a negative association with TIC (-0.235; p = 0.045). With
other things constant, a $1,000 increase in unassigned fund balance decreases future true interest
cost by 0.235. These findings provide support that municipal bond analysts recognize
municipalities with higher amounts of both flexible governmental fund balance measures, and
subsequently charge slightly less interest on future bonds (Apostolou et al. 2014; Reck and
Wilson 2014).
[TABLE 3.4 ABOUT HERE]
Columns [3] and [4] examine Equation (1) with Rating as the dependent variable. The
coefficient estimate for UnrestrictedPC is insignificant. However, a significant positive
relationship is found between UnassignedPC and Rating at the five percent significance level
(1.017; p = 0.014), lending some support for H2 (Marlowe 2011). This finding highlights that a
$1,000 increase in per capita unassigned balance would roughly increase the future Moody’s

202

bond rating by one full level (e.g., Aa2 to Aa1). Based on these results, a bond rating agency
values the most flexible fund balance information in assessing the risk of not repaying a bond.
Overall, municipal bond analysts and bond raters seem to reward municipalities with higher
flexible governmental fund balances by providing more favorable bond characteristics.
Besides H1 and H2, the results in Table 3.4 demonstrate several other important findings.
First, Maturity has a significant positive relationship with TIC (p < 0.01) in Columns [1] and [2],
which is logical since longer debt obligations generally increase the amount of interest required
(the negative relationship is less pronounced with Rating). Second, Columns [1]-[4] reveals
significant positive associations between IncomePC and TIC and negative associations between
IncomePC and Rating (all p < 0.01). This could be interpreted that bond raters feel municipalities
with higher wealth are more financial stable and less likely to have default risk. Last, the
sample’s TIC has a significant growth in 2012-2014 and Rating has a significant decline on
average in both 2013 and 2014, all compared to the 2011 base year, suggesting more risk and
less favorable municipal GO bond characteristics as time has continued.
Equation (2) assesses RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3 via pooled OLS to examine how changes in
flexible fund balances (in thousands of dollars per capita) are related to future changes in logged
expenditure and revenue compositions. I make no directional predictions with ΔExpCat and
ΔRevCat variables and their respective associations with flexible fund balances.
Table 3.5 displays results of RQ1 (i.e., the relationship between changes in flexible fund
balances and changes in future expenditure types). The estimate for ΔUnrestrictedPC shows
some evidence of having an association with future ΔLogOpExp (0.046; p = 0.054) in Column
[1] at the ten percent significance level. The relationship between ΔUnassignedPC and
ΔLogOpExp is insignificant in Column [2] (Hendrick 2006), suggesting that increasing
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operational expenditures (e.g., salaries and wages) may be more explained by prior internally
allocated funding (e.g., committed balances) than the most freely used amounts. When the
dependent variable is ΔLogCapOut in Columns [3] and [4], the coefficient estimate is
insignificant for ΔUnrestrictedPC but negative and significant for ΔUnassignedPC (-0.295; p =
0.007), respectively. This result could entail that growth in the most flexible balances are used
for other purposes than capital projects. Additionally, the lack of findings could indicate that
future operating and capital spending are somewhat inelastic (i.e., services and capital project
spending is expected by citizens even when poor financial conditions arise) (Jimenez 2014).
[TABLE 3.5 ABOUT HERE]
Interestingly, only ΔLogOpExp (but not ΔLogCapOut) are significantly higher when
municipalities have more current debt outstanding per capita (DebtOutPC) (p < 0.05). This could
entail that municipalities often utilize debt proceeds to fund future operating spending and not for
capital projects. The negative associations in Columns [3] and [4] between Unemp and
ΔLogCapOut (p < 0.10) suggest that municipalities suppress capital spending when the prior year
has poorer economic conditions. With a significant positive relationship between CapOutPcnt
and ΔLogOpExp in Columns [1] and [2] (p < 0.01) and a significant negative relationship
between CapOutPcnt and ΔLogCapOut in Columns [3] and [4] (p < 0.01), the suggestion is that
higher (lower) percentages of capital outlays to total expenditures may result in higher (lower)
costs in operations (e.g., inventory or personnel) after fixed asset purchases or completed
construction. Also, higher percentages of capital outlays could lead to future capital spending
reductions from increased efficiencies (e.g., decreased maintenance costs).
Table 3.6 shows the Equation (2) results based on RQ2 (i.e., the association between
changes in flexible fund balances and changes in future own-source revenue compositions). A
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negative coefficient for ΔUnrestrictedPC and ΔLogPropTax in Column [1] (-0.055; p = 0.068)
suggests that property taxes are raised in response to lower flexible fund balances (Wang and
Hou 2012). Alternatively, future property taxes would be lowered to compensate for higher
accumulated unrestricted balances (potentially increasing citizen satisfaction). The coefficient
estimate for ΔUnassignedPC in Column [2] is insignificant, however. Significant coefficients of
-0.098 (p = 0.023) for ΔUnrestrictedPC in Column [3] and -0.077 (p = 0.071) for
ΔUnassignedPC in Column [4] when the dependent variable is ΔLogServFees could indicate that
municipalities increase service charges to stabilize their financial condition (Jimenez 2014). The
results highlight that municipalities can reduce pressure on property taxes and user fees under
higher financial flexibility. The insignificant coefficient estimates in Columns [5] and [6] for
changes in flexible fund balance signals that future debt increases (ΔLogDebtIss) may be issued
for other reasons outside of bolstering financial condition (e.g., capital spending).
[TABLE 3.6 ABOUT HERE]
Estimates for IncomePC indicate that higher wealth promotes greater future service fee
growth in Columns [3] and [4] (p < 0.05) and more future long-term debt issued in Columns [5]
and [6] (p < 0.10), possibly due to higher municipal expenditure expectations. Both Unemp and
CouncilMgr are significantly positive (p < 0.05) in Columns [5] and [6], which provides
evidence debt issuances become more important under economic stress and with municipal
managers having potentially higher financial expertise. Lower services fees (p < 0.01) and
intergovernmental revenues (p < 0.05) as a percentage of total revenues (ServFeesPcnt and
IGRevPcnt, respectively) show a negative association to ΔLogServFees in Columns [3] and [4].
Thus, municipalities with lower percentages of service fees or intergovernmental revenues may
boost finances with service fees increases in the future. A negative estimate for DebtIssPcnt (p <
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0.01) when the dependent variable is ΔLogDebtIss in Columns [5] and [6] is indicating little
persistence in debt issuances over time.
Table 3.7 contains the estimation results for RQ3 (i.e., how changes in flexible fund
balances affect changes in future intergovernmental revenues). In Columns [1] and [2], neither
flexible fund balance change variable is significant with future total intergovernmental revenue
changes (ΔLogIGRev), suggesting some potential noise in combining different intergovernmental
revenue types. The negative estimates for ΔUnrestrictedPC in Column [3] (-0.257; p = 0.029)
and ΔUnassignedPC in Column [4] (-0.252; p = 0.051) when the dependent variable is
ΔLogFedIGRev demonstrates the federal government tends to target municipalities with
declining finances for their future aid transfers (Johnson 1985). A negative association at the ten
percent significance level between ΔUnrestrictedPC and ΔLogStIGRev (-0.215; p = 0.058) in
Column [5] shows some evidence that state government provides more future transfers to
municipalities with lower discretionary fund balances. The coefficient for ΔUnrestrictedPC is
insignificant in Column [6]. Based on the overall results, I find evidence that higher governments
support municipalities more when they have lower flexible fund reserves (especially at the
federal level).
[TABLE 3.7 ABOUT HERE]
Supporting the argument that federal government intergovernmental transfers are “needsbased,” I find negative estimates for municipality wealth (IncomePC) (p < 0.10) and positive
estimates for unemployment (Unemp) (p < 0.05) in Columns [3] and [4]. The CouncilMgr
variable shows significant positive estimates in Columns [3] and [4] and negative estimates in
Columns [5] and [6] (p < 0.05). This potentially indicates a greater skill in obtaining federal
grants, but generates lower revenue sharing with state taxes. Another finding is that each
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intergovernmental revenue category percentage is negatively associated with its future change
dependent variable (e.g., between StIGRevPcnt and ΔStLogIGRev). Ványolós (2009) suggests
that intergovernmental revenues have high degrees of unpredictability.

Supplemental Analyses
Even though several of my results suggest that future decisions are influenced by levels
or changes in flexible fund balances, there could be differing outcomes depending on whether a
municipality is under a “surplus” or “deficit” condition. For example, a municipality under a
surplus (deficit) might have more (less) flexibility to adjust revenues or expenditures as needed. I
define a “surplus” as having greater revenues than expenditures after other financing sources and
uses in time t as shown in the Statement of Revenues, Expenditures, and Changes in Fund
Balances for governmental funds. Likewise, I define a “deficit” as having greater expenditures
than revenues after other financing sources and uses in time t.
In Table 3.8, Panel A examines Equation (1) under a “surplus” condition. I find evidence
still supporting H1 and H2 with a negative association between UnrestrictedPC and TIC (-0.297;
p = 0.031) in Column [1] and with a positive association between UnassignedPC and Rating
(0.930; p = 0.037) in Column [4], respectively (Apostolou et al. 2014; Raglund 2017). This still
indicates favorable bond outcomes with higher levels of flexible fund balance types, even when
governmental funds’ revenues exceed expenditures. The results of Table 3.8, Panel B
investigating Equation (2) future expenditure changes (i.e., RQ1) with surplus observations show
both ΔUnrestrictedPC (0.081; p = 0.011) in Column [1] and ΔUnassignedPC (0.060; p = 0.095)
in Column [2] being positively associated with ΔLogOpExp. The finding supports municipalities
using some accumulated slack in flexible fund balances towards future operating expenditures
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(Hendrick 2006). However, there is no evidence that increases in flexible fund balances impacts
future capital spending changes (Jimenez 2014) since this spending could be somewhat inelastic.
[TABLE 3.8 ABOUT HERE]
Using surplus observations in Table 3.8, Panel C for assessing flexible fund balance
changes on future own-source revenue changes in Equation (2) (i.e., RQ2), the only significant
relationship of interest is between ΔUnassignedPC and ΔLogServFees at the ten percent
significance level (-0.123; p =0.084) in Column [4] (Jimenez 2014). This signals that many ownsource revenues stay stable if flexible fund balances change (Park 2017). Table 3.8, Panel D tests
the effect of flexible fund balance changes on future intergovernmental revenue changes (i.e.,
RQ3) with surplus municipalities. A significant negative coefficient for ΔUnassignedPC (-0.474;
p = 0.025) in Column [4] when the dependent variable is ΔLogFedIGRev informs again on the
federal government tending to support municipalities when flexible fund balance decreases,
despite fund revenues exceed expenditures. The changes on state intergovernmental revenues
with tax or revenue sharing may be outside of municipalities’ control.
Table 3.9, Panel A looks at Equation (1) with the flexible fund balances and future bond
outcomes relationship with deficit municipalities. The results are relatively weaker in Column
[1] between UnrestrictedPC and TIC (-0.192; p = 0.095) than in surplus conditions, and still
insignificant between UnassignedPC and TIC. Both coefficient estimates for UnrestrictedPC
(1.858; p = 0.049) and UnassignedPC (2.221; p = 0.020) are relatively more pronounced than
surplus observations when the bond outcome variable is Rating in Columns [3] and [4],
respectively. With about a two-grade increase associated with a $1,000 increase in either
unrestricted or unassigned balances per capita, bond raters appear to take a heightened interest in
flexible fund balances under deficit conditions.
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[TABLE 3.9 ABOUT HERE]
Panels B, C, and D in Table 3.9 investigate how changes in flexible fund balances are
associated with future changes in revenue or expenditure types (i.e., RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3,
respectively) when a deficit occurs. All results show no significance between any flexible fund
balance change independent variables and future specific revenue/expenditure change dependent
variables. This could entail that deficit conditions decrease municipalities’ financial flexibility to
adjust spending uses or funding sources as needed.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of my paper is to examine the outcomes of GASB 54-defined governmental
fund balance types within a sample of U.S. municipalities. Using fund balance amounts with
more flexible spending, I find evidence that higher levels of flexible fund balances lead to lower
future true interest costs and raise bond ratings in a municipal GO bond sample. My analysis
with a multi-year municipality sample also shows that changes of unrestricted funds are
positively associated with changes in future operating expenditures, while changes in these funds
are negatively associated with changes in future property tax revenues, service fees, and separate
intergovernmental revenue types. As well, a negative relationship is found between unassigned
balance changes and future capital spending changes. No evidence is found suggesting that
flexible fund balance changes impact future debt proceed changes. These findings imply that
current governmental fund balance flexibility has the potential to impact both future bond and
municipality-based outcomes.
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This study offers several contributions to prior research. Instead of focusing on a single
selected outcome, I examine how governmental fund balances influence outcomes from several
different perspectives (e.g., future bond factors and revenue ratios). Also, my study incorporates
different variable specifications based on the “spending flexibility” definitions provided by the
updated GASB 54 fund balances to investigate my hypothesized associations with each outcome.
Measuring fund balances at the total governmental funds level (instead of relying on the
narrower general fund) should offer more information in assessing how flexible fund balances
shape internal and external decisions.
Despite my contributions, there may be some limitations involved with my analysis.
Some municipalities issue multiple bonds within a fiscal year. So the current period independent
variables will be the same for every bond issuance in a given municipality-year. Thereby, my
bond model estimates may have added noise that does not account for prior bond issuance
characteristics in the same fiscal year (e.g., first bond issued in October 2012 and second bond
issued in December 2012). Also, unobserved factors may exist that influence decisions that are
difficult to control for (e.g., a finance officer’s tendency to either short- or long-term planning or
raising future expenditures to improve low citizen satisfaction).
Since GASB 54 fund balance classifications are suggested to provide better information
content to bond analysts than prior classifications, one avenue of future research could
investigate bond pricing efficiency. Furthermore, bond rating agencies should perceive less
uncertainty from the consistency and comparability of GASB 54 fund balances. This could lead
to fewer rating differences between multiple rating agencies. Another potential future
consideration is whether municipal officers strategically report information prior to bond
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issuance (e.g., Beck 2018). Specifically, municipalities may build flexible fund balances prior to
bond issuance to gain favorable ratings or interest costs.
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TABLE 3.1
Sample Selection

Panel A: Equation (2) Full Municipality-Year Changes Sample
Potential municipality-year observations from Rich et al. (2016) between 20112015 (364 x 5)
Less 2011 observations for changes in independent variables of interest
Less 2015 observations for future-specified dependent variables (t+1)
Less observations with missing CAFRs
Less observations missing unemployment and income data
Less observations missing Census financial data
Final sample of municipality-year observations (in changes)

1,820
(364)
(364)
(7)
(244)
(301)
540

Panel B: Equation (1) Individual Bond Sample
Number of individual bond issuances from the 364 municipalities in Rich et al.
(2016) between 2012-2015
Less observations with missing CAFRs
Less revenue bond observations
Less observations missing true interest cost or bond rating information
Less observations missing unemployment and income data
Less observations missing Census financial data
Final sample of individual general obligation bonds
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1,251
(18)
(398)
(579)
(5)
(19)
232

TABLE 3.2
Descriptive Statistics

Panel A: Individual Bond Sample (n = 232)
Variable
TIC(t+1)
Rating(t+1)
Unrestrictedt
Unassignedt
IncomePCt
DebtOutstt
Unempt
CouncilMgrt
IssueAmt(t+1)
Maturity(t+1)

Mean
2.46
19.42
65.01
23.66
46.59
782.23
6.32
0.66
21.88
15.80

Std. Dev.
0.80
1.26
81.09
36.64
10.97
1,780.48
2.41
0.47
34.56
5.80

Q1
1.87
19.00
18.38
6.13
39.07
122.57
4.55
0.00
5.93
10.85

Median
2.52
19.00
29.61
12.72
43.84
274.93
5.90
1.00
10.29
16.98

Q3
3.02
21.00
80.57
27.54
50.40
564.15
8.15
1.00
25.18
19.94

____________
Table 3.2, Panel A shows descriptive statistics for all variables used in Equation (1) (i.e., H1 and H2). Unrestricted
is the total combined committed, assigned, and unassigned governmental fund balances in millions of dollars.
Unassigned is the total unassigned governmental fund balance in millions of dollars. DebtOutst is the total debt
outstanding in millions of dollars. The remaining variable descriptions can be found in Appendix 3A.
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Panel B: Full Municipality-Year Sample (n = 540)
Variable
OpExp(t+1)
CapOut(t+1)
PropTax(t+1)
ServFees(t+1)
DebtIss(t+1)
IGRev(t+1)
FedIGRev(t+1)
StIGRev(t+1)
Unrestrictedt
Unassignedt
IncomePCt
DebtOutstt
Unempt
CouncilMgrt
OpExpPcntt
CapOutPcntt
SalesTaxPcntt
PropTaxPcntt
ServFeesPcntt
DebtIssPcntt
IGRevPcntt
FedIGRevPcntt
StIGRevPcntt

Mean
205.45
42.06
49.88
45.63
35.41
52.37
8.51
37.67
39.47
14.02
44.12
368.48
7.24
0.72
72.31
15.45
13.36
18.93
18.36
11.92
16.95
3.46
10.99

Std. Dev.
327.46
70.43
92.49
64.02
118.23
119.97
15.12
105.56
57.58
24.86
11.56
1,010.86
2.23
0.45
10.37
9.26
12.33
12.50
9.55
15.79
12.75
4.27
10.94

Q1
67.93
9.67
13.43
15.78
0.00
9.45
0.97
5.04
10.53
3.25
36.06
60.92
5.65
0.00
65.80
8.35
2.95
8.89
11.91
0.08
7.85
0.84
3.53

Median
114.06
21.11
25.08
26.21
8.28
20.42
3.14
10.76
21.65
9.35
41.15
129.91
7.00
1.00
73.57
13.72
10.04
16.48
17.69
6.63
13.08
2.19
7.59

Q3
223.64
45.20
51.74
47.85
31.25
43.78
9.54
24.57
45.19
18.97
48.89
301.21
8.45
1.00
79.26
20.96
20.57
26.65
23.22
17.00
23.79
4.64
14.63

____________
Table 3.2, Panel B shows descriptive statistics for all variables used in Equation (2) (i.e., RQ1-RQ3). Unrestricted is
the total combined committed, assigned, and unassigned governmental fund balances in millions of dollars.
Unassigned is the total unassigned governmental fund balance in millions of dollars. DebtOutst is the total debt
outstanding in millions of dollars. OpExp, CapOut, PropTax, ServFees, DebtIss, IGRev, FedIGRev, and StIGRev is
the total operating expenditures, capital outlays, property tax revenues, general service charges, long-term debt
issued, intergovernmental revenues, federal intergovernmental revenues, and state intergovernmental revenues,
respectively, in millions of dollars. The remaining variable descriptions can be found in Appendix 3A.
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TABLE 3.3
Pairwise Correlations

DebtOutPCt

1.00
-0.00
0.06
-0.02
0.21*
-0.01
-0.06

1.00
-0.05
-0.39*
-0.15*
0.07
0.10

1.00
-0.16*
0.02
0.23*
0.11

1.00
-0.06
-0.01
-0.10

1.00
-0.10
0.04

Maturity(t+1)

IncomePCt

1.00
0.77*
0.28*
0.01
-0.21*
0.32*
0.03
-0.03

IssueAmt(t+1)

UnassignedPCt

1.00
0.19*
0.13
0.33*
0.05
-0.33*
0.27*
0.02
-0.05

CouncilMgrt

UnrestrictedPCt

1.00
-0.18*
-0.09
-0.06
0.01
0.12
-0.05
-0.03
0.17*
0.78*

Unempt

Rating(t+1)

TIC(t+1)
Rating(t+1)
UnrestrictedPCt
UnassignedPCt
IncomePCt
DebtOutPCt
Unempt
CouncilMgrt
IssueAmt(t+1)
Maturity(t+1)

TIC(t+1)

Panel A: Equation (1) Individual Bond Sample (n = 232)

1.00
0.21*

1.00

____________
* represents significant correlations at the 5% level.
Table 3.3, Panel A shows pairwise correlations for all variables used in Equation (1) (i.e., H1 and H2). Variable
descriptions can be found in Appendix 3A.
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ΔLogCapOut(t+1)

ΔLogPropTax(t+1)

ΔLogServFees(t+1)

ΔLogDebtIss(t+1)

ΔLogIGRev(t+1)

ΔLogFedIGRev(t+1)

ΔLogStIGRev(t+1)

ΔUnrestrictedPCt

ΔUnassignedPCt

ΔLogOpExp(t+1)
ΔLogCapOut(t+1)
ΔLogPropTax(t+1)
ΔLogServFees(t+1)
ΔLogDebtIss(t+1)
ΔLogIGRev(t+1)
ΔLogFedIGRev(t+1)
ΔLogStIGRev(t+1)
ΔUnrestrictedPCt
ΔUnassignedPCt
IncomePCt
DebtOutPCt
Unempt
CouncilMgrt
OpExpPcntt
CapOutPcntt
SalesTaxPcntt
PropTaxPcntt
ServFeesPcntt
DebtIssPcntt
IGRevPcntt
FedIGRevPcntt
StIGRevPcntt

ΔLogOpExp(t+1)

Panel B: Equation (2) Full Municipality-Year Changes Sample (n = 540)

1.00
0.00
0.06
0.34*
0.00
0.25*
0.03
0.12*
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.03
-0.08
-0.04
-0.13*
0.11*
-0.01
-0.06
-0.09*
0.07
-0.03
-0.05
-0.01

1.00
0.04
0.09*
0.08
0.25*
0.16*
0.25*
0.03
-0.06
0.13*
-0.03
-0.03
0.04
0.17*
-0.24*
0.01
0.03
-0.02
-0.04
-0.10*
-0.10*
-0.07

1.00
0.04
-0.11*
0.11*
0.07
0.08
-0.06
-0.07
0.07
0.02
-0.14*
-0.00
-0.03
0.03
0.00
0.01
-0.02
0.07
-0.00
-0.02
-0.01

1.00
0.13*
0.09*
0.02
0.07
-0.04
-0.03
0.09*
0.00
0.00
0.01
-0.09*
0.07
0.01
0.03
-0.18*
0.02
-0.03
0.03
-0.04

1.00
-0.04
-0.02
-0.04
-0.05
0.00
0.06
-0.09
0.10
0.04
0.16*
-0.09
0.04
-0.02
0.05
-0.44*
-0.02
-0.07
0.01

1.00
0.45*
0.61*
-0.04
-0.05
0.07
-0.03
-0.15*
-0.06
0.06
-0.06
-0.02
0.01
-0.03
0.06
-0.04
-0.15*
-0.00

1.00
0.03
-0.03
-0.04
0.00
0.00
-0.05
0.04
0.07
-0.10*
0.02
0.09
-0.04
0.03
-0.12*
-0.16*
-0.06

1.00
-0.07
-0.05
0.07
0.04
-0.15*
-0.09*
0.02
-0.04
0.00
-0.01
-0.01
0.05
-0.02
-0.02
-0.02

1.00
0.85*
0.10*
0.00
0.01
0.08
-0.00
-0.01
0.03
0.04
-0.06
0.10*
-0.02
0.03
-0.02

1.00
0.03
-0.00
0.07
0.04
-0.03
0.02
0.04
0.02
-0.01
0.08*
-0.02
0.05
-0.02

Table 3.3, Panel B is continued on the next page.
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CouncilMgrt

OpExpPcntt

CapOutPcntt

SalesTaxPcntt

PropTaxPcntt

ServFeesPcntt

1.00
0.02
0.05
0.17*
-0.13*
0.08
0.01
-0.26*
0.09*
-0.27*

1.00
-0.76*
-0.22*
-0.06
0.01
-0.26*
-0.08
-0.26*
-0.01

1.00
0.28*
-0.14*
0.10*
0.26*
0.06
0.28*
-0.03

1.00
-0.35*
0.08
0.09*
-0.27*
-0.07
-0.27*

1.00
-0.17*
-0.03
0.15*
0.05
0.22*

1.00
0.05
-0.29*
-0.03
-0.29*

IGRevPcntt
FedIGRevPcntt
StIGRevPcntt

1.00
0.31*
0.87*

1.00
-0.00

1.00

DebtIssPcntt

Unempt
1.00
0.12*
0.14*
-0.20*
-0.09*
0.03
0.05
-0.12*
-0.04
-0.04
0.01

StIGRevPcntt

DebtOutPCt
1.00
-0.09*
-0.02
-0.15*
0.02
-0.04
-0.14*
-0.11*
0.18*
0.01
0.16*
-0.07
FedIGRevPcntt

IncomePCt
1.00
-0.06
-0.32*
-0.05
-0.04
-0.06
-0.02
0.30*
-0.10*
-0.04
0.08*
-0.06
0.07

IGRevPcntt

IncomePCt
DebtOutPCt
Unempt
CouncilMgrt
OpExpPcntt
CapOutPcntt
SalesTaxPcntt
PropTaxPcntt
ServFeesPcntt
DebtIssPcntt
IGRevPcntt
FedIGRevPcntt
StIGRevPcntt

1.00
-0.01
0.07
-0.04

____________
* represents significant correlations at the 5% level.
Table 3.3, Panel B shows pairwise correlations for all variables used in Equation (2) (i.e., RQ1-RQ3). Variable
descriptions can be found in Appendix 3A.
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TABLE 3.4
The Relationship between Fund Balance Flexibility and Future Bond Outcomes

IVs\DVs
UnrestrictedPCt

[1]
TIC(t+1)
-0.199**
(0.014)

UnassignedPCt
IncomePCt
DebtOutPCt
Unempt
CouncilMgrt
IssueAmt(t+1)
Maturity(t+1)
2012.year
2013.year
2014.year
Constant

Observations
Adj R-squared

[2]
TIC(t+1)

-0.011***
(0.007)
-0.000
(0.996)
-0.020
(0.528)
0.009
(0.918)
-0.001
(0.499)
0.107***
(0.000)
0.491***
(0.000)
0.451***
(0.000)
0.331***
(0.007)
1.222***
(0.005)
232
0.705

[3]
Rating(t+1)

[4]
Rating(t+1)

0.406
(0.357)
-0.235**
(0.045)
-0.013***
(0.001)
0.000
(0.977)
-0.023
(0.455)
-0.035
(0.668)
-0.001
(0.438)
0.108***
(0.000)
0.488***
(0.000)
0.451***
(0.000)
0.323***
(0.008)
1.334***
(0.002)
232
0.703

0.047***
(0.003)
-0.001
(0.952)
-0.238*
(0.073)
0.111
(0.790)
-0.000
(0.870)
-0.026*
(0.054)
-0.359
(0.109)
-0.493**
(0.034)
-0.883***
(0.002)
19.278***
(0.000)
232
0.514

1.017**
(0.014)
0.057***
(0.000)
-0.003
(0.873)
-0.256*
(0.057)
0.066
(0.870)
-0.000
(0.926)
-0.025*
(0.069)
-0.371
(0.107)
-0.574**
(0.014)
-0.972***
(0.001)
18.981***
(0.000)
232
0.542

____________
*, **, and *** represent significant coefficients at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Table 3.4 shows pooled OLS estimates for H1 and H2 using Equation (1). The unit of observation is an individual
bond issuance based on the year that sale date (t+1) follows the CPA signing date of the prior fiscal year’s CAFR (t).
The dependent variable within Columns [1] and [2] is the true interest cost (TIC), while the dependent variable
within Columns [3] and [4] is the Moody’s long-term rating (Rating). All dependent variables are measured at time
t+1. All specifications include yearly indicator variables, absorbed state indicator variables, and municipalityclustered standard errors. Variable descriptions can be found in Appendix 3A.

223

TABLE 3.5
The Relationship between Fund Balance Flexibility and Future Expenditure Categories

IVs\DVs
ΔUnrestrictedPCt
ΔUnassignedPCt
IncomePCt
DebtOutPCt
Unempt
CouncilMgrt
OpExpPcntt
CapOutPcntt
2013.year
2014.year
Constant

Observations
Adj R-squared

[1]
ΔLogOpExp(t+1)

[2]
ΔLogOpExp(t+1)

0.046*
(0.054)

0.000
(0.488)
0.001**
(0.025)
-0.003
(0.238)
-0.006
(0.516)
0.001
(0.372)
0.002***
(0.006)
0.030**
(0.029)
-0.001
(0.934)
-0.067
(0.301)
540
0.048

[3]
ΔLogCapOut(t+1)

[4]
ΔLogCapOut(t+1)

-0.011
(0.960)
0.039
(0.135)
0.000
(0.413)
0.001**
(0.017)
-0.003
(0.246)
-0.004
(0.627)
0.001
(0.365)
0.002***
(0.006)
0.030**
(0.029)
-0.001
(0.938)
-0.071
(0.270)
540
0.046

0.003
(0.320)
-0.002
(0.463)
-0.031**
(0.050)
0.019
(0.765)
0.001
(0.821)
-0.023***
(0.000)
-0.075
(0.200)
-0.058
(0.470)
0.420
(0.284)
535
0.090

-0.295***
(0.007)
0.003
(0.305)
-0.002
(0.488)
-0.031*
(0.055)
0.024
(0.704)
0.001
(0.847)
-0.023***
(0.000)
-0.072
(0.215)
-0.071
(0.393)
0.423
(0.288)
535
0.096

____________
*, **, and *** represent significant coefficients at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Table 3.5 shows pooled OLS estimates for RQ1 using Equation (2). The unit of observation is a municipality-year.
The dependent variable within Columns [1] and [2] is the change in natural log of total operating expenditures
(ΔLogOpExp), while the dependent variable within Columns [3] and [4] is the change in natural log of total capital
outlays (ΔLogCapOut). All dependent variables are measured in changes from time t to t+1, whereas the
independent variables of interest (i.e., ΔUnrestrictedPC and ΔUnassignedPC) are measured in changes from time t-1
to t. All specifications include yearly indicator variables, absorbed state indicator variables, and municipalityclustered standard errors. Variable descriptions can be found in Appendix 3A.
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TABLE 3.6
The Relationship between Fund Balance Flexibility and Future Revenue Categories

IVs\DVs
ΔUnrestrictedPCt
ΔUnassignedPCt
IncomePCt
DebtOutPCt
Unempt
CouncilMgrt
SalesTaxPcntt
PropTaxPcntt
ServFeesPcntt
DebtIssPcntt
IGRevPcntt
2013.year
2014.year
Constant

Observations
Adj R-squared

[1]
ΔLogPropTax(t+1)

[2]
ΔLogPropTax(t+1)

-0.055*
(0.068)

-0.000
(0.488)
-0.001
(0.185)
-0.009
(0.133)
-0.016
(0.346)
0.000
(0.626)
-0.000
(0.533)
-0.001
(0.352)
0.000
(0.164)
-0.001*
(0.061)
0.021*
(0.059)
-0.014
(0.583)
0.128
(0.101)
537
0.040

[3]
ΔLogServFees(t+1)

[4]
ΔLogServFees(t+1)

-0.098**
(0.023)
-0.055
(0.127)
-0.000
(0.424)
-0.001
(0.177)
-0.010
(0.128)
-0.018
(0.294)
0.000
(0.560)
-0.000
(0.489)
-0.001
(0.401)
0.000
(0.182)
-0.001*
(0.067)
0.021*
(0.064)
-0.015
(0.560)
0.132*
(0.092)
537
0.039

0.002**
(0.022)
-0.001
(0.327)
0.008
(0.210)
-0.001
(0.971)
0.000
(0.762)
-0.002
(0.129)
-0.006***
(0.002)
0.000
(0.642)
-0.002**
(0.033)
0.042**
(0.026)
0.012
(0.764)
0.024
(0.781)
540
0.033
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[5]
ΔLogDebtIss(t+1)

[6]
ΔLogDebtIss(t+1)

-1.097
(0.190)
-0.077*
(0.071)
0.002**
(0.025)
-0.001
(0.318)
0.008
(0.225)
-0.004
(0.853)
0.000
(0.689)
-0.002
(0.112)
-0.006***
(0.003)
0.000
(0.699)
-0.002**
(0.039)
0.041**
(0.029)
0.012
(0.776)
0.031
(0.716)
540
0.030

0.022*
(0.070)
-0.002
(0.838)
0.276**
(0.011)
0.394**
(0.017)
0.027
(0.100)
0.001
(0.947)
0.003
(0.778)
-0.061***
(0.000)
-0.008
(0.382)
0.348
(0.210)
0.772**
(0.030)
-2.742**
(0.035)
325
0.181

-1.051
(0.488)
0.022*
(0.079)
-0.003
(0.819)
0.270**
(0.013)
0.351**
(0.027)
0.028*
(0.087)
-0.002
(0.899)
0.004
(0.716)
-0.061***
(0.000)
-0.008
(0.370)
0.331
(0.232)
0.744**
(0.033)
-2.610**
(0.041)
325
0.179

____________
*, **, and *** represent significant coefficients at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Table 3.6 shows pooled OLS estimates for RQ2 using Equation (2). The unit of observation is a municipality-year. The dependent variable within Columns [1]
and [2] is the change in natural log of total property tax revenues (ΔLogPropTax), the dependent variable within Columns [3] and [4] is the change in natural log
of total general service changes (ΔLogServFees), and the dependent variable within Columns [5] and [6] is the change in natural log of total new long-term debt
issued (ΔLogDebtIss). All dependent variables are measured in changes from time t to t+1, whereas the independent variables of interest (i.e., ΔUnrestrictedPC
and ΔUnassignedPC) are measured in changes from time t-1 to t. All specifications include yearly indicator variables, absorbed state indicator variables, and
municipality-clustered standard errors. Variable descriptions can be found in Appendix 3A.
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TABLE 3.7
The Relationship between Fund Balance Flexibility and Future Intergovernmental Revenue Categories

IVs\DVs
ΔUnrestrictedPCt
ΔUnassignedPCt
IncomePCt
DebtOutPCt
Unempt
CouncilMgrt
SalesTaxPcntt
PropTaxPcntt
ServFeesPcntt
DebtIssPcntt
IGRevPcntt

[1]
ΔLogIGRev(t+1)

[2]
ΔLogIGRev(t+1)

-0.115
(0.128)

0.000
(0.877)
-0.003
(0.301)
-0.009
(0.374)
-0.031
(0.338)
-0.001
(0.790)
-0.001
(0.609)
-0.002
(0.160)
0.001
(0.443)
-0.007***
(0.000)

-0.106
(0.100)
0.000
(0.936)
-0.003
(0.303)
-0.010
(0.360)
-0.035
(0.281)
-0.001
(0.832)
-0.001
(0.577)
-0.002
(0.174)
0.001
(0.464)
-0.007***
(0.000)

StIGRevPcntt

2014.year
Constant

Observations
Adj R-squared

0.029
(0.403)
0.018
(0.677)
0.251
(0.122)
540
0.073

[4]
ΔLogFedIGRev(t+1)

-0.257**
(0.029)

FedIGRevPcntt

2013.year

[3]
ΔLogFedIGRev(t+1)

0.028
(0.415)
0.016
(0.702)
0.259
(0.112)
540
0.071

[5]
ΔLogStIGRev(t+1)

[6]
ΔLogStIGRev(t+1)

-0.215*
(0.058)

-0.007*
(0.075)
0.012**
(0.022)
-0.039
(0.340)
0.251**
(0.013)
0.007
(0.283)
0.004
(0.387)
-0.006
(0.175)
0.001
(0.787)

-0.252*
(0.051)
-0.008*
(0.065)
0.012**
(0.022)
-0.039
(0.332)
0.242**
(0.016)
0.007
(0.253)
0.004
(0.418)
-0.005
(0.191)
0.000
(0.825)

0.001
(0.511)
-0.000
(0.957)
-0.001
(0.919)
-0.097**
(0.045)
0.002
(0.610)
-0.001
(0.788)
-0.002
(0.493)
0.002
(0.239)

-0.145
(0.163)
0.001
(0.587)
-0.000
(0.959)
-0.002
(0.870)
-0.105**
(0.033)
0.002
(0.562)
-0.001
(0.730)
-0.001
(0.549)
0.001
(0.285)

-0.052***
(0.000)
-0.007
(0.206)
-0.131
(0.144)
-0.131
(0.304)
0.570
(0.290)

-0.052***
(0.000)
-0.007
(0.214)
-0.133
(0.141)
-0.134
(0.295)
0.587
(0.276)

0.000
(0.985)
-0.012***
(0.001)
0.020
(0.691)
0.066
(0.221)
0.121
(0.607)

0.000
(0.988)
-0.011***
(0.001)
0.018
(0.723)
0.066
(0.231)
0.137
(0.561)

493
0.054
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493
0.053

537
0.072

537
0.068

____________
*, **, and *** represent significant coefficients at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Table 3.7 shows pooled OLS estimates for RQ3 using Equation (2). The unit of observation is a municipality-year. The dependent variable within Columns [1]
and [2] is the change in natural log of total intergovernmental revenues (ΔLogIGRev), the dependent variable within Columns [3] and [4] is the change in natural
log of federal intergovernmental revenues (ΔLogFedIGRev), and the dependent variable within Columns [5] and [6] is the change in natural log of state
intergovernmental revenues (ΔLogStIGRev). All dependent variables are measured in changes from time t to t+1, whereas the independent variables of interest
(i.e., ΔUnrestrictedPC and ΔUnassignedPC) are measured in changes from time t-1 to t. All specifications include yearly indicator variables, absorbed state
indicator variables, and municipality-clustered standard errors. Variable descriptions can be found in Appendix 3A.
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TABLE 3.8
Fund Balance Flexibility Outcomes under Surplus Condition

Panel A: Fund Balance Flexibility and Future Bond Outcomes under Surplus
IVs\DVs
UnrestrictedPCt

[1]
TIC(t+1)
-0.297**
(0.031)

UnassignedPCt
IncomePCt
DebtOutPCt
Unempt
CouncilMgrt
IssueAmt(t+1)
Maturity(t+1)
2012.year
2013.year
2014.year
Constant

Observations
Adj R-squared

[2]
TIC(t+1)

-0.004
(0.539)
0.003
(0.819)
0.028
(0.515)
0.033
(0.779)
-0.003
(0.140)
0.106***
(0.000)
0.724***
(0.000)
0.628***
(0.000)
0.546***
(0.000)
0.540
(0.354)
136
0.697

[3]
Rating(t+1)

[4]
Rating(t+1)

-0.021
(0.967)
-0.275
(0.199)
-0.009
(0.188)
0.004
(0.804)
0.012
(0.767)
-0.093
(0.316)
-0.003
(0.182)
0.107***
(0.000)
0.705***
(0.000)
0.612***
(0.000)
0.496***
(0.000)
0.855
(0.120)
136
0.688

0.050***
(0.006)
-0.022
(0.505)
-0.159
(0.338)
-0.020
(0.961)
-0.000
(0.956)
-0.025
(0.108)
-0.210
(0.439)
0.097
(0.757)
-0.498
(0.167)
18.702***
(0.000)
136
0.583

0.930**
(0.037)
0.069***
(0.001)
-0.019
(0.548)
-0.223
(0.204)
-0.262
(0.557)
-0.000
(0.884)
-0.019
(0.200)
-0.318
(0.229)
-0.100
(0.741)
-0.761**
(0.030)
18.105***
(0.000)
136
0.613

____________
*, **, and *** represent significant coefficients at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Table 3.8, Panel A shows pooled OLS estimates for H1 and H2 using Equation (1) when total governmental funds’
revenues exceed total governmental funds’ expenditures after other financing sources/uses in time t (i.e., surplus
condition). The unit of observation is an individual bond issuance based on the year that sale date (t+1) follows the
CPA signing date of the prior fiscal year’s CAFR (t). The dependent variable within Columns [1] and [2] is the true
interest cost (TIC), while the dependent variable within Columns [3] and [4] is the Moody’s long-term rating
(Rating). All dependent variables are measured at time t+1. All specifications include yearly indicator variables,
absorbed state indicator variables, and municipality-clustered standard errors. Variable descriptions can be found in
Appendix 3A.
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Panel B: Fund Balance Flexibility and Future Expenditure Categories under Surplus
IVs\DVs
ΔUnrestrictedPCt
ΔUnassignedPCt
IncomePCt
DebtOutPCt
Unempt
CouncilMgrt
OpExpPcntt
CapOutPcntt
2013.year
2014.year
Constant

Observations
Adj R-squared

[1]
ΔLogOpExp(t+1)

[2]
ΔLogOpExp(t+1)

0.081**
(0.011)

-0.000
(0.786)
0.001
(0.580)
-0.002
(0.521)
-0.008
(0.471)
0.000
(0.807)
0.002*
(0.099)
0.034
(0.140)
0.007
(0.681)
-0.019
(0.841)
302
-0.001

[3]
ΔLogCapOut(t+1)

[4]
ΔLogCapOut(t+1)

0.179
(0.718)
0.060*
(0.095)
-0.000
(0.989)
0.001
(0.314)
-0.002
(0.594)
-0.005
(0.654)
0.000
(0.742)
0.002*
(0.094)
0.034
(0.138)
0.006
(0.705)
-0.036
(0.703)
302
-0.009

0.001
(0.732)
0.002
(0.797)
-0.045**
(0.038)
0.008
(0.937)
0.003
(0.383)
-0.016**
(0.017)
-0.111
(0.172)
0.048
(0.692)
0.279
(0.535)
300
0.059

-0.458
(0.100)
0.001
(0.724)
0.006
(0.425)
-0.040*
(0.062)
0.022
(0.812)
0.004
(0.363)
-0.016**
(0.017)
-0.103
(0.202)
0.045
(0.713)
0.226
(0.607)
300
0.067

____________
*, **, and *** represent significant coefficients at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Table 3.8, Panel B shows pooled OLS estimates for RQ1 using Equation (2) when total governmental funds’
revenues exceed total governmental funds’ expenditures after other financing sources/uses in time t (i.e., surplus
condition). The unit of observation is a municipality-year. The dependent variable within Columns [1] and [2] is the
change in natural log of total operating expenditures (ΔLogOpExp), while the dependent variable within Columns
[3] and [4] is the change in natural log of total capital outlays (ΔLogCapOut). All dependent variables are measured
in changes from time t to t+1, whereas the independent variables of interest (i.e., ΔUnrestrictedPC and
ΔUnassignedPC) are measured in changes from time t-1 to t. All specifications include yearly indicator variables,
absorbed state indicator variables, and municipality-clustered standard errors. Variable descriptions can be found in
Appendix 3A.
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Panel C: Fund Balance Flexibility and Future Revenue Categories under Surplus
IVs\DVs
ΔUnrestrictedPCt
ΔUnassignedPCt
IncomePCt
DebtOutPCt
Unempt
CouncilMgrt
SalesTaxPcntt
PropTaxPcntt
ServFeesPcntt
DebtIssPcntt
IGRevPcntt
2013.year
2014.year
Constant

Observations
Adj R-squared

[1]
ΔLogPropTax(t+1)

[2]
ΔLogPropTax(t+1)

-0.050
(0.305)

-0.001
(0.127)
-0.003
(0.183)
-0.018**
(0.020)
-0.012
(0.611)
0.001
(0.537)
-0.000
(0.588)
-0.000
(0.884)
0.000
(0.630)
-0.001
(0.292)
0.015
(0.259)
-0.033
(0.355)
0.234**
(0.020)
301
0.068

[3]
ΔLogServFees(t+1)

[4]
ΔLogServFees(t+1)

-0.082
(0.162)
-0.064
(0.306)
-0.001
(0.106)
-0.003
(0.181)
-0.018**
(0.019)
-0.014
(0.546)
0.001
(0.462)
-0.000
(0.549)
-0.000
(0.919)
0.000
(0.648)
-0.001
(0.298)
0.015
(0.265)
-0.033
(0.357)
0.237**
(0.018)
301
0.069

0.001
(0.227)
-0.004
(0.234)
0.005
(0.412)
-0.004
(0.883)
-0.001
(0.468)
-0.002
(0.273)
-0.003*
(0.099)
0.000
(0.778)
0.000
(0.951)
0.034
(0.200)
0.079*
(0.051)
0.035
(0.627)
302
-0.035

____________
*, **, and *** represent significant coefficients at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
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[5]
ΔLogDebtIss(t+1)

[6]
ΔLogDebtIss(t+1)

-0.568
(0.463)
-0.123*
(0.084)
0.001
(0.302)
-0.004
(0.254)
0.005
(0.408)
-0.007
(0.774)
-0.001
(0.601)
-0.002
(0.234)
-0.003
(0.103)
0.000
(0.769)
0.000
(0.914)
0.034
(0.204)
0.079**
(0.050)
0.040
(0.575)
302
-0.031

0.032*
(0.064)
0.008
(0.871)
0.321**
(0.014)
0.470
(0.159)
0.048
(0.191)
-0.009
(0.651)
0.026
(0.226)
-0.060***
(0.000)
-0.007
(0.778)
0.541
(0.133)
1.116***
(0.003)
-4.497***
(0.009)
187
0.200

-2.848
(0.137)
0.032*
(0.066)
0.024
(0.647)
0.316**
(0.013)
0.420
(0.191)
0.054
(0.147)
-0.015
(0.444)
0.032
(0.131)
-0.061***
(0.000)
-0.009
(0.714)
0.556
(0.121)
1.135***
(0.003)
-4.436***
(0.009)
187
0.209

Table 3.8, Panel C shows pooled OLS estimates for RQ2 using Equation (2) when total governmental funds’ revenues exceed total governmental funds’
expenditures after other financing sources/uses in time t (i.e., surplus condition). The unit of observation is a municipality-year. The dependent variable within
Columns [1] and [2] is the change in natural log of total property tax revenues (ΔLogPropTax), the dependent variable within Columns [3] and [4] is the change
in natural log of total general service changes (ΔLogServFees), and the dependent variable within Columns [5] and [6] is the change in natural log of total new
long-term debt issued (ΔLogDebtIss). All dependent variables are measured in changes from time t to t+1, whereas the independent variables of interest (i.e.,
ΔUnrestrictedPC and ΔUnassignedPC) are measured in changes from time t-1 to t. All specifications include yearly indicator variables, absorbed state indicator
variables, and municipality-clustered standard errors. Variable descriptions can be found in Appendix 3A.
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Panel D: Fund Balance Flexibility and Future Intergovernmental Revenue Categories under Surplus
IVs\DVs
ΔUnrestrictedPCt
ΔUnassignedPCt
IncomePCt
DebtOutPCt
Unempt
CouncilMgrt
SalesTaxPcntt
PropTaxPcntt
ServFeesPcntt
DebtIssPcntt
IGRevPcntt

[1]
ΔLogIGRev(t+1)

[2]
ΔLogIGRev(t+1)

-0.061
(0.484)

-0.002
(0.242)
-0.008
(0.332)
-0.018
(0.176)
-0.085*
(0.074)
0.002
(0.466)
0.004
(0.135)
0.001
(0.722)
-0.000
(0.911)
-0.007**
(0.014)

-0.095
(0.418)
-0.002
(0.213)
-0.008
(0.338)
-0.018
(0.180)
-0.087*
(0.064)
0.002
(0.423)
0.003
(0.144)
0.001
(0.714)
-0.000
(0.917)
-0.007**
(0.015)

StIGRevPcntt

2014.year
Constant

Observations
Adj R-squared

0.020
(0.690)
0.041
(0.526)
0.305
(0.149)
302
0.021

[4]
ΔLogFedIGRev(t+1)

-0.215
(0.426)

FedIGRevPcntt

2013.year

[3]
ΔLogFedIGRev(t+1)

0.019
(0.694)
0.042
(0.525)
0.309
(0.144)
302
0.021

[5]
ΔLogStIGRev(t+1)

[6]
ΔLogStIGRev(t+1)

-0.173
(0.257)

-0.010*
(0.083)
0.022
(0.156)
-0.090*
(0.054)
0.184*
(0.051)
0.021*
(0.060)
0.003
(0.528)
-0.000
(0.950)
-0.004
(0.279)

-0.474**
(0.025)
-0.010*
(0.066)
0.023
(0.140)
-0.089*
(0.061)
0.177*
(0.057)
0.022**
(0.045)
0.003
(0.601)
-0.000
(0.949)
-0.003
(0.297)

-0.002
(0.506)
-0.013
(0.230)
-0.009
(0.597)
-0.207***
(0.003)
0.008*
(0.070)
0.003
(0.364)
0.001
(0.754)
0.001
(0.572)

-0.032
(0.876)
-0.002
(0.441)
-0.014
(0.216)
-0.011
(0.525)
-0.216***
(0.003)
0.008*
(0.060)
0.003
(0.374)
0.002
(0.674)
0.001
(0.661)

-0.046***
(0.001)
-0.011
(0.493)
-0.079
(0.493)
-0.170
(0.328)
0.843
(0.174)

-0.046***
(0.001)
-0.009
(0.537)
-0.079
(0.490)
-0.168
(0.335)
0.842
(0.178)

0.005
(0.546)
-0.017***
(0.007)
0.018
(0.811)
0.118
(0.195)
0.265
(0.432)

0.004
(0.563)
-0.017***
(0.006)
0.015
(0.841)
0.117
(0.197)
0.287
(0.400)

272
0.112

____________
*, **, and *** represent significant coefficients at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
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272
0.117

301
0.119

301
0.116

Table 3.8, Panel D shows pooled OLS estimates for RQ3 using Equation (2) when total governmental funds’ revenues exceed total governmental funds’
expenditures after other financing sources/uses in time t (i.e., surplus condition). The unit of observation is a municipality-year. The dependent variable within
Columns [1] and [2] is the change in natural log of total intergovernmental revenues (ΔLogIGRev), the dependent variable within Columns [3] and [4] is the
change in natural log of federal intergovernmental revenues (ΔLogFedIGRev), and the dependent variable within Columns [5] and [6] is the change in natural log
of state intergovernmental revenues (ΔLogStIGRev). All dependent variables are measured in changes from time t to t+1, whereas the independent variables of
interest (i.e., ΔUnrestrictedPC and ΔUnassignedPC) are measured in changes from time t-1 to t. All specifications include yearly indicator variables, absorbed
state indicator variables, and municipality-clustered standard errors. Variable descriptions can be found in Appendix 3A.
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TABLE 3.9
Fund Balance Flexibility Outcomes under Deficit Condition

Panel A: Fund Balance Flexibility and Future Bond Outcomes under Deficit
IVs\DVs
UnrestrictedPCt

[1]
TIC(t+1)
-0.192*
(0.095)

UnassignedPCt
IncomePCt
DebtOutPCt
Unempt
CouncilMgrt
IssueAmt(t+1)
Maturity(t+1)
2012.year
2013.year
2014.year
Constant

Observations
Adj R-squared

[2]
TIC(t+1)

[3]
Rating(t+1)

[4]
Rating(t+1)

1.858**
(0.049)

-0.016
(0.120)
0.006
(0.222)
-0.061
(0.357)
0.066
(0.699)
-0.001
(0.644)
0.108***
(0.000)
0.356
(0.155)
0.448***
(0.009)
0.185
(0.574)
1.713*
(0.079)

-0.308
(0.157)
-0.017
(0.112)
0.006
(0.193)
-0.056
(0.395)
0.064
(0.698)
-0.001
(0.602)
0.107***
(0.000)
0.356
(0.165)
0.464***
(0.007)
0.193
(0.553)
1.723*
(0.086)

0.029
(0.259)
-0.009
(0.732)
-0.344**
(0.026)
-0.010
(0.983)
-0.000
(0.872)
-0.034*
(0.080)
0.029
(0.951)
-1.066**
(0.046)
-1.311***
(0.007)
20.925***
(0.000)

2.221**
(0.020)
0.038
(0.191)
-0.008
(0.793)
-0.387**
(0.024)
0.109
(0.830)
0.000
(0.952)
-0.031*
(0.096)
-0.038
(0.943)
-1.158**
(0.041)
-1.396***
(0.005)
21.041***
(0.000)

96
0.707

96
0.708

96
0.571

96
0.529

____________
*, **, and *** represent significant coefficients at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Table 3.9, Panel A shows pooled OLS estimates for H1 and H2 using Equation (1) when total governmental funds’
expenditures exceed total governmental funds’ revenues after other financing sources/uses in time t (i.e., deficit
condition). The unit of observation is an individual bond issuance based on the year that sale date (t+1) follows the
CPA signing date of the prior fiscal year’s CAFR (t). The dependent variable within Columns [1] and [2] is the true
interest cost (TIC), while the dependent variable within Columns [3] and [4] is the Moody’s long-term rating
(Rating). All dependent variables are measured at time t+1. All specifications include yearly indicator variables,
absorbed state indicator variables, and municipality-clustered standard errors. Variable descriptions can be found in
Appendix 3A.
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Panel B: Fund Balance Flexibility and Future Expenditure Categories under Deficit
IVs\DVs
ΔUnrestrictedPCt
ΔUnassignedPCt
IncomePCt
DebtOutPCt
Unempt
CouncilMgrt
OpExpPcntt
CapOutPcntt
2013.year
2014.year
Constant

Observations
Adj R-squared

[1]
ΔLogOpExp(t+1)

[2]
ΔLogOpExp(t+1)

-0.028
(0.519)

0.001
(0.172)
0.001**
(0.045)
-0.006
(0.339)
-0.002
(0.925)
0.001
(0.218)
0.003**
(0.041)
0.016
(0.398)
-0.032
(0.418)
-0.133
(0.229)
238
-0.053

[3]
ΔLogCapOut(t+1)

[4]
ΔLogCapOut(t+1)

-0.232
(0.266)
-0.004
(0.932)
0.001
(0.156)
0.001**
(0.042)
-0.006
(0.349)
-0.002
(0.910)
0.002
(0.199)
0.003**
(0.042)
0.017
(0.388)
-0.031
(0.439)
-0.141
(0.206)
238
-0.055

0.003
(0.492)
-0.004
(0.553)
-0.016
(0.606)
0.181
(0.268)
-0.004
(0.660)
-0.037***
(0.001)
0.019
(0.861)
-0.180
(0.141)
0.664
(0.450)
235
0.113

-0.267
(0.212)
0.003
(0.493)
-0.004
(0.552)
-0.017
(0.589)
0.180
(0.272)
-0.003
(0.693)
-0.036***
(0.001)
0.019
(0.856)
-0.190
(0.129)
0.649
(0.470)
235
0.115

____________
*, **, and *** represent significant coefficients at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Table 3.9, Panel B shows pooled OLS estimates for RQ1 using Equation (2) when total governmental funds’
expenditures exceed total governmental funds’ revenues after other financing sources/uses in time t (i.e., deficit
condition). The unit of observation is a municipality-year. The dependent variable within Columns [1] and [2] is the
change in natural log of total operating expenditures (ΔLogOpExp), while the dependent variable within Columns
[3] and [4] is the change in natural log of total capital outlays (ΔLogCapOut). All dependent variables are measured
in changes from time t to t+1, whereas the independent variables of interest (i.e., ΔUnrestrictedPC and
ΔUnassignedPC) are measured in changes from time t-1 to t. All specifications include yearly indicator variables,
absorbed state indicator variables, and municipality-clustered standard errors. Variable descriptions can be found in
Appendix 3A.
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Panel C: Fund Balance Flexibility and Future Revenue Categories under Deficit
IVs\DVs
ΔUnrestrictedPCt
ΔUnassignedPCt
IncomePCt
DebtOutPCt
Unempt
CouncilMgrt
SalesTaxPcntt
PropTaxPcntt
ServFeesPcntt
DebtIssPcntt
IGRevPcntt
2013.year
2014.year
Constant

Observations
Adj R-squared

[1]
ΔLogPropTax(t+1)

[2]
ΔLogPropTax(t+1)

-0.031
(0.538)

0.002
(0.212)
-0.000
(0.685)
0.011
(0.192)
-0.017
(0.441)
-0.002
(0.206)
-0.000
(0.885)
-0.001
(0.492)
0.000
(0.744)
-0.000
(0.655)
0.042**
(0.023)
0.040
(0.274)
-0.117
(0.339)
236
-0.101

[3]
ΔLogServFees(t+1)

[4]
ΔLogServFees(t+1)

-0.190
(0.109)
-0.021
(0.694)
0.002
(0.211)
-0.000
(0.686)
0.011
(0.193)
-0.018
(0.434)
-0.002
(0.208)
-0.000
(0.878)
-0.001
(0.502)
0.000
(0.750)
-0.000
(0.655)
0.043**
(0.022)
0.040
(0.274)
-0.117
(0.341)
236
-0.102

0.004**
(0.036)
-0.001
(0.471)
0.002
(0.885)
-0.019
(0.682)
0.001
(0.544)
-0.003
(0.123)
-0.008***
(0.000)
0.001
(0.523)
-0.004***
(0.009)
0.035
(0.336)
-0.107
(0.310)
0.133
(0.511)
238
0.103

____________
*, **, and *** represent significant coefficients at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
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[5]
ΔLogDebtIss(t+1)

[6]
ΔLogDebtIss(t+1)

0.464
(0.858)
-0.164
(0.206)
0.004**
(0.034)
-0.001
(0.439)
0.002
(0.901)
-0.021
(0.659)
0.001
(0.541)
-0.003
(0.114)
-0.008***
(0.000)
0.001
(0.541)
-0.004***
(0.009)
0.037
(0.321)
-0.111
(0.297)
0.140
(0.491)
238
0.098

0.021
(0.407)
-0.019
(0.184)
-0.029
(0.876)
0.107
(0.847)
0.016
(0.656)
0.013
(0.728)
-0.029
(0.200)
-0.066***
(0.000)
0.004
(0.884)
0.197
(0.708)
-0.267
(0.725)
0.674
(0.769)
138
0.054

1.045
(0.745)
0.022
(0.402)
-0.019
(0.213)
-0.029
(0.874)
0.078
(0.889)
0.017
(0.641)
0.013
(0.730)
-0.029
(0.205)
-0.066***
(0.000)
0.004
(0.882)
0.190
(0.717)
-0.219
(0.775)
0.652
(0.776)
138
0.055

Table 3.9, Panel C shows pooled OLS estimates for RQ2 using Equation (2) when total governmental funds’ expenditures exceed total governmental funds’
revenues after other financing sources/uses in time t (i.e., deficit condition). The unit of observation is a municipality-year. The dependent variable within
Columns [1] and [2] is the change in natural log of total property tax revenues (ΔLogPropTax), the dependent variable within Columns [3] and [4] is the change
in natural log of total general service changes (ΔLogServFees), and the dependent variable within Columns [5] and [6] is the change in natural log of total new
long-term debt issued (ΔLogDebtIss). All dependent variables are measured in changes from time t to t+1, whereas the independent variables of interest (i.e.,
ΔUnrestrictedPC and ΔUnassignedPC) are measured in changes from time t-1 to t. All specifications include yearly indicator variables, absorbed state indicator
variables, and municipality-clustered standard errors. Variable descriptions can be found in Appendix 3A.
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Panel D: Fund Balance Flexibility and Future Intergovernmental Revenue Categories under Deficit
IVs\DVs
ΔUnrestrictedPCt
ΔUnassignedPCt
IncomePCt
DebtOutPCt
Unempt
CouncilMgrt
SalesTaxPcntt
PropTaxPcntt
ServFeesPcntt
DebtIssPcntt
IGRevPcntt

[1]
ΔLogIGRev(t+1)

[2]
ΔLogIGRev(t+1)

-0.097
(0.223)

0.004
(0.284)
-0.002
(0.702)
0.005
(0.822)
0.059
(0.310)
-0.004
(0.344)
-0.007*
(0.096)
-0.002
(0.359)
0.001
(0.311)
-0.008**
(0.014)

-0.081
(0.148)
0.004
(0.280)
-0.002
(0.699)
0.005
(0.826)
0.059
(0.317)
-0.004
(0.346)
-0.007*
(0.095)
-0.002
(0.365)
0.001
(0.319)
-0.008**
(0.014)

StIGRevPcntt

2014.year
Constant

Observations
Adj R-squared

0.056
(0.263)
-0.047
(0.571)
0.088
(0.788)
238
0.104

[4]
ΔLogFedIGRev(t+1)

0.066
(0.779)

FedIGRevPcntt

2013.year

[3]
ΔLogFedIGRev(t+1)

0.057
(0.260)
-0.049
(0.558)
0.091
(0.781)
238
0.103

[5]
ΔLogStIGRev(t+1)

[6]
ΔLogStIGRev(t+1)

-0.146
(0.223)

-0.007
(0.182)
0.011*
(0.082)
0.009
(0.851)
0.406*
(0.094)
-0.008
(0.366)
0.006
(0.608)
0.000
(0.948)
0.004
(0.248)

0.177
(0.355)
-0.007
(0.192)
0.012*
(0.075)
0.010
(0.832)
0.408*
(0.091)
-0.008
(0.372)
0.006
(0.598)
0.000
(0.945)
0.004
(0.251)

0.003
(0.336)
0.008*
(0.071)
0.010
(0.570)
0.126**
(0.037)
-0.008
(0.118)
-0.005
(0.109)
-0.002
(0.497)
0.003*
(0.064)

-0.167
(0.170)
0.003
(0.336)
0.008*
(0.078)
0.010
(0.591)
0.124**
(0.038)
-0.008
(0.117)
-0.005
(0.104)
-0.002
(0.499)
0.003*
(0.066)

-0.057***
(0.003)
-0.009
(0.139)
-0.161
(0.201)
-0.174
(0.380)
0.115
(0.874)

-0.058***
(0.003)
-0.009
(0.146)
-0.161
(0.200)
-0.163
(0.413)
0.090
(0.901)

-0.020**
(0.024)
-0.006**
(0.023)
0.067
(0.234)
-0.000
(0.997)
-0.016
(0.952)

-0.020**
(0.026)
-0.006**
(0.019)
0.068
(0.231)
-0.006
(0.935)
-0.004
(0.989)

221
0.113

____________
*, **, and *** represent significant coefficients at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
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221
0.115

236
0.137

236
0.138

Table 3.9, Panel D shows pooled OLS estimates for RQ3 using Equation (2) when total governmental funds’ expenditures exceed total governmental funds’
revenues after other financing sources/uses in time t (i.e., deficit condition). The unit of observation is a municipality-year. The dependent variable within
Columns [1] and [2] is the change in natural log of total intergovernmental revenues (ΔLogIGRev), the dependent variable within Columns [3] and [4] is the
change in natural log of federal intergovernmental revenues (ΔLogFedIGRev), and the dependent variable within Columns [5] and [6] is the change in natural log
of state intergovernmental revenues (ΔLogStIGRev). All dependent variables are measured in changes from time t to t+1, whereas the independent variables of
interest (i.e., ΔUnrestrictedPC and ΔUnassignedPC) are measured in changes from time t-1 to t. All specifications include yearly indicator variables, absorbed
state indicator variables, and municipality-clustered standard errors. Variable descriptions can be found in Appendix 3A.
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APPENDIX 3A
Variable Descriptions

Variable
Dependent Variables
TIC
Rating

ExpCat

LogOpExp

LogCapOut

RevCat

LogPropTax

Description
True interest cost (in percentage) for each
bond issue
Moody’s long-term rating for each bond
issue, where 21 is the highest (i.e., Aaa
rating) and 1 is the lowest (i.e., C rating)
Represents each expenditure category
variable from RQ1 (i.e., LogOpExp and
LogCapOut)
The natural logarithm of total operating
expenditures (i.e., total expenditures less
capital outlays and intergovernmental
expenditures)
The natural logarithm of total capital
outlays (i.e., purchases and construction)
Represents each revenue category variable
from RQ2 (i.e., LogPropTax,
LogServFees, and LogDebtIss) and RQ3
(i.e., LogIGRev, LogFedIGRev, and
LogStIGRev)
The natural logarithm of total property tax
revenues

LogServFees

The natural logarithm of total general
service charges

LogDebtIss

The natural logarithm of total new longterm debt issued

LogIGRev

The natural logarithm of total
intergovernmental revenues

LogFedIGRev

The natural logarithm of total federal
intergovernmental revenues

LogStIGRev

The natural logarithm of total state
intergovernmental revenues

Independent Variables
UnrestrictedPC

Data Source
SDC Platinum
SDC Platinum

U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)
U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)
U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)
U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)

U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)
U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)
U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)
U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)
U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)
U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)

The total unrestricted governmental fund
CAFR-governmental funds
balance (i.e., the combined committed,
balance sheet
assigned, and unassigned fund balances) in
thousands of dollars per capita
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UnassignedPC
IncomePC
DebtOutPC

The total unassigned governmental fund
balance in thousands of dollars per capita
The county-level per capita income for a
municipality in thousands of dollars
The total debt outstanding in thousands of
dollars per capita

Unemp

The county-level unemployment rate (in
percentage) for a municipality

CouncilMgr

An indicator variable equal to one if the
municipality incorporates a councilmanager government form, otherwise
equal to zero
Issuance amounts in millions of dollars for
each bond issue
Years to maturity for each bond issue
Percentage of the total operating
expenditures to total expenditures

IssueAmt
Maturity
OpExpPcnt

CapOutPcnt

Percentage of the total capital outlays to
total expenditures

SalesTaxPcnt

Percentage of the total sales tax revenues
(general and selective) to total revenues

PropTaxPcnt

Percentage of the total property tax
revenues to total revenues

ServFeesPcnt

Percentage of the total general service
charges to total revenues

DebtIssPcnt

Percentage of the total long-term debt
issued to total revenues

IGRevPcnt

Percentage of the total intergovernmental
revenues to total revenues

FedIGRevPcnt

Percentage of the total federal
intergovernmental revenues to total
revenues
Percentage of the total state
intergovernmental revenues to total
revenues

StIGRevPcnt
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CAFR-governmental funds
balance sheet
American Community Survey
from the U.S. Census Bureau
U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)
Local Area Unemployment
Statistics from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics
ICMA (2011) Municipal Form
of Government Survey

SDC Platinum
SDC Platinum
U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)
U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)
U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)
U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)
U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)
U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)
U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)
U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)
U.S. Census Bureau
government finance data via
Pierson et al. (2015)
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